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The Efficiency of Monetary Control and 
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ABSTRACT
An analysis is made of the major factors determining 
financial innovation and financial change by building 
societies and banks, and the particular innovations 
introduced are examined. The effects of these institutional 
developments upon the growth rates of the broad monetary 
aggregates relative to nominal income are analysed.
Specific attention is paid to the personal sector's motives 
for holding money and particularly the willingness to hold 
interest-bearing money balances at building societies and 
banks. Special consideration is placed upon the abolition 
of the building societies' cartel, the removal of portfolio 
monetary controls on the retail banks and the entry of the
banks into the mortgage market. The effects of the 
abolition of the cartel on the effectiveness of monetary 
control are divided into finite stock effects and more 
continuing effects. The stock effects of credit 
liberalization upon the growth of the broad monetary 
aggregates and the confusion caused as to the
interpretation of monetary conditions are analysed, and an
econometric evaluation of the stock effects of credit 
liberalization on the personal sector's level of debt is 
carried out. In terms of more continuing effects it is 
hypothesized that the abolition of the cartel will have 
reduced the interest elasticity of the demand for money, 
but increased the interest elasticity of consumers' 
expenditure. These hypotheses are evaluated using standard 
error-correction models and co-integrating models of the 
demand for money and consumers' expenditure.
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This thesis presents an analysis of the efficiency of 
monetary control in relation to financial innovation by 
building societies and banks. The major underlying theme is 
the extreme importance of the nature and developments of the 
financial system for the efficient operation of monetary 
control. A central thematic argument implicit throughout is 
that the analysis and application of monetary control cannot 
be divorced from the financial system within which it 
operates.
The central tenets of monetarism and monetary control 
are set out in Chapter Two, and contrasted with the opposing 
Keynesian school. The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a monetarist policy of control of the money supply are 
outlined, alongside the Keynesian viewpoint as to the 
appropriate manner in which monetary policy should be 
conducted.
Recognition is given to the Institutionalist school 
which first warned of the lacuna that existed in the 
monetary economics literature as the result of an 
inappropriate paradigm within which to carry out an analysis 
of the monetary aspects of the economy. The framework of a 
static institutional system, an unchanging market 
environment, and the assumed passivity of financial 
institutions negated, according to the institutionalists, 
many of the central conclusions of the traditional monetary 
debate. A parallel is drawn between the strictures of the
-  1 -
institutionalist school as to the efficiency of monetary
control in a changing financial system with recent
conjectures as to the effects of financial innovation on
monetary control.
The viewpoint that financial innovation has in some way
affected monetary control appears widespread, and some
authors would go further in emphasizing the revolutionary
importance of innovation upon monetary economics,
"As deposits come to bear competitive interest rates 
monetary theory - models of money supply and demand and 
of the transmission of control measures and shocks 
through financial markets to the real economy - will 
have to be rewritten11.
(Tobin 1983, pl62) 
There has been a great deal of comment by the monetary 
authorities as to the effects of financial innovation and 
change on their policy instruments. Much of that conjecture 
has centred upon the developments in the building society 
and retail bank sectors, under the broad umbrella terms of 
liberalisation, innovation and financial change. Chapter 
Three surveys the various attempts at characterising the 
major determinants of financial innovation and for purposes 
of exposition an analytical framework incorporating the 
process of financial innovation within the monetary system 
is adopted. It is noted that there does not exist as yet a 
comprehensive study of the form and nature of the financial 
innovations that have occurred, the reasons for their 
occurrence, their effect on the efficiency of monetary 
control, or of their effect on the conduct of policy.
Attention is paid to the twin constraints of 
regulation and monetary control upon the activities of the
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building societies and the banks and the manner in which the 
market environment shaped and delineated the operational 
policies of these institutions. Particular note is made of 
the dynamic interaction between changes in the authorities* 
regulatory and monetary policies and changes in financial 
innovation. The possibility of regulatory induced innovation 
is examined with reference to changes in monetary control 
and the Medium Term Financial Strategy.
Sustaining the debate as to the effects of the monetary 
authorities' own monetary and regulatory policies upon the 
degree of financial innovation and change, the evidence as 
to the degree to which the activities of building societies 
and banks have becomes less demarcated as a result of 
regulatory induced innovation is assimilated.
The manner in which specific institutional factors such
as the mutuality of building societies and the building 
isocieties recommended rate system shaped the nature of 
competition between the mix of price and non-price factors, 
and hence limited the degree of financial innovation is 
fully analysed, as is the effect of the cartel on the 
desired portfolio balance of the personal sector.
The operation of the building societies' cartel is 
examined, and attention is drawn to the effect it had in 
smoothing building society interest rates and creating an 
excess demand for mortgages that varied with movements in 
general interest rates. An analysis is made of the expected 
effects of the abolition of the cartel both in terms of 
finite stock adjustments and more continuing effects such as 
structural changes in building societies' interest rate
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setting policies. Chapters Five and Six deal largely with 
the Stock adjustment effects of the abolition of the cartel 
and financial liberalization on the effectiveness of 
monetary control, and Chapter Seven examines in more detail 
the more continuing effects in relation to interest rates.
One of' the major economic conundrums of the 1 9 8 0 ’s has 
been the fall in the income velocity of circulation of the 
broad monetary aggregates. Having detailed the major 
innovations introduced by the building societies and banks 
in Chapter Four, Chapter Five examines the effect of these 
innovations in stock adjustment terms upon the growth rates 
of the monetary aggregates relative to nominal incomes. The 
fail in the income velocity of circulation is examined in 
terms of the effects of financial innovation on the personal 
sectors willingness to hold interest-bearing money balances.
The voluminous literature as to the meaning and 
definition of money is reviewed from the angle of the 
innovations introduced by building societies and banks, with 
detailed comment as to the changing motives for holding 
money. The problems and difficulties of interpreting 
monetary growth and controlling the money supply when the 
motives for holding money alter are synthesized with 
reference to the experience of monetary targeting in the 
M T F S .
An investigation into the regulatory convergence of 
building societies and banks and the consequences for the 
delineation of building society and bank activities leads to 
an assessment of the homogeneity and substitutability of 
their deposit liabilities, and an analysis of the necessity
-  4 -
for changing the monetary target for purposes of monetary 
control.
The analysis in Chapter Five of the stock affects of 
financial innovation upon the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates relative to nominal income leads to the 
hypothesis that the payment of interest on extremely liquid 
accounts at building societies and banks has been a major 
contributory factor in the breakdown of demand for broad 
money equations.
Attention is drawn to the dichotomy between monetary 
theory, which emphasizes money balances in the transmission 
process, and reality, where the money and credit markets 
interact to determine the transmission mechanism. Chapter 
Six examines the growth rates of the monetary aggregates 
relative to nominal incomes in terms of the demand for 
credit, with particular attention to the personal sector's 
demand for credit and stock adjustment effects that may have 
caused temporary instability.
Special consideration is placed upon the effect of the
iabolition of the building societies cartel, the entry of the 
banks into the mortgage market, and the liberalization of 
credit to the personal sector. The importance of the 
freeing-up of the mortgage market is isolated, and 
particularly the impact of the temporary stock adjustment to 
the personal sector's demand for money balances. Polar views 
as to the exogeneity or endogeneity of money are judged with 
reference to the behaviour of the building societies and 
banks under contrasting market conditions, and conclusions 
drawn as to the monetarist assumption of exogeneity. The
-  5 -
preliminary general hypothesis that financial innovation has 
in some way altered the money-income relationship is 
extended to nest the hypothesis that financial innovation 
and liberalization has also altered the credit-income 
relationship.
Parallels are drawn between the attempt of competition 
and credit control to promote control of the money supply in 
a freely competitive system with the attempt of the Medium 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). It is argued that the 
lessons from the GCC approach were not taken into account in 
the design and implementation of the MTFS, particularly in 
the form of the likely activities of the building societies 
and banks in a highly competitive market system. It is 
argued that the changing financial system during the period 
of the MTFS has enforced a move away from a dogmatic 
approach to monetary control towards a far more eclectic 
approach that recognizes the existence of institutional 
change.
The more continuing effects of financial innovation 
upon the effectiveness of monetary control are assessed in 
greater detail in Chapter Seven. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that the demand for money has become less 
interest elastic, but that consumer's expenditure has become 
more elastic with respect to interest rates as a result of 
greater flexibility and importance of interest rates 
following the abolition of the cartel.
The ability of the monetary authorities to control the 
money supply given the innovations outlined is analysed with 
reference to the effectiveness of interest rates as a
-  6 -
monetary instrument, and in terms of the applicability of 
monetary base control (MBC).
Chapter Eight critically examines the salient 
econometric literature on the demand for broad money 
function and the demand for credit in the U.K. Earlier 
econometric models of the demand for money are surveyed, 
with explicit consideration given to those studies that have 
attempted to model financial innovation as part of the 
function, and to both the econometric formulation and 
econometric methodology employed.
Chapter Nine sets out a theoretical model for 
evaluating ttie effects of financial innovation by building 
societies and banks. Standard error-correction and 
cointegrating models of the demand for money function for 
the non-bank private sector (NBPS) are estimated to analyse 
the earlier stated hypotheses that financial innovation has 
led to instability of the demand for money, and that the 
demand for money has become less elastic to interest 
differentials, and less elastic to general rates of 
interest. Also evaluated is the hypothesis that wealth has 
become an important variable in the demand for money 
function as the result of money becoming more popular for 
investment purposes.
Given the analysis of Chapter Five which emphasizes the 
homogeneity of building society and bank deposit 
liabilities, the M4 aggregate is used in the demand for 
money specification, rather than M3, which excludes building 
society deposits.
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The stock effects of the liberalization* of credit 
controls are analysed in terms of the demand for credit in 
Chapter Ten. An error-correction demand for credit function 
which incorporates a proxy for the liberalization of credit 
conditions is specified and the effects of a more 
competitive system quantified. A cointegration model is also 
used to corroborate the results.
The hypothesis of Chapter Seven that expenditure has 
become more sensitive to interest rates as a result of more 
flexible and market-related interest rates is 
econometrically evaluated using both error-correction and 
cointegration models. The area of analysis as set out above 
covers the major issues isolated by Akhtar (1983) as being 
of prime importance in the examination of financial 
innovation,
"The process of financial change may exert significant 
influences on the empirical definition of money, the 
money supply process, the demand for money and the role 
of interest rates in the transmission of monetary 
influences to the rest of the economy. More generally, 
changes in the financial system raise questions about 
the meaningfulness of monetary and financial aggregates 
and may lead to shifts or (further) instability in the 
relationship of those aggregates to economic activity".
(p6 )
Chapter Eleven summarises the empirical evidence and 
concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
MONETARY CONTROL - THEORY, PRACTICE 
AND FINANCIAL CHANGE
2.0 Introduction
Monetarist theory, long espoused by academic 
economists, has provided the major basis for macroeconomic 
policy in the United Kingdom since the mid 1970*s. Section
2 . 1  outlines the underlying theoretical rationale of 
monetarism and the opposing theoretical basis of the 
Keynesian school of thought. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions needed for a monetarist policy of control over 
the money supply are detailed, as are the theoretical 
deficiencies in the monetarist standpoint. Section 2.2 
explains the modus operandi of practical monetarist policy 
in the United Kingdom, how it differs from mainstream 
theoretical monetarism (as detailed in 2 .1 ) and the 
reasoning behind adopting such a form of policy. The 
experience and results of monetary control in the UK are 
examined in section 2.3, including an appraisal of the 
contention that financial change and innovation may be 
responsible for the breakdown of previously stable 
relationships upon which theoretical monetarism rests, and 
also responsible for the problems encountered with practical 
monetarism and its subsequent abandonment. The similarity is 
noted between the warnings of the institutionalist school 
over two decades ago as to the effects of financial change 
on monetary policy, and subsequent official statements as to 
the reasons behind the failure of practical monetarism.
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Section 2.4 analyses the views as to the effect of financial 
change on the conduct of monetary control and how financial 
change is expected to modify the early theoretical 
monetarist policy prescription.
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2.1 The Basic Postulates of Monetarism
The modern quantity theory, or "monetarism"!]!] as it 
has come to be known, is firmly based on the work of 
Friedman (1956). According to Friedman, the quantity theory 
is in essence a theory of the demand for money [2]. It is 
argued that the demand for money should be analysed in the 
same manner as the demand for real goods, as money yields a 
flow of services or utility to its holder. Friedman 
emphasised the active role of money in income determination 
with two statements. Firstly, he argued that the demand for 
money bears a stable relationship to money national income. 
The velocity of circulation is assumed to be a stable 
function of a small number of variables. Secondly, Friedman 
argued that the supply of money is exogenously determined 
either because it is fixed by policy or because it is 
independent of the variables which determine the demand for 
money (Friedman, 1970(a))[3]
It is possible to use the Post-Keynesian IS-LM 
framework along the lines of Poole (1970) to show the 
relative importance of monetary policy, and the vital 
importance of a stable demand for money for control of the 
money supply. In the familiar IS-LM diagram below, consider 
the situation whereby the IS curve is subjected to random 
shocks and may lie anywhere between IS-^ and IS 2 • If, as 
monetarists claim, the money demand function is stable, and 
the stock of money is fixed, income may end up at any 
position along the horizontal axis between and Y 2 • If,










there will be fluctuations from Y 3 to
From this it can be seen that shifts in the IS curve 
whilst holding the quantity of money constant leads to 
smaller fluctuations in income than does holding the rate of 
interest constant. Thus, if there is a stable demand for 
money, control of the money supply it is argued, is a more 
effective policy than controlling interest r ates.[4] 
Further-more the authorities can only observe and therefore 
influence a nominal rate of interest, whereas the real rate 
of interest is the relevant one for the IS curve. For the 
two rates of interest to be equal, expectations of inflation 
on the part of the private sector must be zero.
The stability of the demand for money is crucial to 
monetarist propositions as to the appropriate conduct of 
monetary policy . If there is a stable money demand function 
the implication is that money has a predictable influence 
on the economy and hence control of the money supply by the 
monetary authorities is a powerful instrument of economic 
policy (Judd and Scadding, 1982). If the relationship 
between the monetary aggregates and nominal incomes is 
reasonably stable and predictable, the conduct of policy 
should involve a declared emphasis on control of the growth 
of the money stock and monetary policy should be based on 
quantitative monetary targets (Desai, 1981). If there is a 
stable relationship between the monetary aggregate and the 
goal variable, it is possible to set a target growth path 
for the monetary aggregate which will be consistent with the 
desired growth rate of the goal variable. Thus, if monetary
13
aggregates are to be used as targets, it is a necessity that 
there should be a stable relationship between the monetary 
aggregate and the goal variable (nominal income).
Keynes and Keynesian monetary theorists, on the other 
hand, dispute that the demand for money is a stable function 
[5]. Keynes (1936) recognised the importance of the 
transactions motive for holding money in order to bridge the 
gap between planned regular payments and receipts of money, 
and the precautionary motive for sudden unexpected 
expenditures. The main importance of Keynes* analysis of the 
demand for money is found, however, in the emphasis on the 
‘speculative* demand for money, and the notion of 
uncertainty. Keynes highlighted uncertainty in terms of the 
variability of the rate of interest and hence the vital 
importance of the speculative motive to the stability of the 
demand for m oney.[6 ].
Keynes argued that at certain times, money will be held 
in preference to an alternative interest yielding asset.
Such ‘speculative* holdings of money would be over and above 
that held for precautionary motives. Money is a capital 
certain asset, the nominal value of which does not vary. The 
alternative to holding money is to hold an asset (bond) the 
market price of which varies according to the rate of 
interest [7]. When choosing between the alternative of 
holding money or bonds, the expected rate of interest is 
taken into account. If the rate of interest is expected to 
fall, capital gains may be made; if rates are expected to 
rise, capital losses may be faced on bonds. The demand for
14
money is relatively low when the rate of interest is 
expected to fall, and greater when the rate of interest is 
expected to rise. At any one time, wealth-holders have an 
opinion as to the * nor m a l 1 rate of interest relative to the 
current rate of interest. It is assumed that different 
individuals will have different expectations, such that in 
the aggregate a smooth speculative demand for money function 
is obtained which is a negative function of the current 
level of the rate of interest [8 ].
One assertion of Keynes* speculative motive is that the 
normal rate of interest as perceived by wealth holders will 
change over time, fluctuating around the changing ‘normal* 
rate of interest. So, rather than being constant as argued 
by monetarists, Keynes argued that velocity is.both unstable 
and volatile. An increase in the money supply, he argued, 
would lead to an increase in holdings of speculative 
balances, such that any increase is offset by a reduction in 
velocity.
The implications of an unstable demand for money 
function upon the operation of monetary policy can be seen 
in the IS-LM framework. The diagram cxbov^shows relative 
stability of the IS curve [9], whilst the demand for money 
is unstable and may vary from L M 2 to L M 3 . This results in 
variations in income from to Y 3 .
According to this analysis, large fluctuations in 
income may occur, such that Keynesians favour control of the 
interest rate. For example, consider the case where a rise 
in the demand for money occurs, the LM curve shifting from
15
LM^ to L.M'3 • This will force up interest rates, r-^  to r3 , 
and reduce income, to Y 3 • If an interest rate policy is 
being fallowed (i.e. a policy of trying to keep interest 
rates constant), the money supply will be increased to allow 
for the increase in the demand for money, such that income 
returns to Y^. Thus, variations in the level of income will 
be minimised. The policy implications of the Keynesian model 
of money demand are thus distinctly different from the 
monetarist framework. Keynes, through the introduction of 
the speculative demand for money which explicitly outlines 
uncertainty, was able to argue that volatile expectations 
may cause instability in the demand for money function. This 
implies that monetary policy via control of the money supply 
will be ineffective.
Apart from the assertion that the demand for money is 
in reality (i.e. not constrained to a simplified theoretical 
construct but in real world terms), a stable function of a 
few measurable variables, a further assertion appears to 
distinguish clearly Friedman*s approach. Money, he argues, 
is a unique asset, and is therefore not a close substitute 
for any other asset, real or financial. Changes in the 
quantity of money will thus have an impact which is spread 
widely among a number of assets, causing a pervasive change 
in all planned expenditures, both on goods and on financial 
assets; portfolio equilibrium is only restored after large 
changes in asset yields. All forms of expenditure will be 
affected, thus significantly affecting nominal income.
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The monetarist view therefore is that the interest 
elasticity of the demand for money is low, and hence 
monetary policy will be effective. The underlying rationale 
for this position is that if the authorities are able to 
reduce the supply of money, there will only be a small 
volume of idle balances which may be induced into the pool 
of active funds (through an increase in the level of 
interest rates), in order to support the existing level of 
expenditure. Indeed, it would require relatively large
increases in the level of interest rates in order to
/undermine significantly the impact of the initial reduction 
in the money supply (through raising the velocity of 
circulation of money), and this adjustment in itself would 
tend to depress the level of credit financed expenditures 
within the economy. In addition, a significantly higher 
level of interest rates would be expected to reduce the 
demand for bank loans and may depress the volume of bank 
created deposits.
In the IS-LM diagram below, if the money supply is 
reduced, national income will fall further (Y-^ to Y 3 ) and 
interest rates increase further (r-^  to when the demand 
for money is relatively interest inelastic. Therefore the 
lower is the interest elasticity of the demand for money, 
the higher is the change in the rate of interest needed to 
restore equilibrium, the stronger the monetary policy. 
Thus, an important element in the monetarist/keynesian 
debate lay in differing opinions as to the substitutability 
of money to real assets. Empirical studies on the degree of
17
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substitution as measured by the interest elasticity of the 
demand for money have not, however, provided results which 
show whether the monetarist or keynesian theories are most 
valid. The only effect empirical work has had on this point 
is to contradict the more radical assertions of both 
protagonists. The results show that there is a negative 
relationship between changes in interest rates and money 
balances, but that the interest elasticity of the demand for 
money seems to be quite low. The special cases of zero- 
interest elasticity assumed by the monetarists, and the 
infinite interest elasticity of the Keynesians as 
represented by the liquidity trap are both disproven. (See 
Chapter Eight for an analysis of researchers* econometric 
results on interest elasticity).
Monetarist theory asserts that although a rise in the 
money supply will increase nominal income, monetary policy 
will not have a permanent affect on the level of real 
output. A rise in the money supply will affect output after 
approximately six to nine months, and affect the price level 
after about twelve to eighteen months, after which output 
will return to its previous level. According to the 
expectations - Augmented Phillips curve the rise in output 
is only sustained until the accompanying increase in 
inflation becomes fully anticipated. At this time output 
returns to its natural level, the rise in the money supply 
leading only to an increase in the rate of inflation.
Thus, real income, argued Friedman, is determined by 
supply - side considerations. If changes in the rate of
19
growth of .the money supply do not impinge on long-term real 
income, then the price level would change in order to 
restore equilibrium between the supply of money and the 
demand for money. So, changes in the money supply affect 
real income only in the short-run, and prices in the long 
run. This received further theoretical support from the 
rational expectations school [10] (Muth, 1961, Lucas, 1972, 
1973). The adaptive expectations hypothesis implicit in 
F ried m a n ’s work maintains that individuals will continuously 
make systematic errors as to their estimates of future 
inflation. Rational expectations contradicts this however, 
and argues that expectations are based on all available 
information, including past errors in expectations of 
inflation, and the effects of policy actions which may 
themselves alter expectations. Sargent and Wallace (1975, 
1976), show that under conditions of rational expectations, 
there will be instantaneous adjustment of the economy to an 
anticipated increase in tne money supply. Monetary policy 
will have no effect on real output [11]. Instead, prices 
will rise witn no long-term effect on real income. Sargent 
and Wallace thus come to the same conclusion as Friedman, 
that monetary policy should follow a money-supply growth 
rule, rather than be used for active stabilisation policy 
[12], (Friedman, 1960). [13]
20
2.2 Monetary Control in the UK - Policy Prescription
Friedman's assertion of a stable demand for money
became the central issue in debates on monetary economics.
Indeed Laidler (1971) has suggested that the stability of
the demand for money over time is capable of reflecting the
whole argument between Keynesians and monetarists as to the
role of money in the economic system. In the U.S.A.,
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) claimed to be able to show that
real money balances and real income were connected in a
reasonably predictable way, arguing that changes in the rate
of growth of the money stock are a necessary and sufficient
condition for changes in the rate of change of money-income
(Friedman and Schwartz, p676)[l4]. The theoretical arguments
of Friedman and his empirical work on the demand for money
were corroborated by empirical research in the United
Kingdom which suggested that the demand for money function
was stably related to income and interest rates (Paish 1958,
Dow 1958, Kavanagh and Walters 1966, Fisher 1968, Laidler
and Parkin 1970, Laidler 1971, Goodhart and Crockett 1970).
It did seem that in the late 1960's there was a general
consensus as to the existence of a stable demand for money,
"this evidence for Britain certainly points to the 
existence of a stable demand for money function in the 
economy. For the United States the evidence is 




The implications of such a finding were thought to be 
substantial. Through a stable demand for money, controlling 
the monetary aggregates would have a major and determinate 
effect on the economy (Parkin 1978, pp252-253 Freedman 
1983, ppl03-104). At the time,a stable function suggested to 
some economists that monetary policy would be effective, 
that a particular policy could be chosen and monitored, and 
that desired levels of the monetary aggregates could be 
achieved by varying the level of interest rates (Goodhart, 
1984, p46). A stable demand for money thus appeared to 
provide empirical support not only for the ability of the 
monetary authorities to control the money supply, but also 
for the desirability of so doing in terms of the information 
value of monetary aggregates (Courakis, 1981, p306).
The econometric investigations in the UK were carried 
out on M3,[15] and from the monetarist standpoint appeared 
to suggest a direct link between the rate of change in the 
money supply M3 and the rate of change in nominal incomes. 
The line of causation, it was claimed, ran from money to 
income, with a lag. Thus, to bring about a reduction in the 
rate of growth of the price level, it was deemed necessary 
to bring about a reduction in the rate of growth of the 
money supply M3. The econometric evidence also seemed to 
suggest that as there was a link between M3 and nominal 
interest rates, then control of that aggregate could be 
achieved by manipulation of interest rates. Moreover, it was 
believed at the time that control of the aggregate could be 
achieved without recourse to unacceptably high interest
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rates (BEQB, June 1983, p202).
The belief in the ability of the authorities to control 
money supply growth via interest rates was seen to be an 
important factor in placing greater emphasis on the 
manipulation of interest rates in Competition and Credit 
Control [16]. If interest rates could be used as an 
instrument to control monetary growth, then there would be 
no need for the use of direct controls over banks* financial 
intermediation activities, which had proven largely 
ineffective, and with hindsight were seen to inhibit 
competitive efficiency in the banking system (BEQB, June 
1983) [17].
The reliance on the econometric evidence as to the 
stability of the demand for money relationship was soon seen 
to be unfounded, however, (Hacche, 1974). Econometric models 
based on 1930*s data could not explain the monetary 
movements of the early 1970*s, in particular the fast growth 
of M3 after the removal of direct controls in 1971, under 
the aegis of Competition and Credit Control, and the 
abandonment of the retail banks interest rate agreements. 
Yet, the argument that the previously held relationship had 
been distorted by structural change in the financial system 
also led to the notion that once the changes were over, the 
link between money and nominal income would return to a 
reliable, stable, relationship. Despite the fact that it 
did not return to such a state, the monetary authorities 
believed after the aftermath of CCC that,
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"the growth of M3 within reasonable limits could be 
directly influenced, occasionally to a high degree, by 
a combination of direct controls (now more acceptable 
again) and an active policy of debt management".
(BEQB June 1983, p203)
Despite the conjecture as to the effects of structural 
change in the financial system upon the growth of the money 
supply, the institutional background in which policy actions 
take place seems to have been inadequately considered by the 
monetary authorities. Despite the breakdown of the money- 
income relationship as shown by econometric demand for money 
equations, targets were published for the growth of M3 in 
1976, partly in response to the conditions on a loan from 
the International Monetary Fund to maintain domestic credit 
expansion within certain limits.
Although it was recognised that, in econometric terms, 
the money-income relationship had broken down, it was still 
maintained that monetary growth over and above the rate of 
growth of nominal incomes would result in inflationary 
conditions,
"I would not want to suggest that there is always a 
direct, simple chain of causation running from the 
money supply to the price level. Indeed, it is 
generally recognised that inflation can, at least for a 
time, follow a life of its own quite independent of 
current or past monetary developments. But though the 
causation may not be simple there is an observable 
statistical relation between monetary growth and the 
pace of inflation".
(BEQB, 1984(e),p54) 
This belief that the money supply was still the
dominant impulse affecting the price level despite the
breakdown of demand for money functions gained theoretical
support from the emerging "buffer-stock" or "disequilibrium
money" school.
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In the 'buffer* stock model it is argued that economic 
agents may be temporarily moved off their demand for money 
functions by credit-side shocks. This may lead to holdings 
of excess money balances, which will be slowly dissipated 
(Artis and Lewis, 1974, 1976). The applicability of the 
buffer stock model in a period of financial innovation is 
examined in Chapter Six.
The theoretical standpoint of the rational expectations
school (see earlier) was to be emphasised in practical
policy operation through published money supply targets:
"One purpose of announcing monetary targets is to serve 
notice that excessive increases in domestic costs will 
come up against resistance. If people believe that the 
money supply will be expanded to accommodate any
increase in costs and prices, however fast,
inflationary fears are likely to be increased. If, on 
the other hand, people are convinced that the rate of 
growth of the money supply will be held within well- 
defined limits, this should help to reduce inflationary 
expectations".
(BEQB, 1984(e)p46) 
In particular, it was hoped that this would lead to wage 
claims being in some way linked to the future publicly 
announced rate of growth of the money supply. This, it was 
thought, would reduce the impact of possible high 
unemployment under a tight money policy. This is because it 
was maintained that if wage claims grew faster than the rate
of growth of the money supply, it would lead to increased
unemployment. By keeping expectations of the rate of growth 
of the money supply low, it was hoped to reduce wage claims 
and stop unemployment rising. This view was taken up in the 
Green Paper on Monetary Control (1980),
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"The .government believes that its monetary policy can 
best be formulated if it sets targets for the growth of 
one of the aggregates against which policy can be 
assessed. This gives the clearest indication to those 
concerned in both financial markets and domestic 
industry on which to assess the direction of government 
policy and to formulate expectations**.
(Para.8)
It was noted that problems had occurred in the past 
with the M3 aggregate, but it was not felt that these 
problems were insuperable,
**It was recognised that experience hither to in 
achieving fairly close control of this aggregate was 
not entirely reassuring. But it was felt that the 
answer to this might lie in changing the methods of 
control rather than the target aggregate itself,J•
(BEBQ June 1983, p204)
The MTFS also maintained that there was a close link 
between the money supply, the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) and interest rates. It was argued that an 
increase in the PSBR would lead to an increase in the rate 
of growth of the money supply or would push up interest 
rates. This occurs because a large PSBR which results in the 
government borrowing from the banking system necessarily 
increases the money supply. On the other hand, it may borrow 
from the non-bank private sector, which, it was believed, 
would occur at steadily rising rates of interest (TCSC 1980 
p 2 1 ) • Thus, in order to reduce the money supply without 
resorting to high levels of interest rates, it was argued 
that the PSBR had to be reduced. The combined tools of 
monetary control were thus to be short-term interest rates 
and debt management. It is important to distinguish this
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modus operandi from a strict monetarist policy prescription 
of control of the monetary base. Indeed, Friedman himself 
was incredulous as to the proposed method of control in the 
UK in his (oft quoted) evidence to the House of Commons 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee,
"••••I could hardly believe my eyes, when I read, in 
the summary chapter (of the Green Paper on Monetary 
Control) * the principal means of controlling the growth 
of the money supply must be fiscal policy - both public 
expenditure and tax policy and interest r a t e s . 1 
Interpreted literally this sentence is simply wrong. 
Only a Rip Van Winkle, who had not read any of the 
flood of literature during the last decade and more on 
the money supply process, could possibly have written 
that sentence...11
he continued,
"Direct control of the monetary base is an alternative 
to fiscal policy and interest rates as a means of 
controlling monetary growth. Of course, direct control 
of the monetary base will affect interest rates...but 
that is a very different thing from controlling 
monetary growth through interest rates".
(TCSC 1980 Para 11, p57) 
The force of Friedman's argument is evaluated in 
Chapter Seven with reference to the effects of financial 
innovation on the efficiency of both interest rates and 
monetary base control as methods of controlling the money 
supply.
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2.3 Financial Innovation and Monetary Control in the UK
The experience of the monetary authorities in carrying
out a policy of control of the money supply has not,
however, been a happy one,
"Despite the progress we have made towards our 
objectives, it cannot be said that our experience with 
our chosen framework for operating monetary policy has 
been satisfactory. In common with other countries, that 
framework has been one of targeting the rate of growth 
of a monetary aggregate. This intermediate objective 
was chosen in the belief that there was a reasonably 
predictable relationship between the rate of monetary 
growth and the rate of growth of nominal incomes. But 
in practice our ability to use an estimate of that 
relationship for target setting, and to meet those 
targets, has quite frankly, been less than impressive".
(Leigh-Pemberton 1986.p500.)
The Bank of England does appear to have considered the 
problems of financial change at the introduction of the 
MTFS. It noted in 1980 that although targets were set, it 
was possible that structural change may affect the relative 
growth rates of aggregates, but that the problem was not 
insuperable,
"No statistical measure of the money supply can be 
expected fully to encapsulate monetary conditions, and 
so provide a uniquely correct basis for controlling the 
complex relationships between monetary growth and 
nominal incomes. A degree of substitutability, between 
forms of money or liquidity just inside or outside 
their respective measures means that it is insufficient 
to rely on one measure alone".
(Green Paper on Monetary Control, 1980)
In view of future events, however, it appears that the 
problem of financial change was underestimated. In contrast 
to the initial confidence of the authorities as to the
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insignificance of changes in the financial system for the
operation of monetary control, the monetary authorities
progressively emphasized the importance of financial
institutions during the MTFS and subsequent analyses of the
MTFS. Official publications have tended to cite the effects
of change in the financial institutional framework as the
major factor for the problems experienced with monetary
control, yet the Bank of England*s conclusion that monetary
policy is affected by financial change is not a new
viewpoint. Indeed, the notion that the behaviour of
financial institutions needs to be taken into account when
examining the efficacy of monetary controls has a long,
although perhaps not popular, pedigree. The
* institutionalist* school (comprising, inter alia, Gurley
and Shaw 1955, 1956, 1960, Minsky 1957, Tobin 1963(a),
Brainard 1964, Radcliffe 1959) first warned of the possible
dangers of ‘traditional* monetary theory, which has
promulgated the view that the financial system is
essentially a static equilibrium system, a mere unchanging
backdrop against which policy operates, reflected in
**the common tendency of classical and Keynesian 
economics to treat the financial structure as being of 
secondary importance, netting out the assets and 
liabilities of the private sector".
(Brainard 1964 pp95-96)
Opposed to this, the institutionalist school takes the 
actions of financial institutions as being of central 
importance in the conduct of policy. It is recognised that 
observed statistical relationships may change over time due 
to changes in financial markets. Even if a policy of
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controlling the money supply may be optimal at present, if
previously held relationships break down under rapid
financial change, then the rationale for controlling the
money supply may disappear. The IS-LM apparatus used
earlier, and, indeed, often used by monetarists in
demonstrating the conditions under which control of the
money supply is superior to control of interest rates, is
dependent on an unchanging financial system if the
authorities are to be able to control the money supply. With
financial innovation, traditional instruments may become
obsolete in influencing the money supply, as has been
recognised by Poole (1970),
"the relationship between the tools and the proximate 
targets depends heavily on institutional factors which 
are stable neither over time nor over space".
(pl78)
Under the circumstances of deregulation and financial 
change it is instructive to be reminded of Minsky*s concern 
that,
"If a period of rapid changes in the structure or in 
the mode of functioning of financial markets occurs, 




The Radcliffe Report (1959) emphasised in stronger
terms the problems associated with financial change, and
concluded that:
"financial institutions are so highly developed and so 
prone to further development that control of * the 
supply of m o n e y 1 - whatever that may be made to mean - 
is not by itself a reliable policy measure".
(Para.504)
Moreover the Radcliffe report maintained that it is
impossible to define money, because there is no clear
criterion with which to determine those assets that are part
of the money supply [18]. Obviously, if it is impossible to
define the money supply, it is impossible to control. This
view has since been reflected in official commentary during
and after the MTFS. The impact of increased competition
between building Societies and banks has been blamed as a
major determinant of the observed change in relationships
among the various monetary aggregates, and between them and
nominal incomes. The activities of building societies and
banks have been given prime consideration when assessing
the appropriate definition of money and the problem of
implementation of monetary control,
"There are other structural changes to come, some of 
which we can discern in advance, some of which we 
cannot foresee. Among those that we can expect are the 
changes that are arising, and may well accelerate, from 
the changing role and operations of the building 
societies. The extent and nature of competition among 
building societies, and between them and banks, is 
already changing, and this will give that yet further 
impetus. In these circumstances, all the aggregates, 
not only the various definitions of narrow and broad 
money, but also the wider liquidity measures, are 
liable to be subject to unforeseen distortion".
(BEQB D e c e m b e r ,1984 p476)
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One of the main reasons cited has been the importance
of liberalization of credit markets and the introduction of
new types of financial assets,
"the gathering pace of innovation under the spur of 
competition is leading to new channels of finance and 
new financial instruments. A statistical series for any 
monetary aggregate, compiled on static definitions, is 
thus liable to shift in meaning*'.
(BEQB March 1982(«Qp6) 
The authorities have given special emphasis to the new 
financial instruments offered by banks and building 
societies,
"a number of developments currently taking place or in 
prospect could significantly affect the aggregates: 
these include the possible introduction by the clearing 
banks of interest-bearing current accounts, expansion 
of the payments facilities offered by building 
societies, and increasing provision of withdrawal 
facilities for building society term shares".
(BEQB March 1982(b0p21) 
Even a cursory examination of the developments in the 
building society industry indicates that there has been 
considerable evolution and innovation, a detailed 
examination of which is carried out in Chapter Four.
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2.4 Financial Innovation and the Conduct of Monetary Policy
The integration of monetary economics and financial 
innovation by specific institutions is by no means an easy 
undertaking. Indeed, some would argue that traditional modes 
of analysis are incapable of providing the correct framework 
for research,
"The central paradigms used to study and explain the 
largely separate macroanalytics and the microanalytics 
of money and banking, central banking and regulatory 
aspects of financial markets are no longer usefully 
applicable to todays problems. Market segmentation has 
broken down. Issues in aggregative economics - the 
supply and demand for money, interest rates, relations 
between money, interest rates and income and employment 
- are so intimately affected by regulatory structures 
and the competitive behaviour of financial institutions 
that the latter cannot be ignored in macroanalysis” .
(Phillips 1981, p267)
Whilst acknowledging that the combined analysis of financial
innovation, financial change and monetary economics
represents a blending of macro and micro aspects of
economics, it is argued in this thesis that standard tools
of economic analysis are useful in analysing the monetary
effects of financial change. That this is so is stated
succinctly by Llewellyn,
"The focus is upon the dynamics of the financial system 
on the premise that the changes observed are not random 
but susceptible to systematic analysis".
(1985(b), pl9) 
To the authors knowledge there has not been any 
systematic attempt to fully assess the alleged impact of 
financial structural changes upon the operation of monetary 
control.[19] Many of the opinions reported are based largely
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on informed, but speculative comment. It remains unclear as
to exactly how financial change has actually affected
monetary control. Without detailed knowledge as to what the
effects upon monetary control are, and without a grasp of
the magnitude of such effects, theories as to the
appropriate conduct of monetary policy are also based on
informed, but speculative comment.
Although little detailed research has been carried out
on the effects of financial innovation and structural change
upon the appropriate conduct of monetary control, it appears
that there is a consensus opinion that the effects of
financial change necessitate that monetary policy be
conducted in a discretionary manner,
"the unreliability of most of the demand for money 
functions and the disparate readings provided by the 
movements of the monetary aggregates have forced us, in 
some cases none too unwillingly, back to a more 
pragmatic approach to monetary analysis and policy".
(Goodhart,1981, pl29-130)
Not only may policy have to be carried out in a
discretionary approach, but the authorities may be
constrained to,
"muddling through in a discretionary, but unrigorous 
manner".
(Goodhart 1 9 8 6 , (a)pl01) 
It is argued by some that institutional change vitiates 
the strict form of monetarism. Laidler (1981, p23) points 
out that financial innovation which affects the demand for 
money means that it is impossible to impose an ex ante 
growth rule as championed by Friedman (1960). He even argues 
that it may be necessary for wholesale change in the
34
financial institutional structure to ensure the ability of 
the monetary authorities to control the money supply 
(Laidler 1981, p23)
Some monetarist writers have accepted that it is no 
longer plausible to appease opponents with the argument that 
if the rate of growth of one monetary aggregate is held down 
then in the long term the other aggregates will behave 
consistently (Laidler 1981,p23). The movement of the 
monetary aggregates under conditions of financial innovation 
suggests that this can no longer be held as a tractable 
position.
But where does this leave policy? Should the monetary
authorities attempt discretionary control? Have they the
ability to control the money supply? Is there a link between
money and nominal income, and money and prices? The
difficulty experienced by the authorities in interpreting
the movements of the published monetary aggregates has shown
that even taking account of several measures during a period
of structural change may not necessarily provide accurate
information upon which to make policy decisions [20].
Explanation of movements in the monetary aggregates has
become increasingly difficult,
"The relationships among the various aggregates and 
between them and nominal incomes, have been subject to 
considerable variation and uncertainty from year to 
year. Such shifts in previously established statistical 
regularities have provided a challenge to economists to 
come up with new and better relationships'*.
(BEQB December 1984, p476)
Indeed, the 'Legal Restrictions* or 'Libertarian'
School (see Johnson 1968, Black 1970, Wallace 1983, Jao
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1983), argue that the observed link between money balances
and nominal incomes only exists because of certain legal
restraints placed on the banking system. Moreover, it is
argued that once these restrictions are abandoned, and/or
financial innovation occurs, then such statistical
regularities as the demand for money will break down,
"the libertarians theoretical case against mainstream 
monetarism rests on the latter*s uncritical acceptance 
of the various legal restrictions and regulations on 
money and finance. Without such restrictions and 
regulations, the distinctions between banks and other 
non-bank intermediaries would vanish, and the 
conceptual differences between various monetary 
aggregates would become meaningless. With these 
foundations gone, the major components of the 
monetarist upper structure, such as a stable demand 
function for money, and a constant money growth rule, 
also fall to the ground1*
(Jao 1983, pl4)[21]
A conceptually similar argument is provided by those 
who suggest that the very operation of monetary control has 
led to instability of money demand. This is commonly 
referred to as Goodhart*s Law (Goodhart 1984, p96). Without 
the ability to forecast future financial innovations, the 
Bank of England may have to take discretionary action in the 
interpretation and control of the monetary aggregates (BEQB 
December 1986 p506). It is important to note, however, that 
as recently as 1981 Friedman has reaffirmed his stance on 
this issue,
"It matters far less whether that aggregate is MIA or 
M1B, M2 or Mn, than that a single aggregate be chosen**,
(p6)
and (1982, pll7) that a long term target path be set,
"for a single aggregate - for example M2 or the base.
It is far less important which aggregate is chosen than 
that a single aggregate be designated as the target".
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2.5 Conclusion
Although it appears that the way in which monetary 
control can be exercised may have changed, under certain 
conditions it may still be an effective tool of economic 
policy. It is possible that if, as some would suggest, 
growth in the money supply is still a necessary force for 
inflation, then there may still be an important role for 
monetary policy. This is dependent, however, on the ability 
of the authorities to control the money supply, and on 
knowledge of the effects of institutional change on the 
private sector's demand for money. Monetary policy may only 
be useful if the authorities have a detailed understanding 
of any relationship between financial innovation/structural 
change and observed breakdowns in previously stable economic 
relationships, and any effects of financial innovation on 
the techniques of monetary control.If, as many commentators 
would argue, change in financial institutions and the 
markets in which they operate are important factors in the 
operation of monetary management, then they need to be 
examined closely to determine any effects that institutional 
change may have on the operation of monetary policy, and the 
appropriate conduct of monetary control. In particular, it 
is desirable to fully investigate the possible effects of 
the intermediation activities of building societies and 
banks upon the postulates necessary for a policy of 
controlling the money supply.
37
NOTES - CHAPTER TWO
[1]. There is not, of course, only one 'brand' of 
monetarism. It is not intended in this thesis to fully 
outline the various schools of monetarism. This has 
been adequately done by Congdon (1978), Budd
(1980),Atestis and Riley (1980), Meade (1981), and 
Burton (1982). In this thesis the terms 
monetarist/monetarism follow the broad classification 
suggested by Laidler (1981), in his analysis of the 
conflicting opinions as to the central points of 
monetarism (see also Brunner (1970) and Johnson 
(1972)).
[2]. Laidler (1985) and Cuthbertson (1985), provide a 
thorough survey of the early theoretical and empirical 
literature on the demand for money.
[3]. Despite Friedman's assertion to the contrary, critics 
have argued that his analysis need be modified only 
slightly to fit into any neo-Keynesian model. Indeed 
Johnson (1962) and Patinkin (1969) argue that 
Friedman's theory of the demand for money is 
essentially an extension of the Keynesian capital 
theoretic analysis of the role of money, rather than a 
reformulation of the quantity theory. Friedman, whilst 
admitting that Keynes' liquidity preference influenced 
his work (1970a), has set out his own formal framework 
(1970b, (1971). Laidler appears to concur with this 
view,
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"Keynesian though Friedman's model is, it is no 
more Keynes' model than Keynes' "Marshallian" 
theory of income determination is Marshall's 
theory: and it differed from other developments of 
Keynes theory of liquidity preference that 
appeared at about the same time in a number of 
ways"
(1981 p3)
[4]. The decision between the money supply and interest
rates depends not only on the relative stability of the
functions but also on the slopes of the IS-LM curves,
"within the compass of the traditional Hicksian 
IS-LM structure, the superiority of an interest 
rate policy over a money stock policy, measured by 
comparing the expected squared deviation of the 
goal variable (typically income) from its 
desired' value, depends on the variance- 
covariance structure of the additive disturbances 
attaching to the expenditure and monetary sectors 
and on the values of the parameters describing the 
response of expenditures to changes in the 
interest rate and of the demand for money to 
changes in the interest rate and income '.
(Courakis,1981 p272)
Poole points out that it is suboptimal to use either 
the money supply £r interest rates as the instrument of 
monetary policy. A combined policy whereby the money 
supply is a function of the interest rate is 
preferable. B. Friedman (1975, 1977) however, has 
argued that a situation whereby the money supply is the 
intermediate target to be manipulated by the instrument 
of interest rates is also suboptimal. This policy is 
wasteful of additional information that may be helpful 
in achieving the ultimate target, and also neglects 
Kareken, Muench and Wallaces (1973) stricture that any 
variable that cannot be precisely controlled should be 
used as an "information variable" rather than a
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"surrogate goal of policy" (Lane, 1985).
[5]. See, inter alia, Tobin (197d) > Radcliffe (1959), Kaldor
(1970), Robinson (1970). Keynesians were not the only
economists to take this view,
"Pre-Keynesian monetary theorists did not believe 
in an empirically stable demand for money function 
either. Though they often enough assumed a 
constant velocity of circulation that is by no 
means the same thing, and in any event, they 
typically did so in order to make their analytic 
points with the maximum of clarity, and not with 
the intention of stating a belief about the nature 
of the real world".
(Laidler, 1981.p3)
[6] Uncertainty is of course present in the precautionary 
demand for money in terms of uncertainty over the 
future need to carry out expenditures. Keynes 
emphasised the uncertainty involved with the 
speculative demand for money, which is dominated by 
uncertainty over asset values.
[7]. The money/bonds distinction is of course an extreme 
simplification of reality derived from assumptions as 
to the theory being outlined. There are alternatives to 
holding bonds, and there is some debate as to the 
importance of the money/bonds distinction made by 
Keynes.
[8]. Keynes also argued that, at very low rates of interest, 
all investors are likely to think that rates will rise, 
such that no bonds will be held, the "liquidity trap".
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[9]. Most Keynesians would in fact admit that the IS curve 
is unstable, but not so volatile as the LM curve.
[10] Often called the New Classical School.
[11] Most economists would probably now argue that the 
strong form of rational expectations is a special case. 
Few would deny the importance of rational expectations, 
however. Indeed, many Keynesian models now embody 
rational expectations (see Gale (1983) and Begg 
(1982)).
[12] Budd (1980), points to an apparent dichotomy between 
the Sargent/Wallace and Friedman analyses. Although 
reaching the same conclusion, they appear to argue from 
different premises. Friedman argues that no-one can 
forecast the future movements of the economy (therefore 
it should not be used for stabilisation policy), 
whereas Sargent/Wallace argue everyone can forecast the 
economy (again it should not be used for stabilisation 
policy). This apparent dichotomy can be rationalised by 
maintaining that the important factor is that the 
governments forecasts are no more accurate than anyone 
elses (Budd, p6) which would appear to satisfy both 
schools of thought.
[13] The monetarist viewpoint on a monetary growth rate rule 
is buttressed by the belief that active stabilisation 
policies cannot be effective, and may in fact be de­
stabilising. Thus, discretionary policy actions may 
cause the economy to veer off its path (Friedman
1960,p23)
[14] The empirical work of F-S has been heavily criticised, 
however. For a critique of F-S1 UK econometric work, 
see Hendry and Ericsson (1983).
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[16] See Chapters Three and Seven for further analysis of 
Competition and Credit Control.
[17] See Chapter Seven for an examination of the efficacy of 
direct monetary controls.
[18] See also Sayers (1960) and Chapter five for a further 
analysis of the importance of financial change and the 
definition and meaning of money.
[19] Spencer (1986) provides a detailed account of financial 
innovation and monetary controls, but concentrates 
exclusively on the period up to 1980, and therefore
-does not consider building society or bank innovations 
after that time.
[20] See Chapter five for a further analysis of financial 
innovation and distortion of the relative movements of 
the monetary aggregates.
[21] Quoted in Goodhart (1984).
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CHAPTER THREE 
BUILDING SOCIETY AND BANK DEVELOPMENTS, 1970-1979
3,0 Introduction
It was noted in Chapter Two that there has been 
substantial speculation and assertion that the core of the 
MTFS - control of the money supply - has in some way been 
inhibited by financial innovation, particularly on the part 
of building societies and banks. Given this conjecture as to 
the possible detrimental effects of the activities of 
building societies and banks on the operation of monetary 
control, it is germane to examine the operations of these 
intermediaries and the developments and innovations that 
have occurred.
Little substantive work has been carried out into 
building society and bank innovation, and, importantly, why 
innovation occurs. To ascertain the effects of financial 
innovation on monetary control (if any) it is vital to 
isolate the main innovations, and the factors motivating 
them. If innovation has in some way altered the efficiency 
of monetary control, it is important for future policy 
considerations to have an understanding of why innovations 
occur, and what conditions are necessary or sufficient for 
innovation. It is also of importance to ascertain as to 
whether or not they are a one-off short-term phenomena or an 
inexorable process. These considerations are vital to an 
understanding of the development of financial innovations 
and financial change, and their possible impact upon 
monetary control.
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It is possible to divide the period of study, 1970- 
1987, into two periods, pre 1980 and post 1980. It is 
recognised that bank and building society changes have not 
occurred overnight, hence a dividing line is in some senses 
an inappropriate categorization. Of course, change involving 
building societies and banks has occurred extremely fast, 
yet it has also been of an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary manner. The use of 1980 as a delineator is 
therefore rather arbitrarily chosen, given that innovation 
and financial change occur over a period of time, yet a 
number of factors outlined below appear to provide the 
necessary justification for the delineation of building 
society and bank activities according to these broad time 
periods•
The literature on the definition and process of 
financial innovation is analysed in section 3.1 and used to 
set out a broad framework in which to examine building 
society and bank developments. The way in which 
institutional features have affected the objectives of 
building societies is examined in section 3.2. The combined 
factors of mutual status and the operation of the interest 
rate cartel are analysed in relation to their effects upon 
the manner in which building societies have conducted their 
business. An analysis is made of the operation of the 
cartel, with emphasis on the manner in which it created a 
variable excess demand for mortgages that tended to be 
variable over the interest rate cycle. Also the degree to 
which mutuality and the cartel impinged upon the type of
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competition'in terms of the mix of price and non-price 
factors is evaluated. The operation of the cartel is 
compared with traditional economic models of cartels, with 
special reference to the interest rates on shares and 
deposits and on mortgage loans. The relationship between the 
degree of financial innovation and the twin constraints of 
mutuality and recommended interest rates is also examined in 
section 3.2. The effect of extensive non-price competition 
upon the variety of financial instruments offered by 
building societies and banks is detailed, and the link 
between cost efficiency and financial innovation in the 
building society sector examined.
The nature of competition between banks and building 
societies in terms of the effects of monetary control and 
the banks* ability to compete in the personal sector retail 
financial market is analysed in section 3.3. The asymmetry 
of monetary control is outlined, as are the relative non­
neutral tax considerations applied to building s oci ety’s and 
banks. The effects of these asymmetries upon the relative 
market share of banks and building societies is shown, as is 
the effect on the degree of financial innovation by these 
institutions.
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3.1 The Definition of Financial Innovation and Financial
Change
It is necessary to precisely define what is meant in
this thesis by the terms "financial innovation" and
"financial change". [1] Llewellyn (1985a), 1985b)
categorises the former as the types of financial instruments
introduced, the growth of new financial markets and the
methods by which financial services are provided. The latter
is related to the area of business activity financial
institutions are prepared to move into and hence is a factor
in laying down both the demarcation lines between different
groups of financial institutions, and the degree of
competition involved.
This appears to be a logical classification, and is the
one adopted in this thesis.
Whilst "financial change" in terms of changing areas of
activity can be identified, it is not easy, in practice, to
identify "financial innovation", as Desai and Low point out,
"In oligopolistic markets with product differentiation, 
it is a standard selling strategy to describe products 
as 'new, improved'. A handful of firms each providing a 
similar if not identical range of products may 
continuously announce new, improved, super versions of 
their products which may only be new in trivial aspects 
of product design. A bank providing its customers with 
cheque books in different colours may claim to be 
innovative, but it is when a rival bank/non bank offers 
higher interest rates for the same withdrawal facility 
that one would say that we have an important 
innovation. This implies, of course, a priori ordering 
of characteristics by their importance. Such ordering 
may be revealed by consumer preference but this is not 
guaranteed"•
1987, pll4
There have been numerous attempts to specify the 
underlying causal factors affecting the nature and degree of
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financial innovation. An analysis of the literature shows 
that technological, market, and regulatory factors are 
maintained to be the major determinants of financial change 
and financial innovation, although the emphasis placed on 
each tends to differ somewhat between authors (and there is 
no precise standardisation of terminology). For example,
Kane (1983) categorizes technological, market and regulatory 
factors as environmental constraints, a change in any one of 
which may lead to a restructuring of a financial 
institution’s product line, organizational structure, 
production process, and demand for financial services. Bain 
(1986) cites Hood (1959) when he classifies the factors 
influencing the changing variety of financial instruments 
available as structural, legislative, and market. .The first 
includes the location of surplus and deficit units in the 
economy, portfolio preferences of the users of financial 
services, and the economic and political environment. 
Legislative influences include taxation considerations, 
monetary and supervisory contrpls, whilst market factors 
involve the stage of development of financial institutions 
and markets in the economy, particularly in the form of the 
competitive relationships between different financial 
institutions.
Smithin (1984) categorizes financial innovations by 
distinguishing those that are caused by technological, 
institutional, and regulatory factors, and from a slightly 
different perspective (commenting on the American 
situation), Tobin (1983) also cites technological,
48
institutional, and regulatory factors as being prime 
determinants of financial innovation and change.
A slightly different approach is taken by Rybczynski, 
(1986). Changes in financial markets are differentiated by 
Rybczynski according to whether they are changes in 
’internal1 or 'external* frontiers. The former refers to the 
elimination of traditional demarcation lines as to the 
activities carried out by financial institutions. These he 
outlines as the payments mechanism, (preserve of the banks), 
the collection of savings, (provided by non-bank financial 
intermediaries), and the underwriting of securities and fund 
management (investment banking). The external frontiers he 
establishes as the number of clients for services, the 
geographical area over which services are available, and the 
provision of new financial services both by incumbent 
institutions and new entrants.
The main factors affecting these 'internal' and 
'external' frontiers, according to Rybczynski, include 
economic factors (under which technological innovation is 
subsumed) and the regulatory framework, the latter cited as 
the main cause of shifting the frontiers.
Perhaps the most comprehensive classification of the 
factors affecting financial change and financial innovation 
is that of Llewellyn (1985a, 1985b). The analytical 
framework for considering the evolution of the financial 
system consists of six major elements (which are set down 
here verbatim):
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i) the yolume and structure of the flow of funds of users
of the financial system which determine the demand for
financial intermediation;
ii) their portfolio preferences which determine the type of 
services and instruments demanded;
iii) the ‘effi c i e n c y 1 of different financial intermediation 
mechanisms which determines the terms that can be 
offered by institutions to both savers and borrowers;
iv) institutions* own portfolio strategies and preferences;
v) the dynamics of financial innovation;
vi) the portfolio and regulatory constraints on financial
institutions.
Furthermore, all of these factors can be influenced by 
general economic and monetary influences. Llewellyn 
maintains that it is the mix of the above factors that 
determines financial change and financial innovation in the 
financial system.
Whilst not wishing to prejudge the preceding analysis 
of building society and bank financial innovation and change 
by outlining any one analytical framework, the above 
conjectures as to the determinants of financial change 
provide a useful initial structure within and around which 
to analyse the developments involving the above 
institutions.[2 ]
50
3.2 The Effect of the Cartel on Building Society Operations
The roots of the building society movement as self-help
mutual institutions has greatly affected the manner in which
the movement as a whole has conducted its affairs [3].
The relatively simple role of building societies in the
pre 1980 period is adequately summarized by the Building
Societies Act 1962 [4].
"The purpose for which a society may be established 
under this Act is that of raising, by the subscription 
of members, a stock or fund for making advances to 
members out of the funds of the society upon security 
by way of mortgage of freehold or leasehold estate".
(Ch.37, Pt.l. Section 1(1)) 
The status of building societies as mutual institutions
means that defining their precise business objectives is
somewhat more problematic.[5] Nevertheless, there is
general agreement that during the post-war period, at least
until the early 1980's, a major business objective of many
societies was the pursuit of balance sheet growth. In other
words, it appears that many societies aimed explicitly to
maximise, in the long-term, the volume of their on-lending
within the constraints of prudent fund management and their
ability to attract deposits.
The existence of the recommended rate system [ 6 ] tended
to encourage balance sheet growth as the major objective of
building societies. The recommended rate system effectively
formed an interest-rate setting cartel within the sector.
Whilst most cartels operate in order to keep prices up by
reducing the supply of their product-service, it appears
that the building society recommended rate system operated a
policy of keeping prices down. The cartel tended to keep
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lending rates below the market clearing level such that 
there was a deliberate rationing of mortgage loan supply 
(for empirical results of the rationing of mortgage demand 
see Anderson and Hendry (1984)). This pricing policy was 
adopted largely in connection with the perceived role of 
societies as providers of low-cost housing finance.
The status of building societies as mutual institutions 
has, however, also been a factor in the operation of the 
recommended rate system. The building society industry 
viewed itself as a self-help movement for the benefit of its 
members. Each building society appeared to be a constituent 
part of the movement, all involved in the same goal. The 
building society cartel aimed to limit interest rate 
competition amongst societies partly to protect the smaller, 
more inefficient societies. The cartel appeared to run 
counter to the traditional economic model of a price setting 
cartel. Most cartels function in order to distribute income 
from consumers to industry, and to drive out smaller firms. 
The concentration of a large proportion of total building 
society assets in the hands of a few building societies 
(Table 3.1) would seem to suggest ideal conditions for the 
larger societies to form a cartel to 'drive-out* the smaller 
societies. The recommended rate system, however, had the 
effect of transferring income from depositors to borrowers 
(Llewellyn 1985(c\,i) and to protecting smaller, inefficient 
building societies, Gough and Taylor (1979). Although it may 
have kept building society lending rates below a market 
clearing level, many home-buyers paid an effective rate
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Table 3.1













(£ra) (%) (£m) (%) (£m) %
1970 5416 50.1 6955 64.3 8369 77.4
1975 12797 52.9 16498 6 8 . 2 19930 82.3
1976 15144 53.7 19401 6 8 . 8 23344 82.8
1977 18391 53.6 23715 69.2 28571 83.3
1978 21489 54.4 27901 70.6 33220 84.0
1979 25192 55.0 32390 70.7 38489 84.1
Degree of Concentration in the Building 
Society Industry 197,0-1979 .
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin, October 1987.
above this level. As Boleat (1986, pl77) points out, the 
availability of loans must also be considered as part of the 
cost of house purchase. If a borrower cannot obtain a full 
loan at the building society rate of interest because of 
mortgage rationing, the result may be to obtain a small loan 
at that rate of interest and * top-up* with a larger loan 
from. *other' financial intermediaries at a higher rate of 
interest.
The cartel had a marked effect on the mix of price and 
non-price competition in the market for retail funds. Whilst 
the cartel was in operation, changes in the price 
competitiveness of building societies services could only be 
initiated through changes in the recommended rates, and 
hence a deliberate change in interest rate differentials by
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a large majority of buiLding societies relative to other 
retail financial institutions. This resulted in a lower 
level of price competition than might be expected under a 
free market system.
The effect of the cartel can be seen in the diagram on 
tne next page. Tne Building Societies Association advised 
the level of interest rates on shares and deposits (e.g. ID) 
and mortgages (e.g. I M ) . The Stow Report (BSA 1979) argued 
that the effect of operating with low-interest rates that 
are at an uncompetitive level meant that there were 
insufficient funds to meet mortgage demand. For example, if 
the mortgage interest rate is IM, there will be excess 





Q QiQuantity of Mortgages 
SM = supply of mortgages
S q = supply of shares and deposits.
Effect of the Cartel on Mortgage Supply
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Q^-Q at ID rate of interest on shares and deposits, whereas 
the market clearing level for mortgages is IM-^ .
The cartel operated such that the supply of mortgages 
was largely determined by the supply of deposits. This meant 
that there was variable excess demand for mortgages over the 
interest rate cycle. Building Societies1 interest rates on 
deposits tended to lag behind any increase in the general 
level of market interest rates, resulting in a loss of 
competitiveness and a reduction in inflows to shareholders’ 
accounts. With a fall in inflows of funds, the building 
societies, as they would not push up mortgage interest rates 
to market clearing levels, and as running down liquid assets 
could not occur indefinitely, employed non-price rationing 
devices to limit mortgage supply. At such a time excess 
demand for mortgages tended to be high.
Conversely, when the general level of market interest 
rates was falling, the building societies* enjoyed greater 
competitivenesses a result of sticky interest rates deposit 
inflows were strong, and mortgage rationing declined. Thus 
when general interest rates were falling the excess demand 
for mortgages tended to be low. These effects can be seen in 
diagram 3.2. When general market interest rates as 
represented by LIBOR rose, excess demand for mortgages as 
measured by Meen (1985) tended also to rise, and when market 
rates fell, excess demand for mortgages fell. Overall, the 
cartel tended to operate in such a way as to stabilise and 
smooth out the fluctuations in building society interest 
rates as compared with general market rates, and the role of
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price effects in equilibriating the demand for and supply of 
mortgage funds was reduced. The Wilson Report (1980, pll3) 
expressed the views that the cartel led to inefficiency and 
a hindrance to competition, and argued that the abolition of 
the recommended rate system would lead to higher interest 
rates on shares and deposits (e.g. ID^) and the ability of 
societies to meet mortgage demand. It also noted that one 
likely impact of greater competition would be to encourage 
mergers, both smaller societies transferring their 
engagements to larger ones, and also mergers between larger 







tRATI ONI NG  
\ (RH)
a1972 1974 197b 1978 1989
L I B O R  A N D  M O R T G A G F  
R A T I O N I N G
56
Furthermore, the cartel meant that in general, whilst 
price competition was stifled, competition for retail funds 
was largely effected through the rapid growth of advertising 
and the dramatic increase in the number of building society 
branches. (See Table 3.2).
There was also, however, scope for more efficient 
societies to circumvent the constraints of the recommended 
rate system. In particular, some small societies with low 
management expense ratios were able to offer premia above 
the recommended rate.
It would thus appear that the building societies* own 
portfolio strategies and objectives were a major determinant 
of the manner in which business was conducted. The building 
societies* objectives tended to outweigh the portfolio 
preferences of the members of the building societies and 
their demand for financial intermediation services. With 
deposit rates kept artificially low, inflows of funds were 
lower than would have been expected under a competitive 
market clearing system, and hence this affected the ability 
of the societies to meet mortgage demand.
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Table 3.2















































3.3 Monetary Control, Competition and Innovation
Tiie mode of operation of monetary control was perhaps 
the single most important factor affecting the relative 
competitive positions and degree of innovation by banks and 
building societies over the period 1970-1979.
Initially the broad approach of monetary control under 
CCC was towards free operation of the price mechanism and 
free competition in the financial system, with the level of 
credit to be determined by cost, and away from quantitative 
monetary control which tended to lead to disintermediation, 
distortion, and a lower level of competition than would be 
expected under a less restrictive system.
As explained below, however, it was soon deemed 
necessary by the monetary authorities t-o impose more 
restrictive monetary control arrangements on the banking 
system, controls which effectively then hampered the ability 
of the banks to compete in the personal sector financial 
markets for the rest of the 1970's.
The clearing banks, similarly to the building 
societies, had operated an interest rate cartel since 1955, 
whereby the seven day deposit rate was fixed at two per cent 
below Bank Rate, and lending rates informally linked to the 
Bank Rate. There was therefore an effective limitation to 
tne degree of interest rate competition between the retail 
banks and between the retail banks and other financial 
ins titutions.
Both the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI 
1967) and tne Monopolies Commission (MC 1968), criticised
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tne operation of the cartel, arguing that it led to an over­
emphasis on non-price rather than price competition, and 
particularly in the form of the rapid expansion of the 
branch network in the 1960*s (see Table 3.3). The call by 
the NBPI and the MG for the abolishment of the cartel was 
given impetus by changes in the broad ethos and practical 
methods of monetary control introduced under the Competition 
and Credit Control regime (September 1971). The previous 
policy of direct controls, particularly in the form of 
quantitative ceilings on bank lending were seen to be 
inefficient, and a constraint on competition in the 
financial system. Moreover, the interest rate cartel acted 
as an encouragement to secondary banking institutions to 
develop at the expense of the clearing banks.
Moreover, quantitative controls led to large-scale 
disintermediation through the growth of the secondary money 
markets; flows of funds outside of the banking system which 
avoided the quantitative monetary control ceilings and 
confused interpretation of monetary conditions (further 
analysis of aspects of disintermediation is carried out in 
Chapter Seven).
Initially it was thought that under CCC two main 
instruments would be sufficient, reserve requirements and 
special deposits. Banks were required to keep reserve ratios 
of 1 2 %% between eligible reserve assets and eligible 
liabilities [7]. Secondly, the banks were obliged to place 
special deposits with the Bank of England when called for 






























Committee of London Clearing Banks^a  ^
Branch Network, 1960-19&8
C.L.C.B. (1977) and Abstract of Banking Statistics 
(May, 1988)
Barclays, Lloyds, Williams and Glyn, Midland, 
National Westminster.
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A call for special deposits was expected to have the effect 
of placing pressure on the banks reserve ratios, forcing 
them to sell eligible assets. Goodhart (1981) maintains that 
the decision to impose a reserve ratio arose out of the 
monetary authorities uncertainty as to the banks* reaction 
to operating in a less constrained, more competitive market 
environment. The reserve ratio could act as a pivot against 
which the monetary authorities could apply pressure through 
calling for special deposits.
The attitude of the banking industry in the competitive 
system was indeed dramatic. As would be expected, greater 
competition led to the administratively maintained margin 
between deposit and lending rates being reduced and an 
increase in absolute deposit and leriding rates. In effect, 
with quantitative lending controls abolished, the banks 
actively competed for deposits on price terms, pushing up 
the average rate paid on deposits at banks. The shift from 
non-price to price competition by the retail banks is partly 
evidenced by the rationalization of the branch network in 
the 1970*s as compared to the expansion of the 1960*s (see 
Table 3.3). There was a tremendous "reintermediation** effect 
after the abolition of quantitative controls in September 
1971, with funds previously maintained outside of the 
banking system being re-channelled through the banks. The 
growth of bank deposits and bank lending was particularly 
fast after the removal of the quantitative controls. As can 
be seen from diagram 3.3 bank lending to the non-bank 
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the end of 1973, from £11.2 billion to £17.1 billion (see 
Table 3.4), and doubled over the two year period end of 1971 
to end 1973 from £11.2 billion to £22.9 billion.
Table 3.4
YEAR £ billion ^ G r o w t h
1970 9.6 1 0 . 0
1971 1 1 . 2 16.7
1972 17.1 52.2







Bank lending to the Non-Bank Private Sector^a ^(end period)
Source: Financial Statistics, various Issues.
Table 6 . 6
Notes:
(a) All banks in the United Kingdom plus National Giro, the 
discount market, the Bank of England Banking 
Department.
(b) End of first quarter 1973 inclusion of new contributors 
to series.
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Deposits of the non-bank private sector held with the 
banking system also showed fast growth after the removal of 
quantitative controls - by 30% in each of the years 1972 and 
1973 (see-diagram 3.4 and Table 3.5).
Table 3.5











Bank deposits held by the Non-Bank Private Sector
(end period)
Source: Financial Statistics, various Issues,








1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
NBPS DEPOSITS HITH THE BANKING SECTOR' (/ CHANCE ON PREVIOUS VUfi)
DIAGHflM 3.4-
66
The Bank of England emphasized die importance of
reintermediation of funds channelled through the banking
system, particularly on the part of the personal sector,
"Thus-on the asset side, after so many years of 
controls and restrictions, it was hardly surprising 
that there was a large immediate surge in bank lending 
to those sectors against which the controls had been 
most severely directed, such as the personal sector. 
The extent of the shift was perhaps somewhat 
exaggerated both by the comparative stagnation in the 
demand from manufacturing industry for bank finance, 
though this now seems to be reviving, and also by the
various measures taken, for example, in the field of
taxation and in the abolition of terms control, which 
had the effect of encouraging personal borrowing still 
further".
(Governor of Bank of England, October 1972
Quoted in BEQB 1984(e) p42)
As can be seen from diagram 3 . 5  and Table 3.6 bank
lending to the personal seccor showed particularly fast
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Table 3.6
YEAR £ billion % Growth
1970 2 . 0 6 . 1
1971 2.5 25.0
1972 5.4 116.0





. 1978 10.5 18.0
1979 13.8 31.4
Bank Lending to the Personal Sector(a) (end year)^c ^
Source: Financial Statistics. Various Issues. Tabl’e 10.3
N o t e s :
(a) and (b) see Notes for Table 3*4-
(c) Includes loans for house purchase.
Interestingly, the banks also increased their lending 
for house purchase, thus competing directly with the 
building societies for market share, although bank lending 
for nouse purchase still accounted for only a small 
proportion of total mortgage lending. Net new loans for 
house purchase increased by over 280% during 1972,
(Diagram 3.6) although the absolute figures were relatively 
small compared with the building societies (Table 3.7).
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DIflGRfiH : U
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1988
NET NEH BftNK LOftNS FOR HOUSE PURCHASE 





BANKS O T H E R S
1970 1088 40 181
1971 1600 90 227
1972 2215 345 475
1973 1999 310 584
1974 • 1490 90 859
1975 2768 60 902
1976 3618 80 230
1977 4100 1 2 1 141
1978 5715 275 47
1979 5271 597 593
Net New Loans for House Purchase (end period, £ m i l l i o n ) 
Source: Table 9.4 Financial Statistics, various issues.
(a) Other: Local Authorities, Insurance Companies, Pension 
Funds, other Public Sector.
The extent to which the banks were able to attract
retail deposits is shown in diagram 3.7 and table 3.8.
Personal sector deposits held with the monetary sector grew
by over 25% in 1973, although it is clear that most of the 
growth in money balances in 1973 and 1974 were at the 
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Table 3.8
YEAR DEPOSITS WITH DEPOSITS WITH DEPOSITS WITH
MONETARY SECTOR BUILDING SOCIETIES SAYINGS BANKS
SIGHT TIME
1970 10062 10059 1772
1971 11015 1 2 0 2 0 2013
1972 12901 14159 2367
1973 16317 16347 2533
1974 19290 18316 2595
1975 19206 22477 2866
197-6 20461 25778 3281
.1977 10372 10646 31710 3892
1978 1 2 0 1 0 12164 36609 4463
1979 1.3209 17148 42442 6896
Personal Sector Hoidings of Liquid Assets. (End period,
£ million)
Source: Table 9.5 Financial Statistics. Various Issues.
Given the rapid growth of lending and d e p o s i t s ,the
chosen monetary control system appeared to be a failure,
"clearly the standard control mechanism had not worked; 
the first need was to discover why this was. An 
important factor, in my view, was that we had failed to 
foresee the likely course of bank benaviour in an 
unconstrained system (a failure which may be more 
easily understood since the British banks had noc had 
tne chance of operating in such a milieu in living 
memory). In particular, in an oligopolistic banking 
system, with a large element of 'endowment' profits 
accruing on assets neld against zero-yielding current 
accounts, the extent to which the banks might take the 
expansionary and competitive bit between their teeth 
and gallop off was unexpected". (Goodhart (1981, pl23)
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Under CCC, tnere were two major transmission channels 
by wnich interest rates were expected to affect the money 
supply. Firstly, an increase 4.n interest rates on public 
sector debt was expected to result in funds being 
transferred by the non-bank private sector out of bank 
deposits and into holdings of public sector debt. Increases 
in rates on public sector debt were not expected to be 
matched by increases in rates on bank deposits, as the 
latter were presumed to be stickier.
However, under the competitive, aggressive system 
unleashed by CCC, the banks* competed strongly for deposits 
(particularly wholesale), such that there was not such a 
decisive change in interest differentials between public 
sector debt and bank deposits when the former were raised.
If differentials were unaffected, a policy of raising 
interest rates to induce a shift out of deposits into public 
sector debt would have no affect on interest differentials, 
and hence no effect on monetary expansion.
This placed much more emphasis on the second main 
channel, the effect of interest rates on the demand for bank 
borrowing, which appeared to be a relatively weak 
relationship (Bank of England 1984 (e), p44).
The main problem, as far as monetary control was 
concerned, was the liability management policies of the 
commercial banks. The advent of liability management meant 
that the retail banks were largely credit driven, rather 
than being deposit driven i.e. the banks granted credit, and 
then changed their liability portfolio in response to this
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increase in assets, rattier than vice versa, Goodhart, (1986(<o 
p 8 8 ). Traditionally, equilibrium between assets and 
liabilities was maintained by buying or selling marketable 
government securities; with the advent of a robust inter­
bank market the retail banks increased the tendency to rely 
on raising wholesale deposits at short notice. Such 
"liability side liquidity" allowed the retails banks to 
fulfil the demand for credit.
To counteract the banks aggressive bidding for funds 
through liability management, the Supplementary Special 
Deposits (SSD)[9] scheme was introduced, colloquially known 
as the 'corset'. The SSD scheme represented an attempt by 
the monetary authorities to inhibit the banking sector from 
utilizing the practice of liability management, in the face 
of a strong demand for credit. Under the SSD scheme, non­
interest bearing Supplementary Special Deposits had to be 
placed at the Bank of England if a bank's interest-bearing 
eligible liabilities (IBEL' s ) grew faster than the specified 
penalty-free rate, which was a percentage figure of the base 
level of IBEL's. The periods during which the corset applied 
are shown in Table 3.9.
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TABLF 3-3 THE. SSD S.CHFMF
The scheme applied in principle to ail ‘listed* banks and deposit-taking finance houses; but small institutions and (because of the special 
circumstances there) institutions in Northern Ireland were exempt
Institutions were required to lodge non-interest-bearing deposits with the Bank of England if their interest-bearing eligibie liabilities (see r.e: 
box) grew faster than a specified rate. The rate of deposit was progressive from 5% to 50% as the amount of excess growth increased.
The liability to pay SSDs was calculated monthly, on a moving three-month average of IBELs.
The precise details which applied to each activation of the scheme are shown beiow.
Scheme announced Base period*3*
17 Dec. 1973 Cct.-Dec. 1973
Allowable growth
8% over first six 







5% over first six 
months: i%  per month 
thereafter
4% over period to 
Aug.-Oct. 1978; 1% per 
month thereafter
Rate of deposit 
Until Nov. 1974
5% in respect of excess of up to 1%
2 5 % ..................   o fl% -3%
5 0 % ...................  „ of over 3%
From Nov. 1974 
5% in respect of excess of up to 3%
2 5 % ..............................of3% -5%
5 0 % ..................   „ of over 5%
Asabove
As above






£10 million 18 June 1980(c)
(a) The base level was the average level of IBELs over the period shown.
fb) The scheme did not apply to institutions with IBELs below the amount shown.
fc) The announcement of the termination of the scheme was made on 26 March: iinal deposits were repaid in August.
The underlying motive of the corset was to force the 
banks into a decision-making process limited to the choice 
between accepting lower profits on any additional lending 
undertaken, or to widen their margins. The incentive to 
widen margins was provided by the face that the opportunity
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cost of pJLacing non-interest bearing SSD's with the Bank was
greater than the cost of acquiring extra reserve assets
(BEQB March 1982). The expected result was summed up by the
Bank of England,
"To the extent that they widened their margins a 
'wedge' was driven between their deposit and loan 
rates. Even if higher lending rates had only a small 
short-run impact on the demand for credit, lower 
wholesale deposit rates relative to base rates were 
expected to reduce the opportunities for round- 
tripping. There was also some hope that the reduced 
profitability of marginal business might deter the 
banks from expanding their balance sheets either by 
pursuing innovative lending policies, or by making 
loans with a high default risk. The ability of the SSD 
scheme to encourage non-price rationing by the banks 
might have been important because of the interest- 
sensitivity, at least in the short-run, of the demand 
for credit '. . •(BEQB March 1982," p77)
Alongside the corset, tne Bank of England also imposed
qualitative lending guidelines to the banking system. The
Bank of England consumer credit notice of 17 December 1973
requested the banks to exercise restraint on lending to the
personal sector and to property companies. The request was
reaffirmed in subsequent credit control notices, such that
the banking sector was effectively constrained in their
lending policies to the personal sector throughout the 1974-
1979 period. [10]. This had a major effect on their ability
to compete in the personaL sector retail financial markets.
Furthermore, the retail banks were also requested to
restrict the interest rate paid on deposits of less than
£10,000 to 9%% between September 1973 and February 1975. The
retail banks were thus for a time constrained in their
ability to compete with the building societies for personal
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sector deposits.
Largely as a result of the SSD scheme and the 
qualitative lending guidelines inhibiting the banks* 
potential for competition, the building society movement 
faced a favourable market environment over the majority of 
the period 1974-1979. Bank lending to the NBPS dropped 
dramatically during the first phase of the SSD scheme (see 
Diagram 3.3) and remained stable over the second and third 
phases. Total bank lending to persons, and lending solely 
for house purchase were also curtailed, particularly in 1973 
and 1974, (Diagrams 3.5 and 3.6). The retail banks were 
also unable to effectively compete for retail deposits 
during the operation of the corset and the enforced lending 
guidelines, and the rate of growth of bank balances held by 
the personal sector declined rapidly from 1973 to 1977.
The periodic imposition of direct monetary controls 
between December 1973 and June 1980, aimed at reducing the 
banks deposit bases, thus restricted a major element of the 
potential competition for retail funds, strengthening the 
competitive position of the building societies. Table 3.10 
shows clearly the rapid growth in personal sector holdings 
of money as a proportion of gross financial wealth over 
1971-1974, and the decline after 1974 as a result of 
stringent portfolio controls on the banks.
Leigh-Pemberton, then the Chairman of the National 
Westminster Bank, put forward the objections of the banking 
community to the asymmetry of monetary control,
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Table 3.10





1970 13.7 10.8 7.1 70.4
1971 12.5 10.7 6.3 70.6
1972 12.8 11.2 5.9 70.1
1973 16.5 13.5 6.3 63.6
1974 21.7 16.9 7.0 54.4
1975 17.2 16.0 5.7 61.1
1976 17.1 16.8 5.5 60.6
1977 14.5 16.7 5.1 63.7
1978 15.2 17.5 5.4 61.9
1979 16.0 17.6 4.5 61.9
Personal Sector Holdings of Gross financial wealth by a s s e t 
types as a percentage of total (end period).
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues. Table 14.4
(a) Notes and coin plus sterling and foreign currency sigtit 
and time deposits at UK banks.
(b) Local authority temporary loans, savings bank deposits, 
UK stocks and shares, public sector long-term debt, 
trade credit, equity in insurance and pension funds, 
accrual of taxes and interest and other overseas and 
domestic assets.
79
"Another area in which the banks feel that they are the 
victims of discrimination is in credit control. In 
these days of practical monetarism and monetary 
targetry, bank deposits as a major constituent of 
sterling M3 come in for a great deal of attention.
Other institutions, whose liabilities may in fact be 
very close substitutes for bank d e p o s i t s , are outside 
this control, and to the extent that these institutions 
are able to meet any unsatisfied demand for credit the 
regulation of demand for real resources is frustrated. 
It also means that in times of bank credit restriction, 
non-banks are better able to capture market shares of 
deposits and lending from the banks. The ’corset* 
limiting the growth of bank interest-bearing deposits, 
is a particularly invidious form of control".
(1979 p9(Ltalics added))
According co Leigh-Pemberton, the changing nature of
Building society deposits necessitated placing building
societies under the same controls as were placed on the
banks (both in terms of fairness to banks and in terms of
efficiency of monetary control),
"The nearer other institutions liabilities become to 
bank deposits, and the greater their volume, the 
stronger the case for bringing these institutions 
within the ambit of credit control".
(1979. p9)
It would be expected, according to traditional economic
theory, that the building societies would have taken
advantage of the monetary controls on the retail banks,
"a combination of restrictive monetary policy and 
accumulating debt creates the opportunities for non­
bank intermediaries to offer more expensive attractions 
to creditors and hence to compete more actively with 
ba n k s " .
(Gurley and Shaw 1955, p532) 
Building Societies represented a special case, however, 
in terms of their mutuality and the existence of the cartel. 
The building societies did not actively compete with one 
another on price terms, and hence probably did not attract 
as many deposits from the banking system as they may have
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done if they were price competitive.
The growth of building societies over the period 1974- 
1977 was largely at the expense of the retail banks, whilst
the corset was in operation, (Table 3.11) 
Table 3.11
•
Year Banks Building Societies National Savings
1963-72 +0.3 +16 • 2 -16.3
1972-74 +5.5 + 0.2 - 5.1
1974-77 -8.5 + 9.5 - 0.7
1977-79 +0.4 - 0.4 r ~
1963-79 -2.3 +25.5 -22.1
Deposits of the Personal Sector.Changes in Market Share
(end p e riod) 
Sources Vittas and Frazer (1980)
The evidence appears to indicate that the corset had a 
major affect on the ability of the banking sector to compete 
with the building societies. The banks lost market share to 
societies particularly over the period 1974-1977, a time of 
heavy corset restrictions.
Building Societies thus faced little effective 
competition for retail funds, reflected in their product 
variety and product range (Lewis 1987), (Table 3.12).
Throughout the 1 9 7 0 *s the building societies* funds 
were dominated by the ordinary account. Ordinary shares 
represented over 87% of total savings at building societies 
in 1974, falling slightly to 80.5% by 1979 as a result of 
the limited growth in term shares.
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Table 3.12






1974 87.2 5.6 3.8 3.5
1975 85.7 7.3 3.6 3.4
1976 84.6 8.5 3.6 3.3
1977 83.2 9.4 3.4 3.9
1978 83.1 9.9 3.5 3.5
1979 80.5 13.0 3.4 3.0
Distribution of Savings Accounts at Building Societies 
-------------------------- 1^7 4 -1973'------------
Source: Boleat (1986, p21).
Some commentators would argue that a major factor 
affecting the competitive environment was the lack of 
competitive neutrality (Llewellyn 1986 (a), (b), 1987). In 
particular; the Committee of London Clearing Banks 
complained that Building Societies have enjoyed various 
unfair artificial competitive advantages, (CLCB 1977, pl89).
In relation to the supply of funds to building 
societies, it has often been argued that the existence of 
the composite rate tax system [11] gave them a competitive 
advantage relative to the retail banks (until the extension 
of that system to the retail banks in April 1985). The 
composite rate system worked such that, for example, w i t h  an 
ordinary share rate of 9.75%, a basic tax rate of 30% and a 
composite rate of 25.25% the gross effective yield to tax 
paying investors is 13.93%, but the gross cost to Societies 
of their funds is only 13%. Thus the composite rate system 
allowed building societies to maintain a lower mortgage rate
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than would be necessary under tax procedures applied to the 
banking system at the time (BSA 1972). The banks complained 
that this represented a fiscal advantage in that it acted as 
an inducement to those paying income tax to deposit with 
building societies rather than the retail banks. In the 
example above, to an investor liable to the basic rate of 
tax, the gross equivalent yield is 13.93%, whilst for an 
investor not liable to tax the gross equivalent yield is the 
same as the net yield, 9.75%. According to the CLCB, 
building societies benefited to the extent that tax paying 
investors are more sensitive to differentials in interest 
rates between institutions than are non-tax payers. Thus the 
portfolio preferences of the users of the financial system 
were being affected by the non-neutral taxation 
considerations between building societies and banks. Boleat 
(1986), points out however, that the relative competitive" 
advantage is dependent on the elasticities of demand for 
building society shares and deposits for basic-rate tax 
payers and those not liable to tax. He disputes the point 
that those liable to the basic rate of tax are more interest 
sensitive than those not liable to tax. Also, it should be 
noted that whilst the composite rate may mean that societies 
gain a competitive advantage by attracting money from tax­
payers, at the same time they may suffer a disadvantage in 
attracting money from non-tax payers.
It has also been argued that building societies have 
received favourable treatment in respect of their 
corporation tax liability (formerly it was set at a rate of
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40%, as opposed to the standard 52% rate applied to the 
clearing banks) and the exemption from taxation of the 
capital gains on their gilt-edged securities transactions 
(provided they have been held for more than twelve months). 
It should be noted, however, that due to leasing 
arrangements banks rarely paid the full 52% corporation tax, 
in fact more commonly banks pay effective tax rates of about 
20%.
The main factors affecting the activities of the 
building societies and banks can be seen in terms of a 
regulatory matrix (Table 3.13), after Llewellyn (1987)
( *regulatory' here used to mean any form of regulation, 
official or unofficial, that in some way affects the 
operations of building societies and banks). The functions 
or business areas which the banks could undertake were 
largely prohibited by the monetary controls examined 
earlier, and they were unable to actively compete in the 
personal sector savings market or the mortgage market. Their 
pricing policies were also affected to the extent that they 
were effectively restrained from actively competing for 
deposits. In addition, moral suasion was at times used to 
affect the lending and pricing policies of the banks.
The building societies, by contrast, were not included 
in the portfolio monetary controls and hence were 
unrestrained in this manner in terms of their pricing 
activities. However, the building societies, as emphasized 
earlier, affected their own pricing by operating the self- 
imposed interest rate setting cartel, such that they too
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Table 3.13















X - Building Societies
Y - Banks
Y^ - Monetary control? affecting the banks' ability to compete in the mortgage market.
Y 2 ■. Monetary controls affecting the banks' ability to compete on price terms for deposits.
Y 3 ■ Moral suasion by the Bank of England on the sectors to which the retail banks, should lend.
Y 4 Moral suasion by the Bank of England on maximum deposit interest rates of the retail banks
Y 5 - Legal restrictions on permitted activities of banks.
Yg - Legal restrictions on banks' ownership of insurance companies.
Yy and
Yg - Self-regulation by the Bank of England upon capital and liquidity
requirements and standards.
- . Legal restrictions on permitted activities of building societies.
X£ “ Legal restrictions on ownership of building societies, and building
societies' ownership of other financial institutions.
X 3 - Self-imposed cartel.
X4 and
X 5 - Self-regulation by the Building Societies Commission on liquidity,
reserves, standards.
Regulatory Matrix for Banks and Building Societies 1974-1980
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faced pricing constraints, but as a result of unofficial 
regulation. On their functional side, the building societies 
were not constrained by portfolio controls as the banks 
were, but were more strictly regulated in terms of the areas 
of business allowed under the Building Societies Act (1962).
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3.4 Conclusion
The mix of institutional features and asymmetric 
monetary control have been important determinants of the 
modus operandi of building societies and banks pre 1980, and 
hence major factors in both the nature of competition 
between these financial intermediaries and the degree of 
financial innovation.
The recommended rate system operated by the building 
societies ran counter to the traditional economic model of a 
cartel. Whilst most cartels aim to raise prices, the 
building societies* cartel maintained the deposit and 
mortgage interest rates below market clearing levels. It has 
been shown in section 3.2 that the existence of the cartel 
had a marked effect on the form of competition for retail 
personal sector financial business and subsequently on the 
level of innovation. As a change in interest rates was only 
carried out en masse, price competition was effectively 
stifled. The mix of competition in terms of price versus 
non-price aspects was thus aimed almost exclusively at n o n ­
price initiatives. The fast growth of building society 
branches was a major non-price competitive element, as was 
the degree of advertising.
The cartel tended to encourage the building society 
industry to adopt balance sheet growth as its main 
objective. The existence of fixed, wide margins led to large 
surpluses for the more efficient societies, which tended to 
provide further impetus to non-price forms of competition, 
\nd stifle any need for product innovation on the part of
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building societies.
The cartel smoothed and stabilized building societies* 
interest rates as compared to general market rates, causing 
a high level of excess mortgage demand when interest rates 
were rising, and lower excess mortgage demand when interest 
rates were falling. The price effects of the abolition of 
the cartel on the effectiveness of monetary control are 
examined in detail in Chapter Seven.
A major factor in the degree of competition and 
innovation in the personal sector retail financial market 
lay in the degree of asymmetry of monetary control with 
regards to the retail banks. The effect of monetary control, 
in particular the SSD scheme, was to inhibit the retail 
banks from entering the mortgage market on any significant 
scale or from effectively competing for personal sector 
deposits. This lack of competitive neutrality had a 
significant effect on the mortgage market and the way in 
which building societies operated. The cartel could only be 
operational if the building societies faced no effective 
competition from other financial institutions. With no 
competition from the banks the building societies were able 
to maintain deposit and mortgage rates below market clearing 
levels, and operate a policy of rationing mortgage supply. 
Lack of financial innovation reflected in the simple and 
homogeneous nature of building society and bank deposit 
accounts was determined by the mutuality ethos, the cartel, 
restrictive monetary controls placed on the banks, and 
subsequent low level of competition.
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Notes
[1] Simons (1936) was one of the first economists 
interested in the interaction between financial 
innovation and the monetary system.
[2] For broad overviews of financial innovation in the U.K. 
see Fforde (1983(b)), and for a somewhat earlier 
perspective, Greenbaum and Heywood (1971). For the 
United States see Broaddus (1985), Lindsey (1982), 
Porter et al (1979), Pierce (1983), Simpson (1984). For 
Canada see C Freedman (1983) and R F Lucas (1983).
[3] On the broad issues relating to the recent evolution 
and growth of the U.K. building societies sector, see 
Boddy (1980). Fforde (I983)(b), and Boleat (1986). See 
Cleary (1965) for an earlier perspective, and Bellman 
(1927) for a historical picture.
[4] The 3uilding Societies Act 1986 has of course 
superseded this Act (see Chapter Four).
[5] This is confirmed by the variety of objective functions 
expounded in econometric models of building society 
behaviour. See Dodds (1981) for a survey of the 
literature on building society modelling.
[6] The ability of the building society movement to operate 
a cartel explicitly exempt from the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (1976) is an example of the privileged 
position building societies occupied as major providers 
of home loans. See Boleat (1986) ppl75-177 for a review 
of the historical development of the cartel.
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[7] Between September 1971 and January 1981, each bank was 
required to hold at least 12%% of its eligible 
liabilities in the form of reserve assets. The reserve 
asset ratio was reduced to 10% in January 1981, 
temporarily reduced to 8% for most of March and April 
1981, and abolished in August 1981. Reserve assets 
comprised of:
(a) Balances at the Bank of England (other than 
special or supplementary deposits).
(b) British government and Northern Ireland Treasury 
Bills.
(c) Secured money at call with London discount market 
institutions.
(d) British government stocks with a residual maturity 
of less than one year.
(e) Local authority bills eligible for re-discount at 
the Bank.
(f) Commercial bills eligible for re-discount at the 
Bank (i.e. eligible bank bills) up to a maximum of 
2% of eligible liabilities.
[8] Between 1971 and 1980 eligible liabilities mainly 
comprised of:
(a) All sterling deposits, of an original maturity of 
two years or under, from U.K. residents (other 
than banks) and from overseas residents (other 
than overseas offices).
(b) All sterling deposits of whatever term, from the 
U.K. Banking sector net of sterling claims
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(including non-reserve asset lending to listed 
discount market institutions).
(c) All sterling certificates of deposit issued, of 
whatever term, less any holdings of such 
certificates.
(d) The bank's net deposit liability, if any, in 
sterling to its overseas offices.
(e) The bank's net liability, if any, in conveniences 
other than sterling.
[9] A full account of the SSD scheme is found in BEQB,
March 1982.
[10] It was possible, however, for lenders and borrowers to 
be brought together outside of the banking sector. Such 
"disintermediation" occurred when large corporate 
customers borrowed through the use of an acceptance 
rather than an advance, under which a bank would agree 
to accept and guarantee bills issued by the customer. 
These bank-bills were close substitutes for 
certificates of deposit in terms of liquidity, 
marketability and default risk, yet, as they were only 
a contingent liability of an accepting bank, they were 
represented for accounting purposes as off-balance- 
sheet items and hence excluded from the IBELs 
definition and from £M3. (See Chapter Seven for further 
analysis of disintermediation activities).
[11] Through the composite tax rate scheme the Inland 
Revenue collects directly from Building Societies and 
retail banks the amount of tax revenue which would be
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paid in aggregate by the individual depositors on their 
interest receipts if they were received gross and the 
basic rate of income tax applied to all tax-paying 
depositors. Thus, as some deposits have always earned 
incomes below the minimum income tax threshold, the 
composite rate of tax has always been somewhat below 
the basic rate of income tax.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RE-REGULATION, COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
BY BUILDING SOCIETIES AND BANKS 1 9 8 0 - 1 ^ 7
o
4.0 Introduction
One of the main factors affecting the degree of 
competition and innovation by the building societies and 
retail banks in the 1970's has been isolated as regulatory 
constraint. Monetary controls affecting the banking sector 
and creating a regulatory asymmetry tended to limit 
competition for personal sector retail financial business 
for the majority of the 1970's. The building societies 
recommended rate system could only really exist in such an 
environment characterised by ineffective competition. 
Regulatory constraint, lack of competition, and the cartel 
were the major determinants of the low level of innovation 
during this period. To the extent that building societies 
did not come under the aegis of monetary control, they 
enjoyed a major competitive advantage over the banks.
Given the above constraints on competition and 
innovation, an obvious starting point for an analysis of the 
main catalysts of financial change and innovation would be 
to concentrate on structural change involving the above 
factors - regulation, competition, and the cartel. Section
4.1 assesses the immediate effect of re-regulation in terms 
of changes in the modus operandi of monetary controls upon 
the competitive aspect of the personal sector retail 
financial services market, and analyses the importance of 
regulatory-induced financial change. The effects of changing
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monetary controls upon the operations of the retail banks 
are detailed, including an analysis of the effects upon the 
market for mortgage loans. It is of some importance to the 
monetary authorities if changes in monetary control 
procedures stimulate financial innovations which may 
subsequently affect the very same controls.
The implications of a change in market structure and 
competition upon the operation of the building s o c i e t i e s 1 
recommended rate system is considered in Section 4.2. The 
effects of a competitive financial market on the degree of 
financial innovation are investigated in terms of both 
economic theory and events that occurred in practice. The 
particular innovations introduced by building societies and 
banks are analysed, as is the changing mix of price and non­
price competition that has occurred over time.
Special emphasis is placed on the change in interest 
rate strategy adopted by the building societies. The average 
mortgage rate and deposit rates in the more competitive 
dynamic system are compared with the 1970*s average interest 
rates for evidence of policy change. The fluidity of 
interest rate movements is analysed, to investigate whether 
or not building society interest rate changes have become 
less 'sticky* as economic theory would tend to suggest. An 
analysis is also made of the effect of competition on 
building society and bank margins. Given that one of the 
major policy instruments of monetary control is the 
manipulation of interest rates,(see Chapter Seven) it is of 
some importance to establish if there has been a change in
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interest rate policy by the financial institutions 
concerned.
Particular attention is paid to the abolition of the 
cartel, the subsequent dimninished role of mortgage 
rationing by building societies, and the increased 
importance of the 'price1 of mortgages as reflected in a 
more market related mortgage interest rate.
Section 4.3 examines the relative market shares of 
building societies and banks, and the changing competitive 
advantage over time, and assesses the impact of regulatory 
convergence on the activities of these financial 
intermediaries. An analysis is made of the degree to which 
building society's and banks have become less differentiated 
in their activities as a result of regulatory change 
(particularly as a result of new powers given to building 
societies under the Building Societies Act 1986), and as a 
result of increased competition and innovation. The extent 
to which building societies and banks are becoming more 
homogeneous may be of some importance to the operation of 
monetary control (this point is raised in more detail in 
Chapter Five).
Section 4.4 concludes by summarizing the main 
innovations introduced, and the major determinants acting as 
catalysts for financial innovation.
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4.1 Re-regulation and competition in the personal sector
retail financial market
Since the beginning of the 1980*s the building 
societies sector has undergone considerable evolution, in 
terms of both the innovative financial services offered and 
the apparently more commercial orientation of business 
o bjectives.[l] The metamorphosis of the building society 
movement has been emphasized by Llewellyn,
"The industry is now changing substantially in three
major respects:
(i) the internal cohesion of the industry is being 
eroded as a more aggressively individualistic 
business ethos develops,
(ii) individual societies are adopting a more
explicitly commercial approach to their business, 
and
(iii) in the process of becoming more aggressive,
building societies are becoming less ‘passive 
reactors* to their environment*
(Llewellyn, 1985a, p29)
It is possible to isolate the major factors that have 
brought this about: regulatory change, competition and 
technology appear to have been the main influences affecting 
the personal sector retail financial market. [2.] An analysis 
of the determinants of financial change by building 
societies and banks is obviously of some importance, 
particularly if it is found that new modes of monetary 
control result in innovation by financial intermediaries.
Changes in the U.K. monetary control framework, 
introduced at the beginning of the 1980*s, appear to have 
been the major catalyst in stimulating increasingly 
competitive conditions within the retail financial sector.
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Many of the subsequent innovations by building societies and
banks appear to have resulted indirectly from this change in
monetary control through the increased level of competition.
Recently, Hester (1981), commenting on the U.S. financial
system, has pointed to the possible link between regulation
and institutional change:
"Monetary policy is poorly designed if it fails to take 
into account the possibility that conditions which 
result from policy changes may lead to innovations'*.
(pl42)
Indeed, the effects of Competition and Credit Control upon 
the activities of the retail banks (isolated in Chapter 
Three), appear to be a classic example of this form of 
regulatory induced innovation.
Monetary controls, placed on the retail banks in the 
1970's, effectively precluded them from entering the 
personal sector financial market on any significant scale. 
This meant that the building societies sector faced 
relatively little competition from the retail banks. R e ­
regulation via a change in the system of monetary control 
had a particularly immediate effect on the competitive 
aspect of the mortgage market. Whilst the corset was in 
operation, the banks were largely inhibited from competing 
for mortgage business. The direct monetary controls acted as 
an artificial constraint on the banks' ability to expand 
into this area, by creating a restrictive environment in 
which they could operate. The abolition of exchange controls 
in October 1979 heralded the demise of the corset with the 
possibility that banks could by-pass the corset controls by
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disintermediation through the Euro sterling market. Official 
recognition of the inefficiencies in direct monetary 
controls (outlined in detail in Chapter Seven -® 
disintermediation, hard arbitrage, competitive n o n ­
neutrality) - came with a series of publications, the Green 
Paper on Monetary Control (1980), Background note on methods 
of monetary control (BEQB December 1980), Monetary control - 
provisions (BEQB September 1981), and Monetary control - 
next steps (BEQB March 1981). The main details of the 
changes in monetary control and their effectiveness are 
assessed in Chapter Seven. In essence, short-term interest 
rates were to be maintained within an (unpublished) band, 
and would be the sole instrument of monetary control. The 
abolishment of the corset and subsequent new arrangements 
for the operation of monetary control meant that banks and 
building societies came under the same instrument of control 
- interest rates (Congdon 1979), such that the arguments put 
forward by Leigh Pemberton (see Chapter Three),and Turnbull 
(1979) as to the asymmetry of monetary control could no 
longer be applied. Once interest rates were used to restrain 
monetary growth, there was ultimately no competitive 
disadvantage to the banking system, as recognized by Rose, 
(1978, P 7 ),
"If policy aims at controlling the quantity of money 
and the Government is content to do this solely by 
allowing interest rates to take whatever levels are 
needed to sell the necessary quantities of public 
sector debt, then there is no compelling reason why the 
result should be to restrict the banks* share of the 
total deposit market unfairly or to encourage the 
growth of other institutions .
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Removal of the corset constraint in 1980 
correspondingly removed the artificially created 
environment. The changed conditions meant that retail banks 
could increase their lending for house-purchase if they so 
wished. The initial competition between banks and building 
societies was thus on the assets side of the balance sheet, 
stimulated by a change in monetary control.
There was a substantial re-adjustment on the part of 
the retail banks to rectify a loan portfolio imbalance once 
the inhibiting controls were removed. In effect, the banks 
merely adjusted their portfolios to a level that they would 
have preferred had controls not been implemented.[3] It thus 
partly represented a once-for-all portfolio adjustment. With 
the building societies offering mortgage rates below the 
market clearing level, there had previously existed a 
mortgage queue, with demand outstripping supply, and hence a 
certain amount of non-price rationing by building societies. 
The banks were also able to concentrate on large mortgages 
(over £30,000) as a result of the building societies 
reluctance to lend at the higher end of the market.
Under such circumstances, there was scope for 
profitable lending by the retail banks, (Diagram 4.1). Once 
direct controls were removed, the prime reason for the 
growth of bank lending for house purchase was that of 
profitability. Another facet of the banks rationale for 
entering the mortgage market can be explained in terms of 
their overall strategy aimed at the ultimate objective of 
offering a complete package of financial services to the
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personal sector. Mortgage lending was thus used as a device
for introducing other business such as insurance, home
improvement loans and unsecured lending, both to extend
their customer base and to offer new services to existing
customers. The underlying factor, however, was that of
profit. Mortgage lending and total pending to the personal
sector tended to be a growth area for the retail banks, in
view of the relatively slower growth in the demand for bank
loans by the companies and overseas sectors (BEQB, February
1988(b)p81).The Bank of England has recognised the importance
of regulatory changes which may affect the degree of
competition and financial innovation in financial markets,
"Regulatory changes have also impinged on the provision 
of housing finance, although the catalyst for change 
can often be traced back to regulatory changes in a 
quite different market. This point is well illustrated 
in the United Kingdom, where the abolition of exchange 
controls in 1979 rendered direct controls on the growth 
of banks* balance sheets ineffective, and these 
controls were subsequently abandoned in 1980. Freed 
from controls on their sterling lending, the major 
retail banks felt less inhibited about entering the 
mainstream mortgage market, which they only did in
1982. The building societies* response to the 
competitive challenge led to the ending of the previous 
system of queues and mortgage rationing, and the 
setting of lending rates at market-clearing levels**.
(BEBQ December 1986 p529J
Although an increase in bank intermediation was
expected after the removal of controls in 1980, it appears
that the Bank of England was surprised at the subsequent
market effects,
"What was not so easily predictable was that the 
response would go far beyond a simple stock adjustment 
to contribute to an entirely new dynamic in competition 
between financial intermediaries**.
(BEQB December 1986, p501)
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The entry of the retail banks into the mortgage market 
precipitated an increased level of competition for personal 
sector funds,
"Competition between banks and building societies is 
not confined to their mortgage lending, but extends 
also into competition for deposits. The effect has been 
substantially to improve the attractiveness of personal 
sector liquid asset holdings relative to other assets".
(BEQB May 1987(a), p213)
It appears that there was a change in the retail banks 
funding strategy in terms of the retail/wholesale mix. The 
banks placed greater emphasis on raising funds from the 
retail market, resulting in a stowdown in the earlier 1970's 
trend of increasing wholesale funds. This change in funding 
mix is in large part a result of the change in competition 
between banks and building societies in the 1980's,
(Llewellyn and Drake, 1987).
Traditionally banks have not perceived the building 
societies as being major competitors because they were not 
in competition for lending, and because funds attracted by 
building societies are maintained within the banking system 
(only the ownership of deposits changes, whilst the total 
volume of deposits at banks remain unchanged). However, once 
banks and building societies were competing for mortgage and 
other business, it became logical to compete for deposits. 
Funds held or attracted by the retail banks at the expense 
of building societies will tend to reduce the societies' 
ability to lend for mortgage purposes. Moreover it became 
advantageous to attract deposit customers as this allowed 
customer relationships to develop and the customer base to
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grow, with substantial opportunities for increasing fee 
income and cross-selling financial services.
The entry of the retail banks into the mortgage market 
expedited the breakdown of the building societies cartel. 
Several smaller societies had already been offering interest 
rate premia above the cartel rate. The Abbey National 
Building Society, then the largest in the U.K., formally 
announced its withdrawal from the cartel in 1983. For a 
short period of time (October 1983 to November 1984), the 
Building Societies Association issued 'advised' rather than 
'recommended' rates of interest, although this was also 
later abandoned in November 1984[4]. A further significant 
factor in forcing the breakdown of the cartel, was the 
increasing reliance placed by the government on funding the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) through National 
Savings. Attractive interest rates were offered on National 
Savings investment accounts, representing a further increase 
in competition for building societies.
In particular, there was a target of £3 billion set for 
the contribution of National Savings to finance the PSBR in 
the 1981 Budget.
Of course, the government has a competitive advantage 
over the banks and building societies in the collection of 
funds through National Savings. The government has no 
liquidity or capital adequacy constraints, and can choose 
the returns on National Savings necessary to attract the 
desired inflpow of funds. Furthermore, the government can 
place favourable tax arrangements on National Savings in
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order to raise funds.
The importance of regulatory change can be seen from 
the regulatory matrix for banks and building societies for 
post 1980. In contrast to the earlier regulatory matrix, it 
can be seen that portfolio controls and moral suasion now 
constrain neither banks nor building societies. The retail 
banks functional areas are no longer limited as earlier by 
monetary controls, and they have been able to enter the 
mortgage market. Similarly, they can now compete on price 
terms with the abolition of the corset and the abrogation of 
moral suasion on lending to the personal sector.
Although the building societies have been granted 
substantial new powers in terms of the functional areas of 
business they are empowered to carry out, they are 
nevertheless still legally hindered by the Building 
Societies Act 1986, as outlined earlier. It may well prove 
to be the case that the removal of the remaining legal 
constraints on building societies functional activities will 
be the main catalyst for financial innovation and change in 
the future. It is also noticeable that there are no official 
or unofficial regulations affecting the pricing policies of 
the building societies or the banks, the former having 
abandoned their self-imposed constraint of the cartel in
1983.
Finally, it is of interest that both building societies 
and banks are regulated to a far greater degree than before 
by external agencies, in the form of the securities and 
Investments Board (SIB) and the various Self Regulatory
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Table 4.1
Geographical Functional Ownership Pricing standards Business operations
Portfolio Controls
Moral Suasion
legal i X X .
Self Imposed
Self Regulation XY XY
External Agency Y XY XY
No regulation XY Y XY
Building Societies « X 
Banks ■ Y
Regulatory Matrix for Banks and Building Societies 1980-1988
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Organizations (SRO's) established under the Financial 
Services Act, 1987,
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4.2 Financial Innovation by Building Societies and Retail
Banks
According to economic theory, in a competitive market 
system with no cartel restrictions, the entry of a large new 
competitor will have significant effects upon both the price 
and output of the incumbents product/service.
One major effect of banks competing for retail deposits 
has been a change in the intensity and mix of price and non­
price competition. Prior to 1980, building societies 
competed against each other almost exclusively on non-price 
terms, in particular through the extension of the branch 
network rather than through innovating their share and 
deposit accounts. The entry of the retail banks into the 
mortgage market and competing more aggressively for retail 
deposits, entailed a shift towards more explicit price 
competition and innovation in types of account being offered 
by both banks and building societies. Indeed, the rapid 
development of the branch network in the 1970fs slowed 
considerably in the 1980's as building societies 
concentrated more on innovative accounts and interest rate 
competition. The rather simple, homogeneous nature of 
building society ordinary shares, which dominated building 
societies funding in the 1970's, has declined dramatically 
in the 1980's.
This provides an interesting extension to Kane's 
"regulatory dialectic" which,
"treats political processes of regulation and economic 
processes of regulatory avoidance as opposing forces 
that, like riders on a see-saw, adapt continually to 
each other". (1981, p355)
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Kane argues that innovation is regulation induced, in that,
"in a regulated firm, an innovation can be justified....by its productivity in regulatory avoidance". (1981, p358)
An example of this regulation-innovation cycle in the
U.K. was the 'bill-leak' outlined in Chapter Three; the
growth of banks bills held outside the banking system in
order to facilitate off balance sheet lending and hence
avoid the corset restrictions. It appears, however, that the
events after the release of the banks from the corset are
qualitatively different from the cycle described by Kane.In
1980, re-regulation led to innovation in that it engendered
an increase in competition. Re-regulation of banks in the
form of the ending of the corset and subsequent competition
in the mortgage market, led to innovation by those
institutions not previously regulated (the building
societies) and by those previously regulated (the retail
banks). Rather than restrictive controls leading to
regulatory avoidance through financial innovation, the
liberalisation of controls through re-regulation contributed
to competitive financial innovations.
Diagram 4.2 gives some indication of the degree of
innovation by building societies [5]. It indicates the
relative movements in the distribution of balances held at
building societies.
Pre 1980, most societies limited the investment choices
available to members, as reflected in the diagram. Ordinary
shares accounted for 87.2% of shares and deposits at end-
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year 1974, falling slightly to 79% in 1980. Since 1980, 
however, ordinary accounts have fallen dramatically in terms 
of the share of retail deposits held at building societies 
(63% in 1981 as opposed to 16*5 % in 198 6 - see diagram 4.3).
Ordinary share accounts were superseded in terms of net 
inflow by term shares. First introduced in 1973, these 
accounts offered a guaranteed differential over ordinary 
share rates, in return for investing for a fixed time 
period. Pre 1980 term shares tended to be relatively 
restrictive in that they were less liquid than both existing 
building society share accounts and bank seven-day deposits. 
Money could not be withdrawn from term shares before the 
original term to maturity had expired, often a period of 
between two to five years. In terms of balances held at 
building societies, term shares grew relatively slowly from 
5.6% in 1974 to 9.9% in 1978. During the 1980's many of 
these restrictions were considerably reduced in severity, in 
particular by the introduction of term shares with 
withdrawal facilities (but often with an interest penalty). 
Subsequently, there was a greater rate of growth of term 
shares as a proportion of total balances, from less than 10% 
in 1978 to 23.4% in 1982.
The relative decline in the growth of term shares after 
1983 is largely a result of a new innovation, the high 
interest account. From 1983 onwards there has been an 
outflow of deposits from all types of accounts except high 
interest accounts. These were first offered in 1980, paying 
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(usually seven days) and minimum deposits (sometimes only 
£500). These accounts have gradually become increasingly 
flexible, especially in terms of accessibility, many 
societies offering immediate withdrawal facilities. There is 
little difference between many high interest accounts and 
ordinary accounts except in terms of the former's higher 
return. Less than ten per cent of balances were held in high 
interest accounts in 1981, growing swiftly to over 70% by 
the end of 1987.
The growth of high interest accounts at building 
societies has increased the average rate for all building 
society deposits above the interest rate on ordinary shares 
(see Diagram 4.4). A premium of approximately 2% above the 
ordinary share rate is paid on high interest accounts. In 
many cases, the withdrawal terms and minimum balance 
requirements to qualify for premium rates are scarcely more 
onerous than the restrictions on ordinary share accounts. 
Moreover it appears that building society accounts are being 
treated more like transactions accounts, according to 
diagram 4.5 which shows the number of accounts and 
transactions at a representative Building Society, Bristol 
and West, typical of most large building societies.
Technology has played a major part in building 
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Interest on Ordinary Share accounts and average for all accounts
Source: Bristol & West factual Dackground Autumn 1987.
The intervention of the automatic teller machine (ATM)
could be argued to be an advantage to the building society
industry, [6]
"[The A.T.M.] makes it technically possible for building societies and others to provide cash dispensing and money transmission services in competition with the banks but without incurring the heavy operating costs of the present paper-based system. The banks' virtual monopoly of money transmission serivces is thus put in question at the very moment when competition for deposits between the banks and other deposit-taking institutions is, for separate reasons already explained, becoming more intense" [7] (BEQB September 1983 pp372-373)
The advent of new technologies are also argued to 
provide a spur to the level of competition in the retail 
financial market,
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"Technological innovation seems likely to increase the competitive aggressiveness that is already apparent among the institutions concerned and in particular among the larger ones whose independent survival and prosperity will be very dependent upon maintenance of market share in a period of rapid change".
(BEQB September 1983, p374) 
Technological innovation can thus have a major effect 
on the nature and degree of competition in the personal 
sector financial markets. Technology enhances the ability of 
institutions to offer new financial services through 
lowering the cost of providing such services, and also 
promote efficiency in existing financial services. 
Prohibitive barriers to entry in the form of high costs tend 
to be eroded by technology, such as the increased 
attractiveness of joining the money payments system for 
building societies due to cost reductions (Revell, 1986, 
Revell and Barnes (198if-)). Some building societies have 
taken their financial innovation much further and announced 
the introduction of interest bearing cheque accounts. Such a 
strategy confirms the aggressive nature of building 
societies operations and further erodes the distinction 
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The effect of the building societies offering cheque books 
and being part of the money transmission system may have 
considerable effects. In particular if building societies 
market share of the money payments system increases, as 
seems likely, the greater will be the redepository ratio of 
the building societies. Quite simply, a greater proportion 
of funds paid out of building society accounts will tend to 
return directly to building societies, such that at the 
extreme, they will have the same ability as banks to create 
credit (Rose, 1986, p24) [8].
Unfortunately comparable figures on financial 
innovation by the retail banking industry are not
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available. Certain evidence does point, however, to 
substantial changes in the retail banks funding structure. 
The clearing banks started offering interest bearing sight 
accounts in 1983/84, and higher rate sight deposit accounts 
in 1985.The main innovation of the banks has been the 
introduction of high interest sight deposits. Table 4.2 
shows the growth of high interest personal accounts compared 
to current accounts and total sterling sight deposits. From 
the available evidence, it can be seen that high interest 
personal accounts have grown considerably since 1984, from 
3.2% of total sight deposits to 17.5%. Non-interest bearing 
current a c c o u n t s , by contrast, have fallen as a proportion 
of total sight deposits since 1980.
Seven day deposit accounts have also declined in recent 
years (Table 4.3), from 20.8% of total time deposits in 1985
to 15.9% by 1987. The decline in both non-interest bearing
current accounts and seven day deposit accounts, will be 
partly as a result of switching towards high interest sight 
accounts, although the extent of this is difficult to
determine given the available data.
An analysis of the residual maturity of bank deposits 
(Table 4.4), reveals that the proportion of sterling sight 
deposits as a percentage of total sterling deposits has 
grown steadily since 1981, from 34.6% to 46.4% of the total. 
This appears to be mainly as a result of the decline in 
deposits with a residual maturity of less than eight days. 
Short-term deposits at retail banks have thus become far 
more liquid in the 1980's, and instant access sight deposits
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represent just under 50% of total sterling deposits combined 
with innovation by building societies and banks on their 
deposit accounts.
Substantial change also occurred in the mortgage 
market, with the abandonment of the cartel and greater 
competition. The mortgage queues that existed as a direct 
result of the building societies policy of rationing 
mortgage supply largely disappeared as supply was increased 
to meet demand. Mortgage loans became far more freely 
available, representing substantial liberalisation in this 
market, particularly in 1981 and 1982 (Table 4.5). Loans 
were advanced for a greater percentage of purchase price 
than previously, and higher multiples of income were 
accepted. The building societies policy of charging 










1978 17,747 14547 N/A -
1979 20,936 16068 N/A -
1980(a) 19,989 15879 79.4 N/A -
1981 22,664 16956 74.8 N/A -
1982 26,609 18424 69.2 N/A -
1983 30,808 19810 64.3 N/A -
1984(b) 36,491 21705 59.5 1156 3.2
1985(c) 47,810 22850 47.8 6279 13.2
1986 67,960 30173 44.4 10779 16.0
1987(d) 78,677 34110 43.4 13698 17.5
CLSB GROUP'S DEPOSITS : ANALYSIS BY TYPE 
STERLING SIGHT DEPOSITS (£ Millions)
Notes:
(a) Change from Banking Sector to Monetary Sector.
(b) Formation of CLSB including Standard Chartered 
Group.
(c) Inclusion of TSB Group in the CLSB and change from 
banking month to Calendar month reporting.
(d) Excludes Clydesdale Bank and five other 
subsidiaries.
Source: Abstract of Banking Statistics, May 1988.
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Table 4.3
TOTAL OF WHICH 7 DAY DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
%
1978 24,448 N/A -
1979 29,968 N/A -
1980(a) 37,836 N/A -
1981 45,876 N/A -
1982 59,511 N/A -
1983 63,757 N/A -
1984(b) 68,433 N/A
1985(c) 74,437 . 15483 •oCM
1986 88,805 17705 19.'
1987(d) 101,073 16130 15.
CLSB GROUPS' DEPOSITS : ANALYSIS BY T\
STERLING TIME DEPOSITS (£ millions!
Notes: see table L+.-1.
Source: Abstract of Banking Statistics, May 1988
119
Table 4.4
Sight Less than 8 days Up to One month Up to three months Up to six months Up to one year
1981 23515 (34.6) 24381 (35.8) 6984 (10.2) 6710 (9.9) 2914 (4.3) 1591 (2.3)
1982 27779 (32.3) 27513 (32.0) 11633 (13.5) 8879 (10.3) 4317 (5.0) 3151 (3.7)
1983 32246 (34.1) 27906 (29.5) 12239 (12.9) 10707 (11.3) 4502 (4.8) 3644 (3.9)
1984( c)38191 (36.4) 27703 (26.4) 15511 (14.8) 11907 (U.3) 4753 (4.5) 3396 (3.2)
1985(d)50198 (41.1) 27391 (22.4) 17131 (14.0) 14714 (12.0) 5489 (4.5) 3408 (2.8)
1986 68957 (44.0) 32545 (20.8) 20309 (13.0) 17564 (11.2) 7753 (4.9) 5485 (3.5)
1987( e)80159 (46.4) 33007 (19.1) 18049 (10.5) 20214 (11.7) 9337 (5.4) 7668 (4.5)
(a) Analysed by residual period to earliest maturity date (which could be the first roll-over date 
or the shortest period of notice.
(b) Figures prior to 1986 are as at mid-November.
(c) Formation of CLSB Group including Standard Chartered Group.
(d) Inclusion of TSB Group in the CLSB and change from banking month to Calendar month reporting.
(e) Excludes Clydesdale Bank and five other subsidiaries.
(f) Figures in brackets are percentages of total.
(g) Deposits of over a year's maturity are excluded (as such the percentages do not sum to 100Z).
Source: Abstract of Banking Statistics May 1988
















1985 19116 1 2 . 0
1986 26581 39.0
1987 28976 9.0
Growth in Mortage Lending, 1975-1987
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin, April 1989.
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According to economic theory, the entry of banks into 
the mortgage market would be expected to shift the demand 
curve for mortgages faced by building societies (e.g. DM-^ to 
DM 2 ) (in Diagram 4.6), unless the banks cause the total 
demand for mortgage loans to increase in a manner which more 
than compensates for the decline in market share. The 
effective margin or spread faced by societies will be 
reduced by a shift in the supply of mortgages SM to SM^ and 
a shift in the supply curve for deposits (SD to SD^) as 
competition bids up the cost of funds. With the cartel 
removed, and with increased competition from banks (the new 
entrants), the previous non-market-clearing mortgage rate 
would also be expected to rise (e.g. to IM-^).
It was maintained in Chapter Three that the building 
societies* interest rate cartel had the effect of creating 
an excess demand for mortgages, the size of which varied 
with movements in the general level of interest rates, and 
also tended to smooth out fluctuations in building society 
interest rates in relation to market rates. The cartel thus 
limited the impact of the *price* of mortgages in 
equilibriating the supply of and demand for funds.
It would be expected that the abolition of the cartel 
would lead to more market related building society interest 
rates, and hence a greater importance of the price of 
mortgages as compared with earlier.
In practice it appears that the building societies rate 
setting behaviour has changed. Building societies have shown 





MORTGAGF MARKET and COMPETITION 
source : LlewellyntliSZw)
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loans, whereas previously non-price rationing was in force.
This has entailed a new interest rate setting strategy, 
allowing higher mortgage rates rather than the previously 
adopted policy of pegging mortgage rates below market 
clearing levels. Diagram 4.7 shows the relationship between 
the mortgage rate of interest and the maximum retail rate of 
interest. Mortgage rates have invariably been above retail 
rates over the period 1970-1980. Since around 1980, however, 
the difference between mortgage rates and deposit rates has 
tended to decrease, with deposit rates at several times 
exceeding mortgage rates. So, as would be expected, the 
spread between building society mortgage lending and deposit 
rates has indeed been reduced.
Furthermore, as expected, the mortgage rate has in 
general risen relative to other market rates. Diagram 4.8 
shows the mortgage rate and a representative money market 
rate - the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR). In general 
the mortgage rate has been above LIBOR over the period 1981- 
1987. In contrast, LIBOR was generally above the mortgage 
rate prior to 1981. LIBOR has only tended to be below the 
mortgage rate when money market rates were falling.
[Recently (1988) LIBOR has again risen relative to mortgage 
interest rates]. Moreover, Diagram 4.9 shows that since 
about 1981 the cost of retail funds have risen relative to 
wholesale funds and have on average been more expensive than 
wholesale funds. So, the average cost of funds has decreased
and the spread between mortgage rates and the average cost of
funds has risen.
Allied with an increase in competition, building 
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DIAGRAM 4.9
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other competing rates. Diagram 4.10 shows the maximum retail
rates at building societies and banks. It can be seen that
building society rates are far more fluid and far more
market related after 1980. In other words, interest on
building society deposit accounts has become less fs t i c k y f,
resulting in more flexible rates in relation to changes in
competitors rates,
"More intense competition both within a more 
homogeneous financial system and from other 
institutions at the periphery of traditional domestic 
banking has led to substantial product innovation and 
contributed to greater adjustment of interest rates 
faced by customers".
(Bingham 1983, p2) 
The tendency for financial institutions to pay market- 
related rates of interest has been termed "marketization" by 
Bingham (1983).
Casual analysis of the data thus appears to show that 
building societies have changed their interest rate 
structure in the 1980's. Llewellyn (1988(b)) attempts a more 
rigorous test to see if there has been a structural shift in 
the relationship between the level of LIBOR (a 
representative wholesale rate) and the interest differential 
between the maximum retail rate of societies and LIBOR. A 
regression of the differential against LIBOR (using ordinary 
least squares) tends to confirm that structural change has 
indeed taken place. The results show that building society 
retail rates have become much more responsive to movements 
in market rates.
The abolition of the cartel had the effect of 
eliminating the variable excess mortgage demand that existed
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under the recommended rate system, and eradicated the need 
for non-price rationing on the part of building societies. 
With building societies interest rates being more fluid, the 
price of mortgages became the prime determinant of the 
supply of mortgage funds.
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4.3 Regulatory convergence, and Relative Market Shares 
in Building Societies and Banks 
The relative competitive positions of banks and 
building societies in the market for personal sector 
balances is shown in Table 4.6. After an initial setback by 
building societies in 1981 (largely at the expense of 
National Savings) the relative competitive advantage of 
building societies is reflected in their increasing share of 
personal sector liquid assets. The share of liquid assets at 
building societies increased from 46.8% to 53.0% over the 





1980 50.5 37.2 12.3
1981 46.8 38.3 15.0
1982 48.3 36.1 15.6
1983 49.7 34.4 15.8
1984 51.7 32.3 16.0
1985 53.1 31.4 15.5
1986 53.2 31.9 15.0
1987 53.0 32.6 14.4
Relative Shares in Personal Sector Liquid Assets.
Source: BEQB (May 1987)
The relative interest rate relationships between the
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mortgage rate and LIBOR examined earlier means that it has 
been profitable for new entrants to the mortgage market 
which are exclusively funded by wholesale money (such as the 
National Home Loans Corporation and the Household Mortgage 
Corporation). It has also been suggested that building 
societies suffer a competitive disadvantage in that 
regulation constrains the societies to funding the majority 
(60%) of their mortgage lending in the relatively high cost 
retail market. Building Societies have only been able to 
secure wholesale funds since 1981.[9] In view of the 
structure of interest rates prevailing since then (with 
mortgage rates and retail deposit rates consistently above 
money market rates) it is hardly surprising that building 
societies have increased their wholesale funding as a 
proportion of total funding (see table 4.7). It could be 
argued that the lack of competitive neutrality in terms of 
restraints on building societies wholesale funding has 
increased the tendency for building societies to adopt an 
aggressive innovative strategy in the retail market. 
Paradoxically, it is partly this aggressive competitive 
strategy which has driven up the cost of retail funds 
relative to wholesale funds. In 1988 however, conditions 
reversed somewhat with wholesale rates rising above retail 
rates. Combined with the stock market crash in October 1987, 
which has led to substantial inflows to building societies, 
this has given building societies a considerable advantage 
in 1988.
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It is interesting to note that there is some degree of 
convergence in the liabilities portfolios of the building 
societies and retail banks. Building societies are 
increasing their wholesale funding operations whilst banks 
are attempting to increase their retail funding (see 
Llewellyn and Drake 1987). Thus these institutions are 
becoming less differentiated in funding structures (within 
the confines of the Building Societies Act 1986).
Table 4.7








1981 1 0 2 3601 2 . 8
1982 252 6466 3.8
1983 1635 6839 19.3
1984 2228 8572 2 0 . 6
1985 3093 7462 29.3
1986 6141 6635 48.1
1987 3159 7487 29.7
Building Societies Wholesale and Retail Funding
Source: Building Societies Yearbook (1988)
Moreover, the previous stability of retail funds has 
tended to fall. The changing competitive positions of 
competing financial institutions and the increasing 
financial sophistication of the personal sector means that
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retail funds can at times be extremely volatile (building 
societies are also particularly hit by outflows of funds for 
privatization issues). Thus the advantage of the stability 
of retail funds over wholesale has tended to decline.
Furthermore, the marginal cost of retail funds to 
building societies can be relatively expensive as compared 
to the marginal cost of wholesale funds.
This is because increasing the rate of interest on 
deposits to raise more funds will increase the rate on funds 
already deposited with the building society (alternatively a 
rise in one type of deposit e.g. term shares, may induce 
switching from lower rate accounts). Wholesale funds by 
contrast, will not affect the cost of funds already held at 
the building society. Wholesale funds can thus be extremely 
attractive to building societies.
Wholesale funds have the advantage that building 
societies can actively engage in liability management (as 
the banks do) which gives societies greater flexibility. 
Wholesale funds are generally readily available when needed, 
and can be used to stabilize mortgage lending flows. Indeed, 
the use of wholesale funds means that building societies can 
reduce their average liquidity levels. Traditionally, 
building societies have run down liquid assets at times of 
low funds inflows to stabilize mortgage lending. If 
wholesale funds can be used for this purpose, societies can 
reduce their holdings of low yielding liquid assets.
Building societies would be expected to move towards an 
optimal mix of wholesale and retail funds that minimizes
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costs. Also, portfolio diversification into a greater 
variety of sources of funds should create greater stability 
of inflows. Given the advantages offered by wholesale 
funding, and the tendency for regulatory convergence 
(Llewellyn (1988(b)), it is likely that the funding mix of 
banks and building societies will tend to become less 
differentiated over time.
A further factor affecting competition in the retail 
market is the stipulation that building societies unsecured 
lending be limited to £10,000. Some would argue (Llewellyn 
1987c) that the ability of the retail banks to offer 
mortgages at the same rate of interest as building societies 
(despite building societies lower operating expense ratios) 
is the ability of the banks to cross-subsidize mortgage 
lending with their high-priced profitable lending business, 
such as consumer loans.
Llewellyn argues that this has also allowed the retail 
banks to offset the cost of their high-interest retail 
deposits. The new legislation (Building Societies Act 1986) 
allows building societies also to engage in such c r o s s ­
subsidization with the ability to diversify into unsecured 
lending. The building societies face a regulatory asymmetry 
however, in the constraints imposed on the limits to their 
unsecured lending activities. The limit of £10,000 
represents a lack of competitive neutrality vis-a-vis the 
ability of banks to lend unsecured only constrained by 
prudential limits.
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It may be that this lack of competitive neutrality 
which curtails building societies' ability to cross- 
subsidize high-cost retail funding, has been an important 
factor in the offering of non-price inducements, such as 
increased liquidity of most balances held at building 
societies.
Increased competitive pressure has been partly 
responsible for the increase in the rate of decline in the 
number of building societies in the 1980's (see Table 4.8). 
The decline in the number of societies has been due to 
mergers, rather than dissolution of societies. This had a 
marked effect on the degree of concentration in the building 
society industry in the 1980's, which affects the ability of 
the building society industry to compete. Notice that when 
the cartel was in operation, large interest rate margins 
allowed inefficient societies to survive (see Chapter 
T h r e e ) .
Indeed, this was one of the stated objectives of the 
cartel. The abolition of cartel and greater competition in 
the personal sector retail financial market, combined with a 
reduction in spreads, has increased the pressure for 
smaller, less efficient societies to transfer their business 
to larger building societies. The majority of mergers since 
1979 have been of this type.
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Table 4.8
Decade Average rate of Decline (%)
Year Annual Rate of Decline (%)
1900-10 2.8 1980 4.9
1910-20 3.0 1981 7.3
1920-30 2.1 1982 10.3
1930-40 0.7 1983 9.3
1940-50 1.5 1984 7.8
1950-60 1.2 1985 12.1
1960-70 4.0 1986 9.6
1970-80 5.5 1987 8.6
Rate of Decline in Number of Building Societies
Average 1980 - 1987 = 8.74 
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin. October 1987.
There has also been an increasing number of mergers 
between large building societies in the 1980's. Table 4--^  
shows mergers between building societies which have more 
than 0.5% of the industry's assets. The number of mergers 
between large societies has increased dramatically during 
1982-1987, as predicted by the Wilson Report (1979) (see 
Chapter Three). In the fifty years between 1928 and 1978 
there were twelve 'large' mergers (i.e. both building 
societies with more than 0.5% of the industry's assets), 
compared with eight between 1982-1987. The average size of 
society after merger as a total of industry assets between 
1928-78 was 4.8% compared with 6.85% over the period 1982- 
1987. The tendency to merge has meant that the largest
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societies have gained an increasing share of the industries 
assets (Table 4.10).
Table 4.9











Mergers Involving Large Building Societies 1982-1987 
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin October 1987.
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Table 4.10








































Concentration in the Building Society Industry. 1980-1987
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin October 1987
Moreover, it has been argued (Morgan 1988) that only 
building societies with an asset base of £10-15 billion will 
be likely to thrive over the next decade (at October 1988 
only three building societies had assets of over £10 
billion). Morgan foresees only six to ten large mutual 
societies existing in ten years time. If correct, this means 
that there will be a rapid growth in mergers in the building 
society industry and a large concentration of assets. This 
is important given the evidence of increased efficiency and 
economies of scale due to size and growth through mergers 
(Drake 19870 C10]• It suggests that increasing concentration
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in the building society industry leads to a greater ability 
to compete through cost efficiency. Building societies have 
a major competitive advantage in the efficiency of their 
business over banks. Building societies can operate on a 
narrower spread between the average cost of funds and the 
average interest rate on mortgages. Their ability to do this 
stems from their relative 'efficiency1 vis-a-vis retail 
banks. They can operate with a narrower interest rate spread 
largely because of their uncomplicated business. It is 
interesting to note that building society operating expense 
ratios were increasing up until 1982 whereas they declined 
after that date. This is partly a result of the decrease in 
the annual growth rate of the number of building society 
branches (see Table 3-2 Chapter Three), which, in turn, may 
be a reflection of the increase in price competition rather 
than the previous predominance of non-price competition 
which resulted in a proliferation of building society 
branches. The reduction in building society operating 
expense ratios would appear to justify Silbers (1975) claim 
that cost efficient firms are the main innovators. However, 
this must be treated with caution as there is a strong 
positive relationship between operating expense ratios and 
the rate of inflation, and as such the building societies 
have not had absolute control over this ratio. It is not 
therefore possible to adequately maintain that building 
societies have deliberately become more efficient in the 
1950's as a matter of policy.
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Moreover, the retail banks 'endowment effect* has been 
decreasing in recent years. The increasing importance of 
interest bearing deposits at retail banks and the fall in 
non-interest bearing sight deposits has eroded the banks' 
source of traditionally cheap retail funds (non-interest 
bearing sight deposits are not free as the banks provide for 
the costs of the payments system). Retail deposits have 
become increasingly expensive at the margin for retail 
banks, and the decline in the endowment effect affects bank 
profitability. It is clear from Table 4.11 that there has 
been a decline in the banks' proportion of total income 
derived from their interest margin. Net interest has fallen 
from being over 70% of total income in 1982 to only 64.3% in 
1987. In contrast, fee income has grown from 22.6% of total 
income in 1982 to 28% in 1987. Indeed, non interest income 
(foreign exchange, fees and concessions, and other) has 
grown from 29.7% in 1982 to 36% in 1987. The Bank of England 
(1988) points out that this largely results from a 
deliberate policy change towards fee income growth, 
particularly through diversification into insurance, asset 
management and estate agency. Note that interest margins 
have, however, remained relatively stable over 1982-1987.
Of course, the increasing cost of retail funds will 
tend to have an affect on building societies profitability 
as well. It must be remembered however, that building 
societies have their own version of the 'endowment effect'. 
Building societies face a zero cost of reserve capital. This 
is because, as mutual institutions, they do not have to
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Table 4.11
1983 % 1984 I 1985 I 1986 Z 1987 Z
Net Interest 6.54 68.1 7.51 66.6 7.82 67.6 8.34 66.1 8.78 64.3
Foreign Exchange 0.24 2.5 0.26 2#.3 0.28 2.4 0.41 3.3 0.36 2.6
Fees and Commissions 2.49 25.9 2.98 26.4 2.99 2.6 3.30 26.2 3.80 27.8
Other 0.35 3.6 0.52 4.6 0.47 4.1 0.56 3.3 0.71 5.2
Total Income 9.61 11.27 11.56 12.61 13.65
Four Largest Bank's Sources of Income
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service their capital. Societies thus have free reserves, 
the level of which can affect profitability. A society with 
a large volume of free reserves will tend to be more 
profitable as it will have a relatively high proportion of 
capital on which interest does not have to be paid compared 
with its amount of assets which are non-income earning. This 
results in free reserve income, which provides an endowment 
effect when interest rates are rising. As interest rates 
rise, societies will have an endowment effect as interest 
bearing liabilities will be less than interest bearing 
assets by the size of the free reserves. This may be a 
powerful advantage to building societies during periods of 
rising interest rates.[11]
A further stimulus in the broadening of the 
similarities of building societies and banks was the 
Building Societies Act 1986. Under section 34 of the Act a 
building society or a subsidiary of a building society may 
provide the services listed in Schedule 8 of the Act (and 
the review of Schedule 8 in February 1988). The building 
societies have been given the powers to undertake inter 
alia, money transmission services, foreign exchange 
services, personal equity plans, nsecured loans, estate 
agency, administration of pension schemes, investment 
services, insurance, and unit trust schemes.
The ability to diversify into these areas is a powerful 
example of the decreasing differentiation between building 
societies and banks. Indeed, the Act allows for conversion 
from mutual status to public limited company status, with
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the permission of the members.
Such a society (and at least one - the Abbey National,
has taken this action) would be regulated by the Bank of
England, rather than by the building societies 
r-ioicommission.1- J This may prove advantageous in view of the 
degree of regulatory asymmetry between retail banks and 
building societies - particularly concerning wholesale 
funding, unsecured lending, and capital adequacy 
requirements. [13] The views of one commentator on the 
inevitability of convergence must be taken into account 
however,
"The Building Societies Commission (superseding the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies) is a product of this 
evolutionary process but is unlikely to be the ultimate 
regulatory authority. The central conclusion of this 
paper is that the BSC is a transitional phase between a 
highly specialised set of institutions regulated by the 
Registry of Friendly Societies, and mutual banks (with 
full or near-full banking status) regulated by the Bank 
of England". (Llewellyn, 1988b)
The constant evolution of the financial system is in
this case likely to lead to both building societies and
banks coming under the umbrella of one regulator - the Bank
of England. In the extreme, there may be nominal or zero
difference between the regulations of the two sets of
institutions, and between their main operations and
activities (notwithstanding the possibility of smaller
building societies adopting specialist or ’niche* strategies
according to their relative strengths and weaknesses).
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4.4 Conclusion
Section 4.1 analysed the main factors impinging upon 
the degree of competition in the personal sector retail 
financial market and the main determinants of financial 
innovation. Re-regulation via a change in monetary control 
was shown to be a major catalyst for an increase in 
competition and financial innovation. The removal of 
distorting direct monetary controls from the retail banks 
enabled a portfolio re-distribution towards mortgage 
lending. The retail banks entrance into the mortgage market 
precipitated the breakdown of the interest rate cartel. The 
effects on interest rates of the abandonment of the cartel 
and an increase in competition have been as would be 
expected from economic theory (see Section 4.2). Greater 
competition for personal sector retail funds was combined 
with innovation in the type and variety of deposit accounts 
offered by both building societies and banks. In particular, 
high interest easy access accounts were introduced, by both 
sets of institutions. One major effect of increased 
competition and innovation has been to alter the interest 
rate policies of the building societies and the banks. 
Firstly, the average rate of interest paid on retail funds 
at building societies and banks has tended to increase. 
Secondly, the average rate charged on mortgage loans has 
also increased. Thirdly, building society interest rates 
have tended to become less sticky, and now move more in line 
with other rates of interest. This has resulted in building 
society interest rates becoming more flexible and fluid in
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relation to competitors rates.
Building Society interest rates becoming more market 
related and fluid has meant a greater role for the ‘price* 
of mortgages in influencing the supply and demand for 
mortgage funds. The importance of the price of mortgages and 
the greater fluidity of mortgage interest rates for the 
effectiveness of monetary control are examined in detail in 
Chapter Seven.
There has also been substantial change in the mortgage 
policies of the building societies. As would be expected, 
the higher mortgage rate charged for larger loans has been 
competed away. The supply of mortgage loans, previously 
rationed, has become more responsive to demand conditions, 
such chat mortgage queues have disappeared. Large multiples 
of income have been advanced for the purchase of houses, as 
have larger percentages of the sale price (100% advances not 
being uncommon). This has resulted in substantial 
liberalization of credit conditions to the personal sector.
Section 4.3 analysed the relative market shares of 
building societies and retail banks of the personal sector 
retail financial market, with particular reference to the 
changing extent of heterogeneity between these institutions. 
Banks and building societies are becoming less 
differentiated and more homogeneous in nature. This is 
especially noticeable in the more dynamic, aggressive, and 
innovative nature of building societies. This is exemplified 
in the recent decision of a number of building societies to 
offer interest bearing cheque accounts, further eroding the
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recail banks traditional monopoly of money transmission 
services and increasing the degree of similarity between 
these institutions. It is likely that banks too, will be 
forced to adopt interest bearing cheque accounts (and hence 
further depressing their endowment effect). The range of 
services that building societies are empowered to adopt 
under the Building Societies Act 1986 further increases the 
areas in which banks and building societies are in 
competition. It is likely that the tendency for regulatory 
convergence will ensure that any regulatory asymmetries vis- 
a-vis banks and building societies will be altered over 
time, encouraging the tendency towards homogeneity.
1. Recall that, if a money supply targeting strategy is to 
be pursued, a reasonably stable relationship between 
the policy instrument used and the monetary 
aggregate(s), and a reasonably stable relationship 
between the monetary aggregate(s) and the ultimate goal 
are necessities. Comment has tended to emphasize the 
possibility that financial innovation by building 
societies and banks has in some way affected the growth 
rates of the monetary aggregates in relation to nominal 
incomes. Having examined the main events and 
innovations in the early 1980's it is possible to
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further extend this hypothesis. It has been noted that 
the average rate of interest on building society and 
bank accounts has risen considerably as a result of 
innovation, alongside an increase in liquidity of these 
accounts, such that many high interest accounts are 
instantly accessible. It is feasible that such a 
structural change, representing considerable 
improvement in the terms offered to personal customers, 
may have affected the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates relative to nominal incomes. This is likely 
to be a stock effect as financial innovation occurred, 
rather than a continuing effect. Future financial 
innovations may have similar stock effects however. 
Indeed, the payment of interest on balances that are to 
all intents and purposes transactions accounts may have 
altered the meaning and function of money. These 
hypotheses are considered in detail in Chapter Five.
The change in the nature of the mortgage market may 
also have affected the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates. Tne transition from variable mortgage 
queues and the rationing of mortgage supply to a 
position of market clearing represents a major 
liberalization of credit conditions for the personal 
sector and a major stock effect. This credit side 
'shock' may have led to an increase in the monetary 
aggregates over and above the growth of nominal 
incomes. This is examined in detail in Chapter Six.
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The necessity of a stable demand for money function for 
the monetarist policy of control of the money supply 
was noted in Chapter Two. Very little research into the 
effects of financial change and innovation upon the 
demand for money function has been carried out. Given 
the hypothesis in (1) above as to the effects of 
financial innovation on the growth rates of the 
monetary aggregates (and precursing the analysis of 
that hypothesis in Chapter Five), it is possible that 
financial innovation in the form of high interest 
easily-accessible accounts has affected the stability 
of the demand for money function although instability 
may be for only a transitional period as the financial 
innovations occurred. Such a hypothesis is explored in 
Chapter Nine.
Financial liberalization in terms of freer mortgage 
availability may have provided a shock to the demand 
for credit function, creating instability. Notwith­
standing the analysis of Chapter Six as to the effect 
of credit changes on the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates, the hypothesis that the stability of the 
demand for credit has been affected by changes in 
credit conditions is examined econometrically in 
Chapter Ten.
Hypotheses as to the more long term effects of the 
structural changes in building society interest rates 
after the breakdown of the cartel on the effectiveness 
of monetary control are specified in Chapter Seven.
NOTES - CHAPTER FOUR
[1] Gilchrist (1986) provides a straightforward analysis of 
the overall regulatory changes with respect to building 
societies. For interesting analyses of the monetary 
authorities views as to the changing activities of 
building societies, see Richardson (1978), Davis and 
Saville (1982), Richardson (1983), and Drayson (1985).
[2] Of seven major innovations introduced in the U.S.A., 
Hester argues that all were induced by previous 
monetary policy decisions by the authorities. Simons 
warned of the dangers of ignoring institutional change 
as far back as 1936.
Akhtar (1983) outlines the main broad categories of 
financial change in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France, Germany and Italy as 
being:
(a) The increasing use of interest sensitivee funds by 
banks and other financial institutions,
(b) variable rate lending or borrowing and maturity 
shortening,
(c) the growth of financial markets and of marketable 
financial instruments,
(d) the changing shape of retail banking,
(e) the diversification of sources of financial 
services•
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[3] In fact, once they had reached their desired 
portfolios, the retail banks employed a number of 
rationing devices on their mortgage lending. Many 
borrowers had to maintain an account for a minimum 
period to quality for a mortgage, and restrictions were 
placed on the maximum amounts banks were willing to 
lend as a proportion of property value or as a multiple 
of income. Of course, these are phenomena more normally 
associated with the building society industry.
[4] The Green Paper "Building Societies: A New Framework"
(July 1984) had recommended the abolition of the
cartel, deeming it to be anti-competitive, whilst its
removal would encourage
"the free play of market forces which would ensure 
the best deal for savers and borrowers".
[5] Financial innovations are alleged to occur in 
'clusters' or 'swarms' (Podolski 1985, 1986) as one 
financial innovation acts as the catalyst for another. 
It does seem that in practice one financial innovation 
will trigger off another, particularly in the form of a 
competitive innovation from a competing financial 
institution. The evidence as to 'swarms' of financial 
innovations is not clear-cut, however.
[6] It may be significant that a building society (the 
Nottingham) was the first institution to offer a full 
home banking service in conjunction with the Bank of 
Scotland.
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[7] Indeed, Niehans (1982) considers that declining 
transactions costs are the major determinant of 
financial innovation, although this hypothesis is not 
adequately substantiated.
It is possible to illustrate the effects of 
technological advances upon product variety and product 
mix by using a product matrix (Lewis 1987). The bottom 
of the matrix is the product complexity axis whilst the 
vertical axis shows the breadth of product line. The 
former runs from standardized services to individually 
tailored requirements. The latter shows the variety of 
products offered, ranging from high to low.
It is argued that technological advances allow the 
product matrix to shift to the right, increasing the 
complexity and variety of products on offer as a result 









Impact of Technology upon the Product Matrix for 
financial Institutions. Source: Lewis (1987)
[8] It is interesting to note that it is not only the 
retail banks which will have to re-evaluate their 
strategies. The Halifax Building Society, which alone 
amongst the big six societies has eschewed a paper 
based transmission service in favour of electronic- 
based systems, has announced it is re-examining its 
policy in light of other building societies offering 
interest bearing cheque accounts.
[9] The Stow Report BSA (1979) examined the need for 
societies to adopt wholesale funding. The general 
conclusion was that traditional sources of funds would 
be adequate but suggested that issuing certificates of 
deposit would provide building societies with more 
flexibility. The Phillips Report (BSA 1980a) examined 
wholesale funding in more detail and concluded that
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building society CD's would help to stabilise lending, 
and allow societies to operate with lower liquidity 
ratios. The report did recognise that although in 
principle, there were no restrictions on society's 
raising funds in the wholesale markets, they were 
effectively precluded by the fact that societies were 
required to pay interest net of tax at the composite 
rate (the tax being unclaimable).
The Stow and Phillips Reports were written at a time 
when building society retail rates were generally below 
other rates. The change in rates such that retail rates 
were in general above wholesale rates give an impetus 
to use wholesale markets on a far greater scale thar* as 
envisaged by the reports.
[10] For earlier evidence see Gough (1979, 1981) Gilchrist 
and Rothwell (1980), Barnes and Dodds (1981), Barnes 
(1985).
[11] There are two further aspects to the societies 
endowment effect. Interest is only credited to 
investors accounts every six or twelve months, and of 
course additional interest is only earned on the 
original interest from the date of crediting. Building 
Societies will thus tend to have a pool of interest
funds that has not yet been credited to investors 
accounts. This is particularly important during periods 
of high interest rates.
Secondly,.building societies will tend to make greater 
provision for composite rate tax during periods of high
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interest rates. Until these funds are paid to the 
government, (normally quarterly) these interest-free 
funds can be profitably invested.
[12] See Drake and Llewellyn (1988) for a detailed analysis 
of the conversion to PLC debate.
[13] With respect to capital adequacy requirements, the BSC 
has stated that building societies will eventually come 
under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
proposals for a minimum risk assets ratio of 8%. This 
represents a major turn towards regulatory convergence 
(see Llewellyn (1988)) in that banks, PLC societies and 
mutual societies will be regulated on equal terms for 
capital measures, but retains asymmetry in terms of the 
degree to which mutual and PLC societies can diversify.
155
CHAPTER FIVE
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE MONETARY AGGREGATES
5.0 Introduction
Chapter Five examines the stock adjustment effects of 
the abolition of the recommended rate system and 
financial innovation on the growth of the monetary 
aggregates that are expected to confuse interpretation of 
monetary conditions as the innovations occur, and points to 
more continuing effects on monetary control which are 
analysed in greater depth in Chapter Seven.
The criteria for defining 'money1 assets are examined 
in Section 5.1, where it is noted that defining money is 
wrought with difficulty even without financial innovation. 
The institutionalist school argued over two decades ago 
that, given that financial institutions are constantly 
developing, new assets would at times be created which may 
act as substitutes for money. This was not seen as a new 
process but an example of the evolution of financial 
institutions. It was argued that new assets which perform 
the transactions/medium of exchange function would evolve 
over time leading to an increase in the variety of assets 
that perform the role of money. Financial innovation is not 
therefore a phenomenon solely of the 1970's or 1980's, 
although the variety and pace of financial innovation and 
change in the building society and retail bank sectors has 
been unprecendented.
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Section 5.2 analyses the development of building 
society innovations in terms of their increasing similarity 
and apparently greater substitutability with bank sight 
deposits. The stock effects on the broad monetary aggregates 
of 'switching' of balances between building societies and 
banks are examined, as is the problem of redefining the 
monetary aggregates in the face of financial innovation.
The effect of financial innovation on the money income 
relationship is examined in Section 5.3 in terms of the 
motives for holding money balances. Having noted in Chapter 
Four that many building society and bank easy access 
accounts now bear interest, it may be that as well as 
fulfilling the traditional motives for holding money, 
financial innovations may have led to money being held for 
reasons over and above the transactions and precautionary 
motives. If this is so, then money balances being held for 
other than transactions/precautionary motives may be 
responsible for the fast growth of the broad monetary 
aggregates relative to nominal incomes, as evidenced by the 
fall in the income velocity of circulation of broad money 
since 1980.
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5.1 Financial Innovation and the Definition of Money
The basis upon which to define money has in the past 
aroused considerable controversy, even without the added 
complication of financial innovation. The functional 
criteria often stipulated as defining 'money' have not been 
sufficient to set out a definitive classification of 
'money'. The a priori approach generally places weight on 
the specification of, "money is what money does" (Hicks 
1967, pi) whereby money is defined by functional criteria. 
Anything that can perform in the capacity of fulfilling the 
function that money occupies is assumed to be a constituent 
part of 'money'.
The role frequently volunteered as distinguishing 
'money' from other assets is that of a medium of exchange, 
or the transactions motive. This is as a result of money 
performing the intermediary function between buyer and 
seller that nullifies the necessity of a double-coincidence 
of wants. It is thus, according to this criteria, anything 
that is generally acceptable as a medium of exchange. This 
functional criteria does not however establish an 
unambiguous classification of assets according to whether or 
not they should be represented in that group of assets 
delineated as 'money'. Certainly notes and coin are 
generally acceptable in exchange, and most would further 
argue that bank deposits are a form of money, being subject 
to payment by cheque. As early as 1960 however, there was 
dispute as to drawing the line there,
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"when I draw a cheque on a current account at a bank, 
economists would certainly say that I am using money to 
make a payment. But if this act of writing an 
instruction to a bank is a use of money, why not also 
written instruction to the Post Office Savings Bank or 
a Building Society?"
(Sayers 1960, pp711-712)
Indeed, the Radcliffe Committee (1959) fully rejected
the view that money could be defined according to certain
functional criteria, and the comments made in the report
appear extraordinarily prescient in view of the effects of
financial innovation in the 1980's,
"by 'control of the supply of money* we mean control of 
the availability of certain assets which are used as 
media of exchange and stores of value. We have switched 
from an unambiguous abstraction to a class of 
marketable objects whose boundary has neither sharpness 
nor certainty nor permanence" .
(Sayers 1960, p71l[l])
A largely unquantifiable concept was expounded by the
Radcliffe Committee, the very broad concept of "liquidity".
According to the report, it is liquidity that determines
expenditure decisions, rather than access to money holdings
(medium of exchange) per se,
"A decision to spend depends not simply on whether the 
would-be-spender has cash or "money in the bank" 
although that maximum liquidity is obviously the most 
favourable springboard. There is the alternative of 
raising funds by selling an asset or by borrowing, and 
the prospect of a cash flow from future sales of a 
product both encourages commitment beyond immediately 
available cash and makes borrowing easier".
(Para 389)
According to Radcliffe there is in existence a wide 
spectrum of assets, each of which contains to a different 
extent some of the features of "moneyness". It was further 
argued that there exist in a developed financial economy
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many highly liquid assets which are close substitutes for
money. Money is thus only a constituent part of the much
broader quantum 'liquidity' in the economy. It is therefore,
"the whole liqudity position that is relevant to 
spending decisions, and our interest in the supply of 
money is due to its significance in the whole liqudity 
picture".
(Para 389)
The report does not, however, provide a clear 
quantifiable, unambiguous definition of liquidity [2], 
although an analysis of the 'whole liquidity position' would 
certainly involve, at the very least, looking at deposits 
held at the London Clearing Banks, Building Societies, Post 
Office Savings Banks and the Trustee Savings Banks (Para;
478, Table 22).
Whether or not there is a variety of near-money assets 
highly substitutable for money is an empirical matter. 
Unfortunately, much of the econometric work has been carried 
out on American data and moreover, has provided no clear 
consensus.
The substitutability of money issue is a complex one, 
compounded by the fact that many researchers have obtained 
conflicting results (or what they cloaim to be conflicting 
results). Feige and Pearce (1977) provide an invaluable 
survey of the pre 1977 work. Much of the problem lies with 
disagreement over what numerical magnitude of cross­
elasticity should be taken as indicative of close 
subs titutability,
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"Thus, while the mean values of the empirical estimates 
of the relevant cross-elasticities estimated in the 
foregoing studies are relatively close to one another 
considering the imprecision with which they are 
estimated, the semantic interpretations of the results 
give the impression of considerable disagreement 
between the studies". (Feige and Pearce, p456)
This leads them to conclude that,
"it is not the underlying magnitudes that are primarily 
at issue, but rather the evaluation of the theoretical 
and substantive implications of the estimated empirical 
parameters. The lacuna in the literature is a general 
theoretical framework that is capable of deeming a 
consistent set of substantive implications from any 
given set of empirically estimated substitution 
parameters".
(p463)
Mills and Wood (1977), as far as is known, are the only 
authors to examine the issue of substitution of assets in 
the U.K. They measure the elasticity of substitution by 
estimating a demand for money function, and observing its 
interest elasticity. In doing so, they aim to test what they 
call the "Radcliffe' Hypothesis - that the liabilities of 
NBFl's must be perfect substitutes of those of the 
commercial banks before NBFl's can completely frustrate 
monetary policy as described by the Radcliffe Committee. If 
the interest elasticity of the demand for money has become 
infinite, monetary policy cannot affect money market 
conditions. They found that the interest elasticity of the 
demand for money for the period 1923-1974 shows no upward 
trend, and they thus reject the Radcliffe hypothesis. These 
results must be viewed with caution, however, in view of the 
doubts as to the econometric specifications of the demand
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for money of that time, and in the view of the much faster 
pace of financial innovation since 1980.
Despite the objections of the Radcliffe Committee, only the
liabilities of banks were traditionally included in the
monetary aggregates (along with notes and coin) largely
because of the belief of the banks' 'uniqueness' in terms of
their ability to create credit. Traditionally, theory has
distinguished sharply between banks that create credit, and
financial intermediates (NBFl's) which merely pass it on.
Building Societies, it has been pointed out, have to attract
a deposit before they can make a loan,
"they (financial intermediarites) are unable to lend 
more than savers have decided to place with
them (and) play a neutral role in the saving-
investment balance'.
(Riefler 1959 p301) 
whereas banks have the ability to create "virulent 
liquidity" Holtrop (1959). Whilst it is true that building 
societies were not credit creators as they were not involved 
in the payments mechanism, the strict demarcation lines were 
probably unhelpful in terms of classifying financial 
institutions for the purposes of monetary policy. It tended 
to propagate the view that NBFl's had no role to play in the 
monetary process. This was seen in the view that banks would 
not lose deposits to NBFl's (see Chapters Three and Four and 
Llewellyn 1979(a)) and neglect of the point that NBFl's 
could increase the velocity of circulation of money by 
attracting deposits away from banks. This traditional 
viewpoint; very much promulgated the notion that NBFl's such
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as building societies were passive institutions that did not
affect the monetary process in any way, a standpoint which
was challenged by Gurley and Shaw,
''we take exception to the view that banks stand apart in 
their ability to create loanable funds out of hand, 
while other intermediaries in contrast are busy with 
the modest brokerage function of transmitting loanable 
funds that are somehow generated elsewhere".
(1955, p521)
This is backed up by the 'New View' of Tobin (1963(a)) 
whereby,
"The distinction between commercial banks and other 
financial intermediaries has been too sharply drawn.
The differences are of degree, not of kind1.
(p418)
The Building Societies have increasingly encroached
upon the banks' credit-creating preserve,
"Given the terms on which they can lend, the ability of 
institutions to create deposits depends on: the terms 
on which they can obtain the assets which constitute 
their liquid reserves and the ratios of these liquid 
assets to deposits, which together help to determine 
minimum lending margins; and the extent to which the 
ultimate payees benefitting from their lending 
redeposit their proceeds with the intermediaries 
concerned. The use of bank deposits as a means of 
payment gives banks a high redeposit ratio; but that of 
other intermediaries, especially building societies, 
will presumably grow farther as the attractiveness of 
their liabilities as liquid instruments increases".
(Rose 1986 p24)
Of course, the increasing liqudity of building society 
accounts and, most importantly, the movement of the building 
societies into the payments transmission mechanism means 
that building societies are now also credit creators and 
cannot be ignored for purposes of monetary control [3].
Given that changes in credit correspond quite closely 
to changes in the broad monetary aggregates, this should not
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cause too much of a problem in using a broad money
definition as a target and as an indicator of monetary
conditions. The post Keynesian School, however, argues that
monetary theory and control should emphasize credit money
rather than 'deposit1 money, as the latter is effectively
brought about by the former,
"In modern capitalist economies the total volume of 
bank deposits is effectively determined by the demand 
for bank credit".
(Moore 1988 p4)
Monetarists argue that the composition of those assets 
which are 'money' is an empirical matter. The ultra­
monetarist view is that money is an indicator of nominal 
income, and that control of money will provide control of 
nominal income. The correct definition of money is then that 
aggregate of financial assets which most closely follows 
nominal income (Friedman and Schwartz (1970).
The second empirical approach to defining money stems 
from the view that if it is possible to identify a stable 
demand for money, effects of changes in the money supply on 
the economy may be predictable. Thus the appropriate 
definition of money is that which provides a stable 
aggregate demand for money function (Laidler 1969).
In terms of the first approach, Smith (1978), analysed 
the relationship between national income and five 
alternative definitions of the money supply for the U.K. He 
found that both the best fitting function and the best 
forecasting performance was provided by what he called 'M5' 
consisting of conventional £M3 plus building society, TSB
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and NSB deposits over the period 1924-1977.
Mills (1983) also provided an empirical assessment of
the monetary aggregates according to their ability to
predict future movements in nominal income. He found that
£M3 and PSL1 were the most informative aggregates.
There have, however, been doubts cast on the nature of
empirical definitions that link the definition of money to
the ability to track nominal income. Mason (1976) in
particular gives a thorough critique of this methodology.
With reference to the demand for^money, it has already
been noted (Chapter Two),that the apparent existence of a
stable demand function for £M3 persuaded the authorities to
adopt it as a target. The adoption of a broad monetary
target was also inspired by "Radcliffian views" (Niehans,
1982) of the importance of liqudity in the money supply
process, rather than a strict adherence to the transactions
based quantity theory,
"If the targetting of narrow money seemed to rely 
rather exclusively on the quantity theory, the use of a 
broad money target could be justified by reference to 
rather different theories, about the importance of 
"liquidity" and "credit" as well as by regard for the 
quantity theory itself".
(Bank of England June 1983, p201)
If the original reason for targetting a broad money
definition was influenced by Radcliffe views, it can also be
said that the decision to abandon the £M3 aggregate has a
Radcliffian ring to it,
"Starting from a general concept such as broad money or 
narrow money, any precise definition involves drawing 
an arbitrary dividing line across a virtual continuum 
of financial assets. Moreover, a particular measure 
chosen on the basis of past relationships is liable to 
be undermined over time by developments in the
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financial system. Given the recent fast pace of 
financial innovation and liberalisation, the problems 
of definition have arguably become more acute. There is 
now a vast array of slightly differentiated financial 
products available to the retail and wholesale 
depositor or investor, ranging from cash to long- 
maturity marketable securities. There is no obvious and 
appropriate criterion for discriminating unambiguously 
between those which are 'money* and those which are 
not".
(BEQB December 1986(b), p500)
Clearly, in one sense, we are all Radcliffeans now.
This appears greatly at odds with the monetarist proposition 
stated earlier that money is a 'unique' asset.
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5.2 Financial innovation and reclassification of the
Monetary Aggregates.
Financial innovations which represent close substitutes
for money may necessitate a reclassification of the monetary
aggregates (Milbourne (1986), Jonson and Rankin (1985)). New
financial instruments and improved terms on old ones by
building societies has meant that those assets which perform
the function of money are not immutable over time,
"In practice, for some purposes ordinary accounts are 
like sight deposits with banks, and high interest 
accounts - which have developed since 1979 - are 
similar to seven-day deposit accounts11.
(BEQB 1982(c), p535)
Increasing financial innovation by building societies, 
taking the form of changes in the terms of existing accounts 
and the new services introduced has meant that the monetary 
authorities have had to undertake a re-appraisal of such 
balances for the purposes of monetary control. Three month 
notice accounts were originally treated as investment 
balances by the authorities in terms of monetary aggregation 
because of their fairly strict withdrawal terms. When some 
building societies reduced the terms to twenty-eight days 
notice without further penalty, they were deemed to be 
better represented in the monetary measures as transactions 
balances. They were thus placed within the M2 aggregate at 
the end of 1983.
Such innovation by building societies reduces the 
informational content of the M2 aggregate, and calls into 
question the introduction of this 'transactions' aggregate.
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Similarly, if term shares, which have become 
increasingly liquid, were included in the PSL2 definition, 
it would affect its growth rate (diagram 5.1). Less 
stringent withdrawal facilities on term shares led to them 
growing rapidly between 1981 and 1984, and adding these term 
shares to PSL2 would have increased its growth rate during 
this period. By contrast, after 1984, growth of PSL2 would 
have been slower if term shares had been included, as a 
result of the decline in non-withdrawable term shares and 
slower growth in withdrawable term shares after the initial 
heavy increase.
A further problem affecting interpretation of the
movement in the monetary aggregates has been the competition
for retail deposits between banks and building societies.
Changes in interest rate differentials and non-price terms
offered by building societies and banks have meant that, at
different times, short-term portfolio readjustments by the
personal sector have resulted in distortions of the growth
rates of the broad measures of money. This has tended to
confuse interpretation of monetary conditions, and reduced
the value of monetary targets,
"One factor which has rendered the growth of £M3 more 
erratic than that of the other aggregates, is the 
process of financial change and in particular its 
sensitivity to the ebb and flow of the competition 
between banks and building societies".
(BEQB December 1986(c) p508-509)
Such stock effects resulted in the relationship amongst 
the various monetary aggregates, and between the aggregates 
and nominal income, becoming less stable, although this will
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have been temporary. For example, the growth of term shares
at building societies grew from £5.3bn in 1981 to £15bn in
mid 1984 and the subsequent withdrawal (about £6bn) in 1986
distorted the growth of £M3. It has been estimated (BEQB May
1987) that approximately half of the inflow in 1981 was
drawn from other types of building society deposit, and the
remainder represented 'new' money, most of it from £M3. The
rate of growth of £M3 was thus reduced by between 2-4%. On
maturity in 1986, withdrawal from term shares and a
subsequent portfolio reallocation is believed to have
increased the rate of growth of £M3 by about 1%.
It is in situations like this that,
"policy can be no better than the information that 
guides it".
(Hester 1982, p43), Financial Innovation, has been part
of the reason for the authorities admission that,
"the significance of the broad aggregates as monetary 
indicators has somewhat diminished".
(Budget Red Book 1985)
Indeed, it has been stipulated by the monetary
authorities that a number of variables other than the
monetary aggregate in question are monitored,
"The £M3 rule has never operated in a purely mechanical 
way; we have always been prepared to over-ride its 
signals in the light of other, contrary, evidence on 
the state of monetary conditions".
(BEQB August 1987, p366)
In terms of the targets and instruments literature, it 
appears that the monetary authorities have treated the money 
supply as both an intermediate target and as one of several 
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recently been voiced over the wisdom of the MTFS and the
robustness of its theoretical foundation, given the
likelihood that financial innovation would occur,
"What, then, can one say about the design of the MTFS? 
In its original conception, it was seriously flawed.
The central role given to targets for monetary 
aggregates was a serious error that was repeatedly 
pointed out at the time. Financial innovation and 
liberalization over this period robbed these aggregates 
of whatever informational content they might otherwise 
have had". (Currie 1987 p2)
The Bank of England appears to be favouring the 'new'
aggregate, M4, which includes building society and bank
sterling deposit liabilities to the non-bank, non-building
society private sector, and that sectors holdings of notes
and coin, largely because building society deposits and bank
deposits are becoming increasingly homogeneous,
"Other liquid (and even illiquid) assets may be 
becoming better substites for money because of 
liberalisation and the competition that has ensued. One 
implication of the increasing convergence between 
services offered by banks and building societies is 
that it may be better to look at a broader aggregate 
than £M3 in examining the personal sectors demand for 
money •
(BEQB May 1987, p236)
The increasing substitutability of building society and 
bank deposits has been corroborated econometrically by Weale 
(1986) in an analysis of the demand for various types of 
deposit by the personal sector. Greater substitutability, he 
suggests, implies that emphasis upon £M3 may be 
inappropriate for the purposes of monetary control.
The problem, however, is not simply one of either a 
once-for-all reclassification of the monetary aggregates or
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changing emphasis from £M3 to M4, but the recognition that
financial innovation may require continual reclassification
as new innovations emerge. This confuses the interpretation
of monetary developments, and hampers the operation of
monetary control,
"wherever the boundary is drawn between financial 
assets included in and those excluded from a definition 
of 'broad money* there is likely to be considerable 
scope for substitution of assets across the dividing 
line".
(BEQB 1987(a), p219) 
This means that even an aggregate such as the new M4 
may still be vulnerable to switching of funds included in 
the aggregate and close substitutes excluded fxrom the 
aggregate.
Traditionally, money has not borne a rate of interest. 
Indeed, the uniqueness of money and its very importance in 
monetary economies largely stems from the fact that the rate 
of interest on money is exogeneously fixed at zero whilst 
non-money financial assets bear an endogeneously determined 
rate of interest (Tobin, 1969). [The exogeneity of the zero 
yield on money should perhaps be amended in the U.K. case, 
where there have been no specific controls on the payment of 
interest on money. It is rather that the banks have 
endogeneously decided not to pay interest on money.
Exogeneous or endogeneous, the importance of money bearing 
zero interest still remains [4 ].
The fundamental issue which is raised relates to the 
motives for holding funds in the form of assets included 
within the various monetary aggregates. The receipt of a
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market related rate of interest on funds which offer 
immediate or easy access, often with attached money 
transmission facilities is likely to blur the distinction 
between pure transactions balances and pure investment 
balances. Moreover, from an opposite point of view, pure 
investment balances are likely to become more like 
transactions balances with a progressive reduction in 
illiquidity,
"building society deposits, which were traditionally 
dominated by savings balances, have increasingly been 
used for transaction purposes in recent years •
(BEQB May 1987(a) p212)
In other words, competition between banks and building
societies means that wealth-holders have increasingly been
offered the opportunity to hold attractive easy access
investment assets which entail no explicit decision having
to be made between the placing of funds in a transactions
account with a financial intermediary, and the use of funds
to purchase additional non-money assets (which must be sold
before a means of payment may be obtained) [5]. Times have
certainly changed since Keynes remarked,
"why whould anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use 
money as a store of wealth?"
(1936, p216)
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5.3 The Effect of Financial Innovation on the Monetary
Aggregates
If monetary aggregates are to be used in a money supply 
targeting strategy, it is desirable that there is a 
reasonably stable relationship between the monetary 
aggregate(s) and the ultimate goal (but not necessarily 
close or systematic, according to Friedman, due to lags)[ 6 ]. 
Moreover, the motives for holding money should remain 
consistent over time, such that the growth rates of the 
aggregates convey accurate information as to the level of 
- expenditure. In monetary control terms, a reduction in the 
growth rate of the monetary aggregate(s) should thus imply a 
reduction in the amount of money available for carrying out 
expenditure decisions. There should therefore be a stable 
and close relationship between the monetary aggregates and 
nominal incomes.
It appears that financial innovation may have altered 
the money-income relationship for the broad money 
aggregates, although a new stable relationship may exist 
after the transitional period of financial innovation.
The relationship between M3 and nominal income, and between 
M4 and nominal income, appears to have changed dramatically 
since 1980. After rising during 1974-79, the income velocity 
of circulation of M3 and M4 has fallen since 1980 (diagram 
5.2). Excessive growth in the monetary aggregates, i.e. in 
excess of nominal income, has not led to a subsequent 
increase in prices, as monetarist models would predict. 
Experience in the 1970's indicated that there was a lag of
174
approximately two years between the growth of M3 and 
subsequent growth of inflation (see diagram 5.3). A sharp 
increase in M3 in 1973 was followed by a rise in inflation 
in 1975. Similarly, a sharp rise in M3 in 1978 was followed 
by an increase in inflation in 1980. There is not, however, 
such a relationship after 1980. Indeed, M3 and M4 have grown 
sharply since 1983, combined with a fall in the rate of 
inflation. There appears to be no clear relationship 
between the broad monetary aggregates and inflation, as 
shown in Table 5.1.
Given this "great velocity decline" (Taylor 1987), to 
what extent is financial innovation and competition a factor 
in the rapid growth of the broad monetary aggregates, M3 and 
M4, relative to nominal income?[7]. In particular, is the 
fast growth of M3/M4 a consequence of the particular 
innovations introduced by the retail banks and building 
societies identified in Chapter Four? It is hypothesized 
here that the financial innovations examined in Chapter Four 
which provide a market related rate of interest on easy 
access accounts have altered the money-income relationship 
as a result of offering both investment and transactions 
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1980 16.4 16.3 16.7 13.5
1981 11.5 19.2 17.6 14.3
1982 8.5 18.6 16.9 12.5
1983 5.2 5.7 13.6 13.6
1984 4.6 15.0 13.0 12.6
1985 5.3 12.7 13.3 13.0
1986 3.4 18.2 15.5 14.7
1987 3.4 19.9 15.1 14.5
Inflation and the Broad Monetary Aggregates
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues.
Tables 11.2 and Economic Trends Table 24.
The Bank of England maintains that there are three 
broad factors which have caused the fall in the velocity of 
broad money: (BEQB December 1985 p519-520 - reported 
verbatim)
1. The removal of official restraints on the scale of 
banks and building societies business (i.e. the 
removal of monetary controls identified in Chapter 
Four).
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2. The intensification of competition between and
among banks and building societies, and offering 
of more attractive returns and facilities to 
savers (see below).
3 The persistence of positive real interest rates 
(see below).
It is the first and second of these points to which
attention is now turned.
Recall the hypothesis that 'money' now serves the
purpose of both transactions and investment motives. The
problem of financial instruments which combine transactions
and investment motives summed up by Johnson,
"The main difficulty for monetary control has been the 
conceptual one that so many bank liabilities now 
combine savings characteristics with transaction 
characteristics. There is an economy, in that the 
depositor does not have to have two separate kinds of 
account; one will fulfill his purpose. This means that 
the velocity of many broad aggregates is tending to 
fall as people increase their savings with income''.
(1986 p356)
It would thus appear worthwhile to further analyse the 
relationship between the growth of the broad monetary 
aggregates and financial innovation.
Starting with M3, it may be that the introduction of 
interest bearing sight deposits, and high interest cheque 
accounts at banks may have increased the growth rate of M3. 
Official figures for high interest cheque accounts (HICA) 
are unfortunately not available. Quilter Goodison (1987)
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estimated that the total figure was £9 billion at the end of 
1986. This is however, a conservative estimate, as Midland 
bank alone had £3 billion on its HICA at this time (personal 
correspondence). The effect of the growth in interest 
bearing sight accounts and HICA on the growth rate of M3 
depends ultimately upon where the assets have originated 
from. If interest bearing sight deposits and HICA are so 
attractive that portfolio redistribution by wealth holders 
from assets not included in M3 into the new assets included 
in M3 takes place, then M3 growth will be increased. The 
growth rate of M3 will not be affected, however, under 
circumstances whereby portfolio allocation takes place 
solely between assets included in the M3 aggregate. It is 
possible, therefore, for there to be a large increase in 
holdings of the new innovative financial assets, interest 
bearing sight accounts and HICA, without there being much 
affect on the growth rate of M3. The fall in the share of 
non-interest bearing balances is shown in diagram 5.4 and 
appears to indicate that most of the growth in interest 
bearing sight deposits has in fact been from switching out 
of non-interest bearing balances within M3, thus not 
affecting the growth rate of the aggregate.
That the fast growth rate of M3 is not directly due to 
the new bank innovations is further supported by the 
evidence from the velocity of sectoral M3 holdings. It is 
immediately obvious from diagram 5.5 and 5.6 that the 
decline of M3 income velocity is not due to the behaviour of 
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holdings of M3 has remained relatively constant since 1980 
(see diagram, 5.6). Relative to personal disposable income, 
the personal sectors holdings of M3 reached a peak in 1973- 
74, fell until 1979, and has remained relatively constant
isince then. In fact, the personal sectors share of M3 
assets has fallen, relative to that of ICC's and OFI*s (see 
diagram 5.7). Moreover, from 1977 to 1987, the proportion of 
personal sector holdings of M3 in gross financial wealth 
declined from 15% to only 10%, with the greatest part of the 
fall happening since 1980 (Table 5.2). Given that the vast 
majority of high interest cheque accounts will be held by 
the personal sector, it appears that the fast growth of 
these accounts is not responsible for the rapid increase in 
M3. The majority of the growth in HICAs must be due to an 
increase in the opportunity cost of holding non-interest 
bearing deposits (and a decline in holdings of cash, which 
of course bears no interest), such that switching of 
balances by the personal sector has occurred within M3. When 
analysing holdings of balances within M3, it is evident that 
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Table 5.2












Personal Sector Holdings of M3 as a percentage of 
Gross Financial Wealth
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues, Table 14.4
From Table 5.3 it seems that the behaviour of ICC*s and
0 F I fs is responsible for the fall in income velocity of M3, 
when examining the holdings of M3 assets. 0FI*s holdings of 
sterling with the monetary sector has increased nearly six 
fold over the period 1980-1987, whilst that of ICC's and the 
personal sector have grown 3% times and doubled respectively.
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Table 5.3
Year OFl's ICC's Personal
1980 7328 13645 • 36598
1981 9774 17690 46363
1982 12693 18186 50007
1983 15111 21833 53499
1984 19047 24773 56594
1985 25542 27875 61488
1986 32306 36583 69486
1987 41508 45232 76753
Holdings of M3 by Sector (£tn)
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues. Tables 14.2,
14.3, 14.4.
The growth in holdings, of M3 by ICC's has steadily 
increased relative to nominal income since 1980. This may be 
the result of a higher average rate of return earned by 
companies on. their liquid assets, relative to interest rates 
on competing short-term assets during the 1980's co mpa r e d 
with the 1 9 7 0 *s (BEQB February 1988 p80). The share of OFl's 
holdings of M3 has shown quite a dramatic increase since 
1980. OFl's holdings of M3 grew extremely fast over 1972-73, 
fell marginally from 1974-79, and then increased very 
rapidly from 1980 onwards (see diagram 5.8). How can this 
growth in OFl's holdings of M3 be rationalised? Furthermore, 
how are increased holdings of 'money' by financial 
institutions to be interpreted for the purposes of monetary 
control? A major reason for the build up of OFI deposits at
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banks has been regulation induced. Regulations relating to 
the taxation of building society transactions in gilts were 
changed in 1984 . The change in regulations made bank 
deposits attractive relative to gilts, such that there was a 
portfolio reallocation decision by building societies 
leading to a significant movement away from holding public 
sector debt towards holding bank deposits. Building society 
holdings of bank deposits have, however, been growing fast 
since 1979-80, such that this regulation-induced effect is 
obviously not the only factor involved. In fact, it is 
likely that the change in taxation regulations would have 
only led to a short-term, portfolio re-adjustment, taking 
place over 1985-86. As building society holdings of M3 have 
grown almost nine fold since 1979, there must be other 
factors at work.
In explaining building societies* holdings of M3, it may 
be instructive to return to the abolition of the cartel, 
examined in Chapter Four.
It is clear that for the majority of the period 1980-1987, 
building societies enjoyed a favourable competitive 
advantage over retail banks in terms of paying higher 
deposit rates of interest (see Chapter Four). These high 
rates of interest have largely been paid on extremely liquid 
balances, with little or no withdrawal penalties. The 
competitive advantage of building societies over banks is 
exemplified in the growth of the building societies share of 
personal sector liquid assets since 1980, and the decline in 
the retail banks share. The growth of building society
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liquid assets held by the personal sector has been much 
faster than the growth in personal disposable income (see 
diagram 5.9). Indeed, this growth has been mainly 
responsible for the fall in income velocity of M4 (see 
diagram 5.10). It appears that the effect of financial 
innovation may have been to induce the personal sector to 
hold more building society deposits relative to income. 
Financial innovation has not directly led to a fast growth
iin persons holdings of M3 relative to income, largely 
because of the superior interest rate at building 
societies.lt could be argued however that financial 
innovation has indirectly led to the fall in the income 
velocity of M3. The personal sector has favoured building 
society deposits because of the relatively higher interest 
rates and the 'increased moneyness' of building society 
accounts (BEQB May 1987 p236). These balances have in part 
been recycled to banks, thus increasing M3 relative to 
nominal incomes.
The effect of high interest rates on instant access 
deposits upon the demand for M4 is examined econometrically 
in Chapter Ten.
Financial innovation has therefore indirectly led to an 
increase in M3 relative to income. This is because the 
abolition of the societies' recommended rate system and 
innovation induced fast growth of personal sector holdings 
of building society deposits has a counterpart in the fast 
build-up of building society holdings of bank deposits 
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Building Society Holdings of Bank Deposits
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues, Table 7.7
It must be emphasized that whilst the decision to hold 
additional liquid investment assets is purely at the margin 
of financial portfolio selection, it may have crucial 
implications for the interpretation of movements in the 
U.K's monetary aggregates, for the stability of money 
demand, and for the implementation of monetary controls. 
First, individuals will no longer feel obliged to hold 
separate accounts for pure transactions funds and for funds 
held in readiness for making investments or as part of a 
financial investment portfolio. Secondly, changes in the 
general level of interest rates will have a much-reduced 
effect on the opportunity cost of holding liquid 
transactions balances, and hence it could be expected that 










predictable impact on the growth of the aggregates. Thirdly, 
there is the problem that even if a predictable relationship 
could be established between the growth of money and changes 
in che general level of interest rates, it would still not 
be possible to determine whether or not individuals had 
consciously altered the balance between the amount of funds 
held for transactions purposes and the amount held for 
investment purposes within their aggregate holdings of 
financial assets. Thus, it might still be quite possible for 
an increase in the general level of interest rates to dampen 
effective aggregate demand for goods and services without 
that increase having any discernible impact on the growth of 
the monetary aggregates. Indeed, as individuals would be 
able to alter the distribution of their financial assets 
portfolio (in terms of assets being ear-marked for specific 
functions) without having to take any explicit action (and 
hence without incurring related transactions costs and 
taking on the possible risks related to having to switch 
funds back into a spendable form at short notice), it is 
quite possible that official manipulation of the level of 
interest rates could have an enhanced influence on private 
expenditure decisions. This, therefore, raises the problem 
of the authorities being in a position whereby they may be 
unaware of the effects of policy actions. The change in 
motives for holding liquid funds is likely to have changed 
any link between money and income. If transactions balances 
are being held for investment purposes rather than for 
expenditure purposes, an increase in the money supply may
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not necessarily lead to an increase in income. An increase
in the money supply that is greater than the increase in
nominal income may merely represent an increased desire to
hold high interest money balances for investment purposes.
The effect of high interest instant access balances on the
change in the money-income relationship is tested
econometrically in Chapter Nine.
The problem of changing motives for holding money has
been recognised in recent policy statements,
"There have been significant changes in the 
relationship between broad money and spending over the 
years. Because it is used as a store of value as well 
as for transactions purposes, what matters so far as 
subsequent inflationary pressure is concerned is not 
its growth rate alone but the extent to which people 
are prepared to hold interest-bearing money balances 
rather than to spend them".
(Financial Statement and Budget Report March 1989)
The problem for the monetary authorities is to decide 
whether "excessive" growth of the monetary aggregates 
(relative to nominal incomes) is indicative of loose policy 
conditions or whether it is symptomatic of behavioural 
changes that have not been foreseen and that do not 
necessarily augur future inflation.
It appears that, in the light of the increase in 
competition between banks and building societies, and the 
financial innovations introduced, the build-up of liquidity 
and subsequent out-of-target growth of the broad monetary 
aggregates may merely have been a rational response by 
wealth holders to the behaviour of financial institutions, 
and may have represented a once-for-all adjustment that only 
affected monetary control as the adjustment occurred.
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If this is so, it may be that, rather than being
representative of possible future inflation, it may
represent a rational portfolio redistribution on behalf of
the non-bank private sector. As recognised by the Bank of
England (BEQB December 1986,p503) it is important that the
movements of the aggregates be interpreted rather than
reacted to in a pavlovian manner. There are problems, of
course, in exercising discretion:
"The difficulty is to know how much of the growth in 
personal sector liquidity one should explain in this 
way and how much reflects a build-up of money holdings 
for purely transactions purposes. For although one can 
make a qualitative assessment the separate influences 
cannot easily be quantitatively distinguished".
(BEQB December 1985.p503)
It is interesting to note the significance already 
attached by the UK authorities to the changing competitive 
environment for building societies and banks and the 
operation of their monetary control regime,
"Broad money and credit have been growing fast, and I 
understand the concern that has been aroused on that 
score. As I pointed out last year, it was clear that 
the liberalisation of the financial system, the end of 
mortgage rationing and the increased competition 
between financial institutions would lead to a steady 
increase in the ratio of broad money to GDP. This, 
indeed, has been a consistent feature of the 1980 s. 
There is every sign that people are holding the 
increased amounts of broad money quite willingly. As 
long as this is so, its growth is not inflationary".
(N Lawson, O c t . 1986)
However, it should also be recognized that after almost 
a decade of negative real interest rates on retail financial 
assets, the 1980's has witnessed a substantial shift back to 
positive real interest rates on retail assets. Indeed, it 
is probably correct to suggest that rates of interest paid
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by both building societies and banks have been higher in 
real terms during the past three years than at any time 
during the post-war period.
If, as Lawson suggests, the "increased amounts of broad 
money" are being willingly held, the continued willingness 
of the non-bank private sector to hold these balances may 
depend crucially upon real interest rates being maintained 
at a high level.
If this is so, then unless it is the desire of the 
authorities that real interest rates should remain high 
indefinitely (or at least until domestic productive capacity 
can be raised sufficiently to allow for the absorption of 
the increased domestic spending power in a non-inflationary 
manner), the actual build-up of the money holdings can be 
neither condoned nor ignored if the control of inflation is 
to be seen as a long run objective as well as a shorter-term 
objective of government policy. However, the shorter-term 
policy dilemma is likely to be that whilst high real rates 
of interest may be necessary in order to induce holders of 
interest-bearing money assets to continue to hold the higher 
levels of liquidity, they are probably a primary cause of 
the build up in these potentially destabilising balances.
The official policy statements have tended to utilise 
the developments in the financial institutions framework as 
a means of calming fears about the build-up of liquidity,
(in relation to nominal incomes) in the UK financial system, 
and as a means of explaining the apparent break-down in the 
relationship between money supply growth and inflation which
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had underpinned the g o v e r n m e n t s  approach to macro-economic
policy. As the Governor of the Bank of England pointed out
in a lecture given on 22nd October, 1986:
" . .  a good part of the increase in personal sector
liquidity since 1980, which is held largely with 
building societies rather than banks, can be attributed 
to a redistribution of personal sector assets as a 
response to changes in the behaviour of financial 
intermediaries. To this extent it does not carry the 
same threatening message about future inflation as the 
same increase in liquidity would in the absence of the 
change in financial behaviour".(BEQB December 1986 p503)
It is possible however, that individuals might amass 
large amounts of assets for their (liquid) investment 
characteristics whilst real interest rates remain high, but 
then rapidly unload these balances through expenditure on 
goods, services and real assets once the real return on 
holding liquid assets begins to fall. Thus, whilst a growth 
rate of the aggregates well in excess of the growth of 
domestic output might be legitimately rationalised as being 
of little concern for the short-term course of inflation and 
the current account of the balance of payments, so long as 
the monetary policy remains restrictive with high real 
interest rates, any official action taken to ease monetary 
controls might have a quite disproportionate effect on the 
growth of real spending power of the private sector. Not 
only would the return from holding liquid investment assets 
be reduced relative to the marginal utility to be gained 
from current consumption, but also inflationary 
expectations, stimulated by the recognition of the pent up 
purchasing power within the economy, may encourage increased
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expenditures on real goods, services and assets.
This assumes, of course, that the adjustment of money 
balances will involve expenditure on real goods and 
services. It may be that (and this is an empirical matter) 
portfolio re-adjustments take place largely through 
switching into other financial assets, rather than through 
consumption expenditure.
The statement that "increased amounts of broad money"
are being held of course relates to levels of broad money
compared with nominal incomes. As stated earlier the
relationship between holdings of broad money and financial
wealth have remained fairly constant since 1980. The correct
interpretation may be that the relationship between money
and income is being restored to levels observed before the
inflation shocks of the 1970*s. If this is so, it would seem
to suggest that the velocity of circulation may soon stop
decreasing and "flatten out". It may be that velocity is
returning to trend levels of the early 1970's, such that
combined with a constant ration of money to financial
wealth, holdings of money are neither excessive, nor are
they likely to flow into the pool of transactions, nor do
they represent a build-up of potential purchasing power as
perceived by the balance holders. Rather than being a
breakdown of the money-income relationship, there may merely
have been a stock effect followed by a new stable
relationship,
"The immediate response of the demand for a broad 
aggregate, whose marginal components bear interest at 
market rates, to a policy designed to lower its long- 
run growth rate, will be to grow more rapidly until it
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has reached the new and higher equilibrium growth level 
that an increase in its own rate of return dictates".
(Laidler, 1984, pp36-37)
It is not clear, however, given the continued fast
monetary growth of the aggregates in the U.K., when or
whether an equilibrium level will be reached.
However, should the monetary authorities attempt to
constrain the growth of the monetary aggregates, the
financial developments introduced by building societies and
banks have made a simplistic growth target inappropriate.
Short-term movements of funds in response to interest rate
differential changes, in addition to the apparent desire of
individuals to hold liquid balances for investment purposes,
makes excessive dependence upon the monetary aggregates
quite unrealistic. The monetary aggregates may still be part
of a monetary package, however, as a guide to discretionary
policy in a world of financial innovation,
"when the relationship between the money stock and the 
ultimate targets of policy is changing, due to 
deregulation or whatever reason, the case for utilizing 
additional information is strengtnened. But this does 
not mean that there is no useful information in the 
monetary aggregates. Judgements about whether or not 
the monetary aggregates are growing too quickly will be 
harder than in a more stable regulatory framework but 
the information content of the aggregates will not be 
zero"•
(Jonson and Parkin, 1986 pl5) 
The reliance of policy on a number of indicators 
necessitates a judgemental approach as to the relative 
significance of the various indicators.
It appears that financial innovation means that 
monetary policy may have to be carried out in a 
discretionary interpretive manner,
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"It is the counterbalance between the shifting 
structure of the financial system on the one hand, and 
the need for rules and pre-commitment on the part of 
the authorities on the other, that makes it so hard to 
select an optimal form of monetary targetry, one that 
could retain underlying discipline, while at the same 
time allowing a sensible and flexible response to the 
rapidly changing form of the financial system".
(Goodhart 198£ p325)
Laidler (1981) appears to concur on the effect of
financial innovation on monetary control,
"I doubt that my own view, that the case for governing 
monetary policy by rules is impossible to sustain in 
the face of careful consideration of the influence of 
institutional change on the behaviour over time of the 
demand for money function, will find a great deal of 
support among monetarists at present, while I would be 
surprised to find it regarded as sufficient of a 
concession to "fine tuning", and it really is no such 
thing, to satisfy the Keynesians".
(P25)
From the evidence of the 1980's, it seems that growth 
of the money stock in excess of the growth of nominal income 
does not always cause inflation.
This means that money may still be a necessary cause of 
inflation but not a sufficient cause of inflation. 
Essentially a fast rate of growth of the money supply 
relative to nominal income may or may not cause an increase 
in inflation, depending on the nature of the monetary 
expansion.
A fast rate of growth of the money supply induced by 
financial innovation may have no effect on inflation. The 
problem for the monetary authorities is to interpret the 
nature of the monetary expansion and decide as to its 
possible effects (if any) and hence policy actions. The
201
existence of financial innovation, or the possibility that 
it might occur, hinders the operation of monetary control.
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5.4 Conclusion
Two broad effects of building societies' and Banks' 
financial innovation on the relationship between money and 
income have been identified. Firstly, there are those new 
financial assets that carry out what are termed the 
'traditional' motives for holding money (transactions and 
precautionary) that at times make it necessary for the 
monetary authorities to reclassify the monetary aggregates 
(as in the case of building society innovations and 
M2/PSL2), and which may also lead to short-term distortion 
in the growth rates of the monetary aggregates. Such 
innovation, it is argued, it not a new phenomenon, but 
merely the changing evolutionary development of the 
financial system. The institutionalist school has for many 
years pointed to the existence and emergence of close 
substitutes for money. The difference in the 1980's is the 
variety and pace of financial innovation and change. 
Financial innovations which perform the traditional 
functions of money inhibit the short-term operation of 
monetary control through temporary stock adjustment effects. 
There will often be a time lag between the introduction of 
an innovation and the identification of that innovation by 
the monetary authorities. There may be a further time lag 
between analysing the innovation and deciding whether or not 
the monetary aggregates need to be reclassified. During this 
time, the growth of the new asset may lead to distortions in 
some of the targetted money supply figures, causing problems 
of interpretation of monetary conditions. Redefinition of
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the monetary aggregates to include a new asset may also 
invite scepticism as to the authorities approach to monetary 
control in terms of accusations of manipulating the figures 
and/or "moving the goalposts" - (Johnson 1986. P3).
Secondly, there are those financial innovations that 
may be held for their investment properties. Highly liquid 
monetary assets (many of which are instantly accessible) 
have evolved which offer extremely competitive market- 
related rates of interest. 'Money 1 has not historically paid 
explicit interest. The payment of interest on instant access 
accounts means that these balances increasingly represent 
attractive repositories for investment balances. Moreover, 
these new assets also tend to fulfill the traditional 
functions of money. The important aspect of these assets is 
that they require no explicit action on the part of their 
holders to switch them from being investment balances to 
media of exchange/expenditure balances. These investment 
balances usually have the property of being instantly 
realisable. There tend to be few prohibitive transactions 
costs, investment and expenditure balances being kept in 
the same account, and merely perceived as being separate in 
the mind of the holder.
These interest bearing transactions balances may be 
relatively interest inelastic, and so may have more 
continuing effects on monetary control (see Chapter Seven).
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An analysis of the growth of the monetary aggregates in 
section 5.3 suggests that the introduction of easy access 
high interest accounts that offer both transactions and 
investment characteristics may have been responsible for the 
change in of the money-income relationship. The fall in the 
income velocity of broad money since 1980, i.e. the tendency 
for broad money aggregates to grow faster than nominal 
incomes, may be explained by the increasing emphasis placed 
on money balances as investment assets. The further 
attraction of high real interest rates on money appears to 
have altered the money-income link. Thus, the money income 
relationship appears to have changed due to the new role 
assigned to money by balance holders. This may however be a 
simple stock adjustment, and the relationship may have 
stabilized. The specific hypothesis that financial 
innovation in terms of high interest money balances has 
affected the money-income link through the demand for money 
function is tested econometrically in Chapter Nine.
It may certainly be concluded from the evidence of this 
Chapter that at the very least, the operation of monetary
policy should be carried out in an interpretive,
discretionary manner, rather than through some pre-stated 
monetary rule. The usefulness of a discretionary policy will 
depend, moreover, on the ability of the authorities to
control the money supply and on the stability of the demand
for money, which are investigated in Chapters Nine and Ten.
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Notes
[1] Sayers was one of the major authors of the Radcliffe 
Report,
[2] See also Coghlan (1977, 1978).
[3] The Building Societies Association has recently argued 
that Building Society accounts are primarily used for 
investment purposes (BSA 1983), but with the 
introduction of interest-bearing cheque accounts, there 
are an increasing number of accounts that combine both 
transactions and investment services.
[4] Hadjimichalakis (1982) examines the effects of payment 
of interest on money upon the operation of monetary 
control in a U.S. context. As much of the analysis 
concentrates upon the effects of the lifting of 
Regulation Q, the conclusions are not strictly 
transferable to the U.K.
[5] It has been suggested that a solution to the breakdown 
of the money-income relationship may be to specify the 
monetary aggregates in DTvisia Index form, Barnett 
(1978), Spindt (1984), Barnett et al (1984). The 
present monetary aggregates give equal weights to all 
asset components, whereas a Divisia monetary aggregate 
would weight assets according to their 'money' services 
or 'user costs' (the difference between a bench mark 
asset and the asset's yield). Although this seems 
intuitively plausible, the new aggregates would be 
difficult for economic agents to understand, and 
moreover Mills (1983) reports that it is not possible,
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according to his research, to specify a demand for 
money equation for a broad Divisia aggregate.
[6 ] See Mills (1983) and Bailey et al (1982) for analyses 
of the information content of the monetary aggregates 
in the U.K. in terms of their ability to statistically 
'explain 1 nominal income.
[7] See Bordo and Jonung (1981) for an international 




COMPETITION, MORTGAGE LENDING, AND THE 
MONEY-INCOME RELATIONSHIP
6.0 Introduction
It is not simply money balances, of course, that are 
important for monetary control or that affect the growth 
rates of the monetary aggregates. The level of borrowing is 
also of importance for the analysis of monetary 
developments. Section 6.1 examines the relationship between 
movements in the monetary aggregates and the growth of 
borrowing. It is noted that there has been a rapid expansion 
in both borrowing and the monetary aggregates since 1980, 
particularly by the personal sector, and largely for house 
purchase. This is a response to the factors outlined in 
Chapter four, relating to the stock effects of the abolition 
of the building societies’ cartel and the ending of the 
corset.
As personal sector borrowing has been a major factor in 
the rapid growth of the broad monetary aggregates it may be 
possible to rationalise the fast increase in the money 
supply figures in relation to nominal incomes by reference 
to lending to the personal sector. Indeed, it has been 
suggested by some authors that the personal sector 'mortgage 
leak' is responsible for the slow growth of nominal incomes 
compared with the broad monetary aggregates. This argument 
is explained and fully examined in section 6.1. An 
alternative hypothesis as to the effect of personal sector 
borrowing on the fall in the income velocity of money is
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presented in section 6 .2 .Specifically, the combined effect 
of an increased level of mortgage lending and greater 
financial innovation by building societies and banks upon 
the activities of 'last-time sellers' is analysed.
The hypothesis outlined in Chapter Four that finite 
stock adjustments following the abolition of the recommended 
rate system and the ending of the corset may have 
temporarily affected the stability of the demand for money 
and credit is examined in further detail.
The effect of deposit and credit shocks upon the 
operation of monetary control are examined in section 6.3 in 
terms of the buffer stock model, and conclusions are drawn 
as to the applicability of this model both in theory and in 
reality. Section 6.4 analyses the debate as to whether the 
money supply is exogenous or endogenous in terms of the 
activities of building societies and banks as set out in 
section 6 . 1  and in view of the effects of supply-side credit 
shocks to the economy.
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6.1 House Purchase, the Mortgage 'leak* and the 
Money-income relationship
It may be useful to examine the growth of the monetary 
aggregates in terms of the effects of building society and 
bank lending. Any analysis of the transmission mechanism 
between money and prices must include both the money and 
credit markets to get a full picture. Some would argue that 
this point has not always been expressly acknowledged,
"For many years, economists ignored the role of the 
credit markets. Recently there has been some change.
The analysis of the transmission process is incomplete 
without both the money and credit markets and their 
interaction".
(Brunner and Meltzer 1988 p446) 
Indeed, the neglect of the credit market is exemplified 
in the IS/LM analysis introduced in Chgapter Two, where 
money determines aggregate demand, all other financial 
instruments (including credit) being categorized, under the 
amorphous heading of 'bonds*. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)and 
Brunner and Meltzer (1988) have extended the basic JS/LM 
framework to accommodate the roles of both money and credit. .
The importance of the credit market to growth in the 
monetary aggregates can be seen in diagram 6.1 which shows 
the change in bank and building soceity lending to the non­
bank private sector and change in M4. It is clear that there 
is a close relationship between credit and growth in the 
money supply.
Diagrams 6.2 and 6.3 show that borrowing by ICC's,
OFl's and the personal sector have all growth extremely^fast 
since 1980. In terms of volume, personal sector borrowing
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from banks and building societies has grown from 10.8 
billion in 1970 to 220 billion by the end of 1987, with the 
majority of the growth coming since 1980. That of OFl's has 
also grown fast, from 0.5 billion to 48 billion over the 
same period, with bank borrowing by ICC's growing from 6.9 
billion to 87 billion. As can be seen from diagrams 6.4 and
6.5 there have been marked trends in the growth of bank and 
building society sterling lending to the three categories 
that form to make up the non-bank private sector. Much of 
the growth in bank and building society lending has been to 
the personal sector. The proportion of total bank lending to 
persons has increased from 22% in 1970 to 43% in 1987, with 
much of the growth coming since 1980.
By contrast, bank lending to ICC's as a proportion of 
total bank lending has fallen from over 70% in 1970, to 33% 
in 1987. The growth of bank borrowing by OFl's has also 
grown markedly. For an analysis of OFI and ICC bank 
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Personal OFI ICC Personal OFI ICC
1970 1 0 . 8 0.5 6.9 1981 74.8 1 0 . 1 31.9
1971 13.0 0 . 8 7.5 1982 93.0 1 2 . 0 33.0
1972 18.1 1.4 1 0 . 1 1983 112.5 15.4 35.6
1973 21.3 ■ 2 . 0 14.0 1984 133.2 18.9 39.5
1974 23.1 2 . 1 17.4 1985 158.4 25.1 43.1
1975 26.0 2.3 16.0 1986 186.2 37.5 51.6
1976 30.2 .2 . 6 18.2 1987 2 2 0 . 0 48.0 67.2
1977 35.4 2.7 20.3
1978 42.3 3.4 2 2 . 6
1979 50.8 4.5 26.8
1980 60.0 7.2 29.4
Bank and Building Society Sterling lending to 
the NBPS (£billion)
Source: Financial Statistics, Various Issues, Table 14.4
The importance of personal sector borrowing from
building societies and banks to the growth in M4 can be seen
in diagram 6 .6 . The degree to which the growth in M4 is
determined by personal sector borrowing from banks and
building societies is seen by the close trend of the two
series. Of total bank and building society lending to the
personal sector, mortgage lending cannot be overemphasized,
as diagram 6.7 shows. Indeed, when analysing the broad
monetary aggregates, official comment has centred upon the




1972 1974 1976 1978 1988 1982 1984 1986 1988
CHANGE 1H M4 AND PERSONAL SECTOR H O M I N G  FROM BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES!£ MILLION)
218
oDIAGRAM 6.7
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"In the United Kingdom at present, monetary growth is 
being driven to a considerable extent by the strength 
of lending to the personal sector in general, and by 
mortgage lending in particular".
BEQB December 1986 p531
That this upsurge in personal sector borrowing has occurred 
should not be surprising, however [1 ].
The increase in personal sector borrowing resulted 
from the stock adjustment of the increase in mortgages after 
the building societies* cartel and the removal of the corset 
on the banks. These changes entailed a greater supply of 
credit and a finite portfolio reallocation by the personal 
sector back towards its desired demand for credit function.
Wills (1982) argues that banks can be analysed as two- 
input, two-output firms. The two inputs are retail and 
wholesale deposits (liabilities) and the two outputs being 
retail and wholesale lending. If wholesale lending is for 
the moment ignored, this analysis can also be extended to 
building societies. Wills maintains that banks (and building 
societies) act as price setters and quantity takers in the 
retail deposit and loan markets, such that the supply curve 
for loans/credit would be relatively flat. In the diagram 
(6 .8 ), as long as the market is competitive and 
unconstrained by restrictive monetary controls, at price 
banks and building societies will supply whatever credit is 
demanded (subject to the ability of the borrower to repay).
At times in the period prior to 1980, however, banks and 
building societies could not operate in this manner. The 
banks* ability to operate as price-setters and quantity- 
takers was circumscribed by the various monetary controls
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placed on them, as described in Chapter Three. Similarly, 
the building societies were constrained by the interest rate 
cartel agreement. For the majority of the 1970's building 
societies and banks effectively operated as price-takers and 
quantity- setters. The ending of direct monetary controls 
and the cartel meant that banks and building societies could 
return to being price setters and quantity takers as Wills 
suggests. This resulted in a considerable supply-side credit 
shock, with substantial reintermediation on the part of the 
personal sector, as evidenced by the rapid growth of the 
broad monetary aggregates.
The stock effect in terms of the re-allocation of 
personal sector credit portfolios would be expected to 
destabilise the demand for money and credit as the effects 
occurred, but which may in the long-term settle down to 
stable relationships.
The fast growth of the broad monetary aggregates, and 
in particular the rapid increase in building society and 
bank lending to the personal sector since 1980, would, under 
monetarist models, be expected to lead to an increase in the 
rate of growth of inflation. An increase in the level of 
lending would be expected to lead to an increase in the 
level of expenditure, ceteris paribus. An increase in 
expenditure would be expected to push up prices. As is well 
known, inflation did not increase 1980-1988. A comparison 
can be made with the "Barber boom" years of increased 
monetary growth, and its counterpart, bank lending. The 
introduction of Competition and Credit Control led to an
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upsurge in bank lending, and a subsequent upturn in 
inflation, with a lag of about two years. Given the fast 
rate of growth of building society and bank lending since 
1980, why did the UK economy not experience any increase in 
the rate of inflation, as happened earlier? Dow and Saville 
(1988) have attempted to provide an explanation for this 
phenomenon. Their analysis is worth detailed examination, 
partly because as former members of the Bank of England's 
Economic Section their views will undoubtedly be widely 
respected, but largely because it is held by the author that 
their explanation, although in the right direction, is 
seriously flawed, and may lead to serious misconceptions of 
past events and of future policy conduct.
Dow and Saville use the example of an increase in bank 
(or it could be a building society - in their work they are 
treated as the same) lending to the private sector, in an 
attempt to show that increases in bank lending have resulted 
in portfolio shifts by the private sector, rather than 
increases in expenditure (pl86), and hence has resulted in 
the decline in the velocity of broad money. They point out 
that if all the money lent by building societies and banks 
had been spent, then there should be a large effect on GDP. 
Table 6.2, which reproduces their data shows the annual 
changes in the real stock of loans to the private sector by 
building societies and banks, as a percentage of GDP. From 
this data, Dow and Saville point out that,
"The fact that the changes in borrowing, although
usually in the same direction, were altogether larger
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than actual changes in GDP makes it impossible to 
believe that all - or even a considerable fraction - of 
the additional borrowing resulted in additional 
spending'*. (Dow & Saville ppl96-197)
Several criticisms may be made of this analysis, but 
are left until after a summary of Dow & Saville' explanation 
for the apparent discrepancy between fast growth in bank and 
building society lending and growth in GDP.
As the majority of the increase in building society and 
bank lending since 1980 has been to the personal sector, it 
is perhaps best to start with Dow and Saville's analysis of 
whether or not increased borrowing by this sector has led to 
increased expenditure. Again, table 6.3 reproduces Dow and 
Saville's data. Dow and Saville argue that the table shows-,
"how greatly such 'disproportionate' increases in 
lending would have added to consumers expenditure if 
the whole of the additional lending to persons had been 
spent". (p2 0 0 )
"If the hypothesis were accepted that such lending 
resulted in equivalent additional spending, it would be 
more than enough in many years to account for tne 
observed fluctuations in consumer spending. That 
appears highly implausible". (p2 0 1 )
Dow and Saville emphasise that the increase in the
mortgage leak occurs because mortgage finance providers
relax the stipulation that mortgages are granted for the
purchase price of a house minus any proceeds from the sale
of a previous dwelling. Thus new mortgage borrowing is in
excess of expenditure on new and existing housing. They
argue that the funds acquired through this mortgage 'leak'
process (which amounts to some 3% of PDI), rather than being
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used to finance an increase in expenditure, has been used to 
build up financial assets. This they argue is a rational 
response by personal sector borrowers, as in some years the 
rate of interest on mortgages has been below that available 
on deposit accounts at building societies, and this effect 
is enhanced when account is taken of tax relief on interest 
payments on mortgage borrowing for house purchase or 
improvement. The incentive to use mortgage loans is largely 
a reflection of the pattern of relative interest rates that 
have developed. With building societies paying a high rate 
of interest on easy access deposits, there has been a 
reduction in the spread between the rate on mortgage loans 
and the rate on deposits of building societies. Indeed, 
since 1981 there has been several occasions, when the 
mortgage rate has been lower than the deposit rate, 
resulting in profitable arbitrate opportunities. In other 
words, if a person has, for example, £5000 cash from a house 
he/she has sold, and wishes to buy a house for £30,000, it 
is profitable in some periods to take a mortgage of £30,000 
and maintain the £5000 cash in a high interest account. Of 
course, arbitrage opportunities are rare, but even when they 
are not present, it is still better to maintain portfolio 
allocation in this manner as mortgage rates are far cheaper 
than typical non-mortgage consumer credit rates.
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As it appears to be a stock re-adjustment following the 
abolition of the cartel and portfolio monetary controls, it 
has led to some commentators to minimise its economic 
significance,
"what we have seen is a change in the personal sectors 
financial behaviour, resulting from the freer 
availability of credit, which may be of less economic 
significance than would have been implied by earlier 
relationships between borrowing and spending".
(BEQB February 88 p49)
It is argued here that relationships between borrowing 
and expenditure may have changed, but that Dow and Savilles' 
analysis of the importance of the 'mortgage leak' is both 
naive and flawed.
The effect of mortgage borrowers using their borrowings 
to add to liquid assets as in the moving owner-occupiers 
'mortgage leak' is too small to explain the divergence 
between the growth of personal sector money balances and the 
growth of incomes. Certainly this practice has occurred, but 
it is not large enough to account for the discrepancy. 
Moreover, the figures for equity withdrawal by moving owner- 
occupiers used by Dow and Saville seriously over-estimate 
this type of equity withdrawal. The figures they use are 
those of Drayson (1985) which are reproduced here (Table 
6.4). Drayson's figures are for total equity withdrawal 
rather than for just equity withdrawal by moving-owner- 
occupiers.
There is the theoretical possibility that bank and 
building society multiple deposit expansion through lending 
for mortgage may, in theory, have no effect whatsoever on
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Estimate of net cash withdrawal from the 
private sector housing market
Source: Drayson (1985)
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the real economy. If all funds received by last-time sellers 
are placed in a building society, there will only be a 
constant market in second-hand houses, with no expenditure 
multiplier involved. Building Society deposits and hence 
lending are increased, building societies lend more for 
house purchase, and receive all the funds of the next last 
time sellers, and so on. No expenditure is carried out by 
last time sellers and hence there can be no expenditure 
multiplier. Of course, this assumes a perfect redepository 
ratio for building societies, which will not occur. This 
theoretical case, however, may point to interesting 
possibilities and help to explain past monetary 
developments, as explained below.
The mortgage leak figures, have, in fact, been updated 
and amended by Holmans (1986). The true level of equity 
withdrawal by "raoving-owner-occupiers" is considerably less 
than Draysons' figures that Dow and Saville base their 
analysis on. In 1984, for example, Holmans estimates this 
type of equity withdrawal at £3020m, compared with Draysons 
£7210ra, less than half the amount (Table 6.5). Equity 
withdrawal only equals 18.2% of net new loans for house 
purchase, as opposed to 43.5% as claimed by Drayson and Dow 
and Saville. This considerably weakens their analysis.
Whilst not denying that this type of mortgage leak does have 
an effect in reducing the expected level of expenditure and 
hence nominal incomes if it is used to purchase financial 
assets, it is argued here that the magnitude of such effects 
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6.2 House Purchase, last time sellers, and the money
income relationship
The majority of building society mortgage loans are 
extended for the purchase of existing housing, rather than 
new housing. The Stow Report (1979) estimated that 85% of 
building societies* mortgage lending is for existing 
housing. Figures are not available for bank lending on 
mortgage, but it appears plausible to assume a similar 
proportion is for "second-hand" housing. In buying an 
existing house, the purchaser will exchange a building 
society loan for the house, and the vendor becomes the 
recipient of the sale price for the house. There may then be 
a chain of further transactions (the vendor may wish to buy 
another house, for example), but at the end of the chain,
(if it involves existing housing stock) all of the funds 
lent for house purchase on the security of already existing 
housing stock must end up in the hands of those who are 
" last-time sellers" - ie. those who are selling a house but 
not buying another house, and therefore not requiring a 
further mortgage. There are several reasons why people 
become last-time sellers. Some may inherit the houses of 
their parents when they die, and subsequently sell the 
property. Some last time sellers may be elderly people 
leaving their own house to move into rented rest-home 
accommodation. Furthermore, some houses which may formerly 
have been rented may be sold.
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Every mortgage loan will therefore necessarily end up, 
after a (perhaps long) chain of transactions, as a receipt 
of funds by a last-time seller.
Let us assume that the last-time seller saves all of 
the money received from selling a house. Further, let us 
assume all of the money is saved at a building society. (The 
money may, of course be used to acquire other financial 
assets, but here the case is limited to the funds being 
returned to a building society for reasons which should 
become clear). The building society will now have more funds 
which it will lend out by way of mortgage. Thus, it can be 
seen that building society lending may be in part self 
financing. The degree to which funds do actually return to 
building societies from mortgage lending depends upon a 
variety of factors which are examined below.
The importance of these funds for the operation and 
interpretation of monetary control depends on what the 
recipient does with the money. The recipient can decide 
either to spend the funds on real assets, or save the funds 
by way of a financial asset, or spend and save the funds in 
a desired proportion. The first case will lead to a greater 
level of expenditure and consumption, whilst the second will 
lead to greater saving. If the funds are spent on real 
assets, the extra expenditure will lead to an expenditure 
multiplier effect, whereby the receiver of the funds will 
spend some and save some, and so on, according to the 
marginal propensity to consume,
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"the flow of loans granted and spent generates a 
significantly larger flow of income. (Or, if you 
prefer, an increment of loans generates a multiple 
increment of income)". (McLeod 1984 pl91)
The amount of funds received by last-time sellers, and 
potentially available for re-lending, is large. The 
categories below are reproduced from the Stow Report (1979) 
"Mortgage Finance in the 1 9 8 0 ,s". As in the report, the 
total number of house sales is divided into two groups:
1. Sales where the funds realised are re-invested in 
housing or transferred overseas. This category can in 
turn by subdivided into four categories:
People moving where the proceeds are used as the 
deposit on the next house. Leakages are assumed to 
be used up in transactions costs.
Council house sales where the proceeds are used by 
councils.
New housing, where the proceeds cover the costs of 
labour, materials, profit and land.
Houses sold on emigration.
2. Sales where the funds are not re-invested in housing or 
transferred abroad; ie. where they are retained for 







(i) people moving out of owner-occupation and into
other tenures. The proceeds are assumed to be 
equal to the average house, price less the average 
mortgage redemptions multiplied by the number of 
sales.
(ii) Household dissolution. This group consists
principally of elderly households with little or
no mortgage and the proceeds are assumed to be 
equal to the number of sales multiplied by the 
average house price.
(iii) The sales of formerly rented houses - adjusted to
allow for company-owned rented property sales. The
proceeds are assumed to be equal to the adjusted 
number of sales multiplied by the average house 
price.
According to the Stow Report, an estimated £4500 
million accrued to last-time sellers in 1979, the latest 
date of the reports calculations. Table 6.6 updates and 
recalculates the Stow data to show the amount of funds 
realised by last-time sellers (Holmans 1986). As can be 
seen, these estimates are somewhat higher than the Stow 
data, and represent a large proportion of funds lent on 
mortgage.
It can be seen that in most years moving owner- 
occupiers proportion of total equity withdrawal accounted to 
less than about 25%, whereas equity withdrawal by last-time 
sellers is almost half the total in most periods. This
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considerably weakens Dow and Saville's emphasis upon the 
importance of moving owner-occupiers affecting the income 
velocity of circulation of the broad money aggregates. The 
economic effects of these large holdings of money are 
dependent upon the proportion that is saved, and the 
proportion that is consumed. The greater is the tendency to 
consume additional income, the larger will be the 
expenditure multiplier. The larger is the propensity to save 
additional income, the greater is the magnitude with which 
banks and building societies institutions can expand 
deposits.
A change in policy of rationing mortgage supply towards 
meeting mortgage demand will necessarily involve financing a 
greater number of loans for house purchase (see Chapter 
Four). A behavioural change by building societies from 
rationing mortgages to providing an excess supply of 
mortgages would be expected to increase both the equity 
withdrawal by "owner-occupier movers" and the volume of 
money received by last time sellers. It would be expected
everything else being equal, that such an increase in funds 
for "owner-occupier movers" and "last-time sellers" would 
lead to an increase in expenditure. Moreover, if the 
previously unsatisfied demand is met, it may lead to a rise 
in house prices. Home owners, with an appreciating asset, 
may adjust their expenditure plans in response to gains from 
house prices. If this is the case, personal sector
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expenditure may rise. This, in turn, may lead to a multiple 
expansion of incomes. If this scenario is correct, then 
increased building society lending for house purchase is 
likely to have similar multiplier effects as follows from an 
increase in bank lending for corporate investment. In fact 
this has not happened. Increased mortgage lending has not 









































Total Equity withdrawal, and by last-time 
sellers and moving owner-occupiers(£m)
Source: Holmans (1986)
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It has already been noted (see Chapter Four) that 
competition between banks and building societies and the 
abolition of the cartel has resulted in a higher average 
rate of interest paid on building society and bank deposits, 
coupled with enhanced liquidity. It would appear reasonable 
to suggest (although difficult to quantify) that high real 
rates of interest on liquid deposits may have attracted a 
large number of last-time sellers to deposit a significant 
proportion of their funds in either building societies or 
banks (in view of the analysis of Chapter Five, mostly at 
building societies) rather than use the money for 
expenditure purposes.
High real interest rates on instant-access accounts
means that an exogenous shock - such as the increase in
building society and bank mortgage lending, may not lead to
holdings of 1 unwanted1 money.. Money, paying an attractive
rate of interest (relative to other financial assets) may
now be regarded as a portfolio investment asset, rather than
merely as a transactions medium (see Chapter Five).
Financial innovation thus seems to have reduced the income-
generating effects of building society and bank lending.
Financial innovation means that money may become long-term
buffer stocks after an exogenous shock to the system, and as
such may be treated as investments, rather than expenditure
balances.. Thus income will not increase as much as might be
expected. This may be part of the reason for the decline in
the income velocity of the broad money aggregates since
1980. If a higher proportion of last-time sellers are being 
attracted to hold their funds as liquid balances at banks
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and building societies, the growth of the money stock will 
be distorted. The growth rate of the money supply would be 
expected to grow faster than the growth rate of nominal 
incomes, because of a reduction in the expenditure 
multiplier.
At the extreme, if all funds of last-time sellers are 
redeposited with building societies and banks, and all these 
funds are subsequently lent for house purchase of existing 
housing stock, there would be absolutely no effect on the 
rate of growth of nominal incomes. Thus, this could be part 
of the explanation of the fall in the income velocity of 
money. Furthermore, as noted before, even that proportion 
of funds spent by last time sellers may end up in banks and 
building societies, because of the desire of people to hold 
funds at these institutions after an unanticipated supply 
side credit shock. The influence of relative interest rates 
on the inflow of 'large' sums of money to building societies 
is shown below (diagram 6.9).It shows that there is a strong 
correlation between inflows of large sums of money and the 
interest rate differential.
Presumably the data for retail banks will exhibit a 
similar sensitivity of large balances to interest rate 
differentials (unfortunately similar figures are not 
available for the monetary sector). This data confirms the 
suggestion that the high rates of interest due to an 
increase in the average rate of interest paid on deposits 
may have attracted investors, (especially last time sellers) 
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this evidence further.
It is perhaps useful to recognise the effect that the 
increase in house prices may have on the expenditure 
multiplier. It is likely that the demand for funds for house 
purchase will increase in line with the rise in house 
prices. It can be seen, however, that a rise in house prices 
will also increase the volume of funds being received by 
last time sellers.
It would appear plausible to suggest that the larger 
the capital received by last time sellers, the greater the 
proportion that will be saved, rather than consumed. The 
rise in house prices which has occurred since 1983 (Table 
6.7) and its corollary, a larger volume of capital being 
received by last time sellers, would seem to imply a greater 
proportion of funds being attracted into banks and building 
societies than before the dramatic rise in house prices, 
given the tendency to consume less and save more as income 
increases. The rise in house prices may therefore have 



















Average House Prices (existing houses at Mortgage 
Completion Stage) 1975-198?
Source: B.S.A. Bulletin April 1989
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6.3 Buffer Stock Model and Financial
Innovation
The 'buffer stock1 or 'disequilibrium' model stems
largely from the work of Artis and Lewis (1974,1976). Artis
and Lewis take exception to conventional specifications of
the demand for money that implicitly assume that the actual
stock of money being held must be equal to the amount
demanded, usually explained by the assumption that the money
supply is demand determined and that the demand for bank
lending is interest insensitive (Artis and Lewis 1976 pl56-
157). On the contrary, Artis and Lewis maintain that,
"If the sources of new supply are augmenting the money 
stock fast enough it is plausible to suppose that 
individual transactors will find their money holdings 
are out of line with, and in excess of their 
expectations and desires. The dissipation of excess 
holdings of money through the rearrangement of 
portfolios, a generalised downward pressure on interest 
rates, and upward pressure on purchases, the level of 
prices and imports - a process which takes time - could 
therefore be overwhelmed by further unexpected 
increments in money holdings".
(Artis and Lewis, 1974, p244)
Disequilibrium between money supply and money demand
came about in the early 1970!S, according to Artis and Lewis,
due to specific unique supply-side events at that time, in
particular, institutional change under competition and
credit control, whereby controls were relaxed on bank
advances, and,
"Variations in reserve requirements and other 
institutional changes contributed initially to a 
disequilibrium between money supply and money demand. 
Further sources of new supply from government budget 
deficits and the Bank's abolition of controls upon bank 
advances perpetuated the cycle".
(Artis and Lewis, 1981 p31 [2])
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Models of buffer stock money are frequently analysed in 
terms of inventory theoretic models (Miller and Orr 1966).
It is argued that money acts as a "buffer11 between 
variations in receipts and expenditures. The individual has 
a desired level of cash or sight deposit (money) holdings. 
This desired level of money holdings is allowed to fluctuate 
within upper and lower bands, due to transactions costs of 
adjustment. When the upper or lower bands are reached the 
money balance is (instantaneously) returned to an 
intermediate level. The optimal rule (Miller and Orr 1966) 
is to have a lower band (0 in the diagram) and a constant 
upper band, (h). When these upper and lower limits are 











The buffer stock model suggests that an 
unanticipated increase in net receipts due to a supply-side 
shock (for example, an increase in bank lending) will lead 
to an accumulation of holdings of buffer stock money (i.e. 
the recipients of the * spent* bank credit will have an 
unexpected increase in their money holdings).
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In terms of the MiLIer-Orr model, some money holders 
will reach their upper threshold (h) and hence 
instantaneously reduce their money balances to the desired 
level (z). Other money holders may not reach their upper 
threshold (despite having unanticipated increases in money 
balances) and hence will willingly hold the "buffer" money 
in the short-run.
The net effect of an unanticipated increase in receipts 
depends upon the initial allocation of money balances 
amongst money holders (Cuthbertson and Taylor 1987). 
Obviously, if all money holders reach their upper threshold, 
then in aggregate there will be no increase in "buffer 
money" , as it will be instantaneously transferred to time 
deposits or other assets. Buffer stock proponents however, 
argue that aggregate holdings of buffer money will be 
increased, especially if money holders do not frequently 
check their money balances (Cuthbertson and Taylor, pl07). 
Buffer stock money will be willingly held in the short run, 
but holders of buffer stock money are assumed, however, to 
have been forced off their long-run desired function for 
money balances, because interest rates, the price level, and 
income adjust only slowly (Artis and Lewis, 1976, Laidler 
1980, Goodhart 1984). This 'disequilibrium* notion, that the 
long-run demand for money is not always equal to the supply 
of money, has been widely quoted as the rationale for 
instability in econometric short-run money demand functions, 
which assume money holders are always on their desired 
short-run money demand functions (Laidler 1982, 1984,
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Goodhart, 1980).
Laidler (1984) and Milbourne (1986) provide recent 
surveys of the fast expanding literature on buffer stock 
money. Laidler (1982, 1984) in particular, argues that the 
buffer-stock hypothesis may provide an explanation of the 
problem of instability of the demand for money. Milbourne
(1987) however, is sceptical of the (limited) empirical 
evidence so far produced on the buffer stock model,
"the empirical evidence tends to strongly refute
current single-equation version* of the hypotheses'*.
(p41)
The Miller-Orr model analyses cash and sight deposits. 
This model can be extended to a situation whereby economic 
agents have an upper and lower target threshold for broader 
money balances other than cash or sight deposits [3].
Indeed, with recent financial innovation it is difficult to 
distinguish between pure transactions and investment 
balances. There is often little difference in liquidity or 
return characteristics between sight deposits and so-called 
'time' deposits at banks and building societies. It is 
likely that, given the combination of increased return, 
increased liquidity, and high real interest rates, the upper 
threshold for holdings of broad money balances will have 
increased,(i.e. due to the increased attractiveness of money 
relative to other assets). The upper return point at which 
money balances would normally be reduced may therefore now 








At first sight an increase in the upper threshold may 
appear to enhance the applicability of the buffer stock 
model. If the upper return threshold is increased less 
economic agents will reach the upper band after a given 
supply side shock. Hence more money will be held initially 
as a buffer stock, and slowly spent.
The evidence suggests, however, that this scenario has 
not occurred. It is argued that the recent fast growth of M3 
and M4 (i.e. the fall in income velocity of the broad 
aggregates since 1980) is the result of a combination 
between supply-side shocks emanating from the abandonment of 
the corset and subsequent increased mortgage lending, and 
the attractiveness of market determined high real rates of 
interest at building societies and banks. It appears that 
E x c e s s *  money balances in evidence since 1980 as a result 
of credit shocks have been willingly held as investment 
balances in wealth-holders portfolios. Not only have these 
balances been willingly held in the short-run, as the buffer 
stock model would suggest, but they appear also to have been 
held willingly in the long run, contrary to the buffer stock 
model. The upper threshold level may have increased to such
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an extent that most money holders have not reached their 
upper level, despite increased holdings of money. Moreover, 
there is no buffer stock effect, as those who have not 
reached the upper return level are willingly holding the 
increased money balances in the long term. This suggests 
that these money balances are not at present holdings of 
'’buffer'* money. Indeed, this appears to be the view of the 
authorities, (see Chapter Five) [4]
It is impossible to determine, however, when or if 
these money balances emanating from supply side shocks will 
be 'unwillingly' held and hence spent.
There is the possibility that financial innovation has 
made money such an attractive asset to hold that, as 
interest rates remain high, the extra spending will not come 
about.
It may be, however, that financial innovation has 
delayed the point at which money becomes a buffer stock. In 
this scenario supply-side shocks which create unanticipated 
receipts will be willingly held for long periods of time 
(extremely long periods, on evidence of the last eight 
years), but may become buffer stocks if there is a fall in 
the rate of interest.
The 'higher' upper threshold (h-^ ) may not be immutable 
over time. It is possible that if interest rates fall, the 
upper threshold may return to h. In this case, some money 
holders will find they are above their threshold levels, and 
will have unwanted money, which will be instantaneously 
transferred. Many balance-holders however, will still be
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below their threshold level, (depending on the initial 
distribution of money across economic agents), such that, in 
aggregate, there are excess money balances. Initially, these 
money balances will be willingly held, but in the long-run, 
they will be spent. It thus appears that money already 
willingly held as a result of a supply-side shock, may 
become a buffer stock some time after the original supply 
side shock.
Alternatively, and this may be a crucial point for the 
operation of monetary control, it is possible that when the 
monetary authorities attempt to control the money supply 
(for example the increase in interest rates in the second 
half of 1988), wealth-holders may run down their large 
holdings of buffer-stocks that have been amassed, rather 
than cut down on spending. There may thus be a substantial 
period of time before interest rates affect the rate of 
spending and hence the price level.
Chapter Five maintained that money may indeed be a
necessary determinant of inflation but at certain times (eg. 
when financial innovation occurs) it is not a sufficient 
cause of inflation. Likewise with credit. It is possible 
that an increase in the growth rate of credit over and above 
the growth rate of income may not lead to an increase in
inflation.. Therefore credit may indeed be a necessary cause
of inflation but not always a sufficient cause of inflation.
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6.4 Credit Shocks and endogeneity
It must be recognized that post Keynesians have for a 
long time argued that it is the growth of credit that
determines the growth rate of the money stock. Increases in
the quantity of money are seen as the result of increases in
the quantity of credit created, and it is credit that plays 
the dominant role in the economy (see inter alia, Kaldor, 
1970, Tobin 1970, Blinder 1983, Blinder and Stiglitz 1983 , 
Davidson and Weintraub 1983, Godley and Cripps 1983, Lavoie 
1984).
Dow (1987) points out that it has been a long held 
Keynesian belief that the fundamental cause of monetary
growth is expenditure decisions which lead to a greater
supply of credit being made available, such that monetary 
growth is only the proximate cause of inflation. Credit is 
the engine of monetary growth, stimulated by changes in 
demand. If money is demand led, then it is necessarily 
endogenous. This does not mean however, that the monetary 
authorities cannot control the money supply, nor that such a 
policy will be ineffective.
A credit-induced money stock is rationalised by post- 
Keynesians through reference to the actions of financial 
intermediaries in an unconstrained competitive system, and 
by the traditional role of the Bank of England. Returning to 
the microtheoretic model of banks and building societies as 
price setters and quantity takers, it should be noted that 
the use of liability management in the wholesale markets 
leads to 'liability-side liquidity'. Banks and building
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societies will lend whatever is demanded (within prudential 
limits and the ability of the borrower to repay) at a given 
rate of interest, such that according to post-Keynesians the 
volume of credit granted is demand-determined. The role of 
the Bank of England as lender of last resort is important in 
this respect,
"the central rationale for the creation of central 
banks, and still by far their most important function, 
was to provide an elastic currency supply. To ensure 
the ultimate liquidity of financial assets and so the 
viability of the financial system, central banks must 
stand ready to perform the role of lender of last
(Moore 1983 p543) 
In other words, the Bank of England appears to allow 
the money supply to increase to accommodate rises in the 
demand for credit, as a result of its role of supporting the 
banking system. Post-Keynesians argue that the money supply 
process should be examined as part of the interaction 
between financial institutions and firms in an income- 
generating process (Davidson 1972). An increase in wage 
rates which increases production costs, will require extra 
working capital. Extra working capital is gained by 
borrowing from the banking system. It appears that in the 
1980's however, re-regulation and competition has been the 
dominant factor in influencing supply-side credit shocks, 
rather than increases in wages.Vith re-regulation and 
competition, it is plausible to assume that the money supply 
may be endogenous. Endogeneity, as opposed to Friedman's 
assertion of an exogenous money supply, appears to be 
strongly grounded in intuitively plausible real-world terms.
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The analysis that the money supply is essentially demand-
determined with the quantity demanded depending on a host of
real-world factors at least has the distinction of providing
an explanation of how/why excessive money growth may come
about, rather than the Friedmanian helicopter that increases
the money supply. Increases in the money supply have to
originate somewhere,
"in the real world, money is not created as the manna 
from heaven of a Patinesque world or dropped by 
helicopter as in Friedman's c o n s t r u c t i o n 1.(Davidson 1972 pl07)
According to Cobham (1988) a "disequilibrium 
monetarist" school is emerging which agrees that the money 
supply appears at various times to exhibit both endogeneity 
and exogeneity, such that there is a convergence of opinion 
amongst monetarists and Keynesians. The above analysis would 
tend to concur with the suggestion that the money supply can 
be either endogenous or exogenous. An endogenous money stock 
is particularly likely in a competitive financial system, 
with banks and building societies operating as price setters 
and quantity takers, but not in a constrained system, as in 
the 1970's.
The origin of any supply-side credit shock is likely to 
have important repercussions for any subsequent link between 
the money supply and the price level. A wage induced credit 
shock is likely to involve an increase in the money supply 
and the price level, whereas a credit shock emanating from 
re-regulation and portfolio restructuring as has occurred in 
the 1 9 8 0 's may not necessarily lead to an increase in prices.
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In terms of monetary control, the debate is to an 
extent superfluous. If the money supply is endogenous 
because credit is the prime motivator behind the monetary 
aggregates, as suggested by post-Keynesians, it does not 
mean that the aggregates cannot be controlled. If monetary 
growth is a necessary feature of inflation, and if credit 
which leads to monetary growth can be controlled, then there 
is still a place for monetary control.
The Bank of England may still be able to control the 
money supply if interest rates are a determinant of the 
demand for money and the demand for credit; the potency of 
control will depend on the interest elasticity of the demand 
for credit and the demand for money.
The emphasis of the monetary authorities in the supply 
side counterparts to the monetary aggregates exemplifies 
this control mechanism. Control of the credit counterparts 
implicitly presupposes endogeneity, but of course does not 
imply uncontrollability.
As has been seen, from the evidence of Chapter Five and 
this Chapter, the money supply appears to show signs of both 
endogeneity and exogeneity. It is emphasized in this thesis 
that the importance lies in the identification of money and 
credit shocks, and analysis of effects on nominal income. If 
shocks occur through financial innovation and change, they 
may have no effect on nominal income and inflation. Money 
may be a necessary cause of inflation but not the sufficient 
cause. The money supply may increase for endogenous reasons
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(ie. be demand determined) but at the same time may or may 
not have affects on inflation.
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6.5 Conclusion
Monetarist theory has in the past largely neglected 
lending when examining monetary developments, and emphasised 
the liabilities side of financial institutions balance 
sheets, in contrast to the practical approach, which relies 
on the control of bank lending.
It was hypothesized in Chapter Four that financial 
innovation and financial change in the form of high interest 
easy access accounts and liberalization of the mortgage 
credit market have been major stock adjustment factors in 
altering the relationships between money and nominal income 
and credit and nominal income.
It has been noted that borrowing from Building 
societies and banks by the personal sector for the purpose 
of house purchase has grown far faster than the growth in 
personal incomes since 1980. This has led Dow and Saville
(1988) to speculate that the owner-occupier 'mortgage leak' 
is in large part responsible for the fall in the income 
velocity of circulation of broad money. This proposition has 
been examined in section 6.1, and found to be 
unsatisfactory.
The Dow and Saville hypothesis did, however, emphasise 
the importance of examining the monetary aggregates in terms 
of both money holdings and the level of lending. Section 6.2 
retained this outlook in an alternative hypothesis of the 
effect of personal sector borrowing on the growth of broad 
money.
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It appears that the monetary aggregates can be both 
deposit driven (Chapter Five) and credit driven. Growth in 
the money supply is thus the outcome of the combination of 
deposit and credit side interaction.
The stock adjustment induced by the ending of the 
cartel and the corset and increased competition between 
building societies and banks may have resulted in 'unwanted* 
excess money balances held by last time sellers. If these 
balances are 'neutralised' by financial innovation and high 
real interest rates, there may be no concomitant increase in 
nominal incomes - the money may be held as long-term 
investment balances, rather than transactions balances. The 
greater the number of last time sellers who hold the 
proceeds of the sale of their house as investment money 
balances, the smaller will be the expenditure multiplier of 
any given level of building society and bank lending. The 
relationship between lending and nominal income is likely to 
change. Increased levels of lending may result in smaller 
increases in nominal income than previously. The fall in the 
income velocity of circulation of the broad money aggregates 
appears in large part to be explainable by the interaction 
of re-regulation, competition, increased mortgage lending, 
and financial innovation.
Section 6.3 analysed the implications of the combined 
effects of credit shocks and financial innovation upon the 
buffer stock model. It was argued that the buffer stock 
mechanism, whereby excess money balances are dissipated and 
eventually leads to an increase in prices may not be
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applicable in the face of financial innovation. Credit 
shocks in the 1980's have not led to a slow dissipation of 
balances but a willingness to hold money balances for their 
investment qualities. If money is held as a buffer stock, 
then it is held as an extremely long term buffer, the 
consequences of which may be vital for monetary control. If 
these balances are induced by high real interest rates, it 
is possible they may be spent when interest rates fall, with 
consequent inflationary effects. Conversely, at times of 
monetary restraint (eg. as in 1988 with the authorities 
trying to cut off the credit boom via high interest rates) 
balances that have been amassed for their investment 
characteristics may be used to sustain inflationary levels 
of spending.
The degree to which the stock adjustment of the 
personal sector has affected the demand for credit is tested 
econometrically in Chapter Ten.
The opposing views of the money supply being either 
endogenous or exogenous was examined in section 6.4. It was 
concluded that the money supply can at times be demand led 
from the credit side and hence can at times be endogenous. 
This endogeneity does not, however, suggest that there is no 
role for monetary policy, as argued by Keynesians. The money 
supply may not be a sufficient cause of inflation, but so 
long as it is a necessary cause (and many Keynesians accept 
this) and so long as the authorities are able to control the 
money supply, there may be a role for a policy of 
controlling the money supply. It is the ability of the
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[1] Two factors have particularly increased the demand for 
home ownership in the 1980's. Firstly, the government 
has actively encouraged home ownership through the sale 
of council houses. Secondly, demographic changes have 
played a part. The "baby boom" of the early 1960's had 
led to a large number of first-time buyers in the early 
1980's •
[2] Hacche (1974), however, argues that there may have been 
a shift or successive shifts of the demand function 
because of events unique to 1971 and 1972, leading to a 
higher level of desired money balances than previous 
experience would have predicted.
In particular, it is possible that, as a result of 
changes introduced by competition and credit control 
(see Chapter Two), and the subsequent increase in 
banks' competitiveness, interest bearing 'money' may 
have increased in attractiveness relative to other 
financial assets. Following this particular hypothesis, 
Hacche (1974) argues that the demand for M3 may have 
been affected by the rate of interest on wholesale time 
deposits and certificates of deposit.
Hacche employed four different own-rate variables in 
order to ascertain whether or not they could explain 
the 'shift* towards interest bearing money. He found 
that including the C.D. rate provided equations which 
adequately fit the data to the end of 1972. He offered 
the explanation that,
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"the importance of the C.D. rate to the results may to 
a large extent be a reflection of the transition to the 
changed money-market environment, and in particular of 
adjustment to the growing market in C.D's." (p296)
Artis and Lewis allow for the growth of the C.D. market
post 1971 by utilising definitions of money which do
not include CD's ie, Ml and M3 minus CD's. They note
that both these definitions produce results no better
than those for M3 (conventionally defined) and
therefore according to this evidence allowance for CD's
cannot explain the forecasting error. More formally,
Artis/Lewis use a variable which they claim will both
measure interest rate competition before 1971 and also
any greater competitiveness of bank interest rates
after 1971. They split the money stock M3 into
components of interest bearing deposits (see Appendix
4, 1974), a weighted average of the rates on these
deposits then taken. Artis/Lewis conclude that the
inclusion of this 'own' rate still results in an
unstable demand for broad money.
It is possible also to criticise Hacches' measure of 
the own rate because of his assumption that there is no 
interest rate competition between banks, accepting 
houses, overseas and other banks prior to competition 
and credit control (Artis and Lewis 1976 pl50). The 
consequence of employing an own rate of zero prior to 
1971, and the CD rate post 1971 is analogous to 
utilising a dummy variable in the equations. This will 
therefore exaggerate the importance of the CD (own
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rate) after 1971).
[3] Milbourne cogently argues that the buffer stock model 
is unlikely to be applicable to a narrow definition of 
money such as Ml (the focus of much of the econometric 
research into buffer stocks) and suggests that if the 
buffer stock is applicable at all, it is relevant to a 
broader definition of money (see also Goodhart 1984, 
p267) •
[4] As Milbourne notes, a crucial element of the buffer 
stock model is the exogeneity of supply-side shocks. 
This is essential since a central tenet of monetarism 
is the assumption that the money supply process is 
independent of the factors which determine the demand 
for money • There are reasons, however, for supposing 
that changes in bank lending (ie. supply side shocks) 
are largely demand determined, particularly in recent 
years. Re-intermediation following the abandonment of 
the supplementary special deposits scheme can only be 
rationalised as demand determined, particularly in view 
of the high interest rates charged on advances (Bank of 
England 1988). The implication of an endogenous money 
supply for the applicability of the buffer stock model 
will not be pursued here, however. The argument that 
financial innovation invalidates much of the buffer 




FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF MONETARY CONTROL
7.0 Introduction
When monetary policy is aimed at maintaining a target 
rate of growth of the money supply in order to achieve a 
desired rate of growth of nominal income, it is necessary 
that the monetary authorities have the ability to influence 
the monetary aggregate(s) being targeted,
"The first requirement [for monetary policy] is that 
the monetary authority should guide itself by 
magnitudes that it can control, not by ones that it 
cannot control".
(Hester 1982 p42) 
This Chapter examines the long-term continuing effects 
of building society developments on the effectiveness of 
monetary control. Specifically, the effects of the ending of 
the building societies' recommended rate system and 
subsequent increased flexibility and importance of the price 
of mortgages for the effectiveness of monetary control are 
analysed in terms of the interest elasticity of consumers' 
expenditure and the interest elasticity of the demand for 
money.
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7.1 The Abandonment of Portfolio Controls
The original emphasis of CCC was the control of 
monetary growth through the manipulation of interest rates, 
and an abandonment of the previous distorting portfolio 
controls. The intention was to move towards a system which 
had free operation of the price mechanism and free 
competition in the financial system, with the level of 
credit to be determined by cost. The re-intermediation 
effect that occurred and the effect on the monetary 
aggregates has been documented in Chapters Three and Five.
It was also noted that the major problem of this system was 
the aggressive liability management policies of the banks, 
for which the corset was devised, and which heralded the end 
of the monetary authorities policy of controlling the money 
supply through its price, and a move towards more direct 
portfolio controls.
The use of portfolio controls upon the banking system 
produced a number of distortions in the financial system. A 
major problem that occurred intermittently throughout the 
1970's, was the phenomenon of 'round-tripping' or 'hard 
arbitrage'. Wholesale rates tended to be more fluid than 
bank based rates such that prime borrowers profited by 
taking up unused overdraft facilities at a base-related 
rate, and re-lending the funds at the wholesale deposit rate.
This practice tended to have a perverse effect on the 
rate of growth of the broad monetary aggregates as bank 
assets were cosmetically increased. The particular monetary
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controls in force - special deposits - acted to increase the 
tendency for round-tripping to occur. Calls for special 
deposits, rather than having the intended effect of 3  
reduction in lending, resulted in the banking system 
competing even more fiercely for deposits. In effect, the 
banks were engaging in liability management rather than 
asset management, increasing the level of deposits in order 
to finance greater levels of reserve assets. This has the 
effect of reducing the yield on reserve assets relative to 
non-reserve asset yields.
The subsequent monetary control mechanism introduced, 
the supplementary special deposits scheme, was also 
undermined by the activities of the banking system.
Widescale disintermediation occurred when the corset was in 
operation, particularly in the parallel money markets.
Indeed, the very existence of these markets is in large part 
as a result of the frustration of credit-worthy corporate 
borrowers being unable to raise bank finance because of 
various monetary controls. When the banking system is 
restricted from lending by a control mechanism such as the 
corset, it is not surprising that companies should seek 
greater recourse to the money markets. Of special relevance 
in the 1970's was the use of acceptances by companies.
Here, companies with surplus funds would lend to deficit 
companies, through the agency of a broker in the form of an 
acceptance, rather than funds being channelled through the 
banking system as in the traditional financial 
intermediation process. The banking system is involved, of
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course, in guaranteeing (ie. accepting) bills issued by 
corporate customers. These' bank bills' are effectively 
underwritten by the banks, and are therefore extremely low 
risk and marketable, and as such may be sold for fine 
prices. For the banking system, fees are earned, but the 
acceptances are only contingent liabilities, and hence are 
counted as off-balance-sheet items, and not included in the 
interest bearing eligible liabilities definition. It was 
thus possible for borrowing and lending to take place, but 
outside of the traditional financial intermediation 
channels.
The existence of disintermediation placed in doubt the 
effectiveness of portfolio monetary controls. Borrowing and 
spending was still able to occur, despite the strict 
operation of the supplementary special deposits scheme. 
Moreover, the increase in bank bills held as off-balance- 
sheet items (often called the 'bill leak') made it difficult 
to analyse monetary developments as they were not part of 
the M3 money supply definition. Thus, M3 was at this time a 
poor indicator of monetary conditions. To the extent that M3 
was growing slower than if bank bills were included in the 
definition, the money supply figures would indicate 
relatively tigheter monetary restraint than in fact was the 
case. In practice the bill leak was widely known about (BEQB 
March 1982 p82) and figures for the bill leak were even 
included in the private sector liquidity series of the BEQB 
Statistical Annex. Recognition of disintermediation does 
not , of course, eliminate the problem of avoidance of
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direct monetary controls. With hindsight, the Bank of
England points out that although direct controls are
inefficient in terms of disintermediation activities, the
bill leak was possibly a less problematical form of
avoidance as it was directly measureable,
"Without such a safety valve [the bill leak], less 
measurable forms of disintermediation might have grown 
more rapidly. The inter-company market might have 
expanded, by-passing the banking sector altogether, and 
large, credit-worthy companies might have issued trade 
bills of similar marketability and default risk as bank 
bills. The funds acquired by issuing trade bills could 
have been used to expand trade and other forms of 
credit to less well-placed suppliers and customers.
Some large industrial and commercial companies might 
therefore have become quasi-banks".
(BEQB March 1982 p82)
The use of portfolio controls really only attacked the
symptoms of monetary growth, rather than the underlying root
cause, and led to distortions in competitive neutrality, and
ultimately to disintermediation, a problem which has become
more acute with re-regulation and financial innovation,
"Money is the most fungible of commodities and our 
experience over a long period is that the effect of 
direct controls is largely to direct financial flows, 
typically into less efficient channels, rather than to 
achieve any deeper purpose. These difficulties can only 
be greater now with the disappearance of traditional 
barriers between different financial functions and of 
distinctions between different financial activities, 
and with the merging of financial markets into a global 
whole. Controls in one area would either be ineffective 
or spread rapidly as further and further controls were 
introduced to head off successive leakages from those 
already in place".
(BEQB August 1987 p366) 
The previous use of portfolio controls could be 
rationalised because of the relative lack of alternative 
sources of finance. It is now possible for the NBPS to 
circumvent credit controls in a variety of ways given the
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number of credit channels now available, and policy has had 
to move towards the price of credit rather than its 
availability. Of course, with the abolition of exchange 
controls in 1979, direct controls on the banking system 
could be circumscribed by offshore disintermediation, and as 
such were abandoned in 1980 (Vqciago (1985), Bingham 
(1985)).
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7.2 Financial Innovation and the Effectiveness ofMonetary Control under the MTFS
A major tenet of the MTFS involved a strong 
relationship between the money supply, interest rates, and 
the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).
The MTFS paid particular attention to the consequences 
of a 'high' PSBR on the money supply and interest rates. Too 
high a PSBR would lead, it was argued, to either higher 
interest rates, or an increase in the rate of growth of the 
money supply, the former was based on the premise that if 
the monetary authorities attempted to restrict the growth of 
the money supply without at the same time cutting the PSBR, 
interest rates would have to be maintained at a high level 
to sell Government debt and to cut the demand for bank 
borrowing. High interest rates, it was argued, would 'crowd 
out' private sector investment, (conversely, high rates on 
corporate debt instruments may in fact lead to companies 
borrowing more from tne banking system, with attendant 
inflationary consequences). The latter is based on the view 
that, again, if the money supply is cut without reducing the 
PSBR, and if the PSBR is not being financed through selling 
Government debt to the NBPS, then the Government will have 
to borrow from the banking system, thus increasing the money 
supply.
Thus, if the monetary authorities wish to control the 
money supply without concurrently maintaining intgerest 
rates at an unacceptably high level, the PSBR would have to 
be reduced,
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"Too high a PSBR requires either that the Government 
borrows heavily from the banks - which adds directly to 
the money supply; or, failing this, that it borrows 
from individuals and institutions, but at ever- 
increasing rates of interest, which place an 
unacceptable squeeze on the private sector".
(T.C.S.C. 1980, p2)
Thus, the role of fiscal policy was that of support for
monetary policy, as evidenced at the outset of the MTFS,
"The Government is ....... planning on a substantial
reduction over the medium term in the PSBR as a 
percentage of G.D.P. The consequence of the high level 
of public sector borrowing has been high nominal 
interest rates and even greater financing problems for 
the private sector. If interest rates are to be brought 
down to acceptable levels the PSBR must be 
substantially reduced as a proportion of GDP over the 
next few years".
(Financial Statement and Budget Report 
1980-81, Part II, para 4)
More recently the Chancellor has stressed the target
for a balanced budget, a PSBR of zero (Financial Statement
and Budget Report, 1988-89, para 2.13).
The target path of the PSBR has changed to a degree
over the time of the MTFS. Originally it was expected that
the PSBR would be reduced, unless it appeared likely that a
future recession was possible, in which case the PSBR could
be maintained at its previous level. Subsequently, the aim
was to maintain the PSBR at 1% of GDP (Budget speech 17
March 1987) in the hope of achieving zero inflation and a
stable debt/income ratio, a policy advocated by Budd and
Dicks (1983).
Although Currie (1987) points out that under this type 
of policy, if GDP is rising quickly, and Government spending 
is set as a target of GDP, then it too can rise rapidly. 
Conversely, when in a downturn, a Government spending target
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as a proportion of GDP will require reduction in Government 
spending which may be difficult to implement.
PSBR targetting may, however, have bolstered the 
intention to reduce inflation by including an automatic 
contractionary response to inflation (Currie 1987, Begg 
1987).
The evidence of the relationship between the PSBR, the 
money supply, and interest rates does not appear to be 
robust, however. Simulations by Kearney and MacDonald (1985) 
show that a tight fiscal policy which reduces the growth of 
the PSBR causes only some interest rates to rise, and others 
to fall (see Llewellyn and Kearney (1984) for further 
analysis)•
Moreover, Artis (1988) points out that there can be 
large errors in PSBR forecasting, leading to the conclusion 
that PSBR targetting is not a viable policy in view of the 
mistakes that could be made.
Kaldor (1980) disputes the assertion that the PSBR and 
the growth of the money supply are closely linked. His 
figures show that the 'unfunded' PSBR (ie. that financed by 
bank credit rather than by the sales of Government 
securities to the non-bank private sector), could have 
contributed only a 'negligible' 2 .1% to the increase in the 
money supply over the period 1977-1980. By contrast, the 
'unfunded' element of the PSBR in the previous 3 years was 
26 times as large, yet the increase in the money supply was 
only half as large. According to Kaldor, it is the growth of 
bank lending which is the main determinant of money supply
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growth.
This analysis of the modus operandi used by the 
monetary authorities is compared and contrasted with the 
traditional view as to the potency of monetary control under 
a monetary base system. Whilst monetary base control (MBC) 
has not been implemented in the U.K., the possible effects 
of financial innovation on such a system if it were in 
operation are examined in section 7.3, given the special 
emphasis placed upon MBC by most monetarists (see Chapter 
Two) .
A useful distinction to make is that of controlling the 
monetary aggregates from either the demand side or the 
supply side (Lewis 1980(b), Artis and Lewis 1981, Davis and 
Lewis 1982). In the demand side approach, the authorities 
influence the general level of interest rates in order to 
influence the demand for bank liabilities. In terms of the 
demand side approach, two effects of financial innovation by 
building societies and banks may be isolated:
(a) The average rate of interest on building society and 
bank deposits has increased.
(b) The deposit rates of interest at these institutions 
have become less sticky, and now closely follow the 
general movement of interest rates.
The monetary authorities have a limited number of 
instruments with which to control the money supply. Indeed, 
it has been recognised by the Bank of England that it is 
ultimately constrained to using only one instrument,
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"When you come right down to it, the only effective 
instrument of monetary policy is the short-term 
interest rate itself". (BEQB August 1987 p366) 
Given the emphasis upon control of the money supply 
through manipulating interest rates it is of some interest 
to examine in detail the effectiveness of the demand-side 
approach with respect to the above effects of financial 
innovation on bank and building society interest rates.
In the demand side approach, an increase in general 
rates of interest engineered by the monetary authorities is 
intended to induce money holders to switch into alternative 
interest bearing assets. However, when money balances at 
building societies and banks bear a high real rate of 
interest, a given policy-induced increase in the general 
level of interest rates is likely to have a reduced effect 
on the opportunity cost of holding money, in contrast to 
the traditional situation, where money does not bear 
interest,
"when no explicit interest is paid on liquid deposits, 
the gulf between these and other accounts tends to be 
greater than when interest is paid, particularly if it 
is paid at a market-related rate. Although an indirect 
return may be provided in the form of "free" bank 
services, large networks of branch offices, etc., the 
adjustment of these terms is generally slower than that 
of interest rates so that substitutability tends to be 
lower - and responsiveness of monetary aggregates to 
changes in interest rates greater - than when interest 
is paid explicitly. As more and more items included in 
the concept of money come to bear market-linked rates 
of interest, the impact of a change in market rates on 
the money supply becomes smaller and smaller, making 
larger and larger changes in interest rates necessary 
to affect demand by a given amount". (Bingham 1985 p7)
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The increase in the average rate paid on buiLding 
society and bank deposits is of itself likely to reduce the 
opportunity cost of holding money when general interest 
rates rise, and hence restrict the ability of the 
authorities to induce a movement out of money holdings. 
Moreover, the second effect of the increased competition 
upon interest rates is likely to enhance this effect. Not 
only has competition increased the average rate of interest 
paid on bank and building society deposits, but it has also 
altered the speed with which these financial institutions 
alter their deposit rates in response to a policy induced 
rise in interest rates. In an extremely competitive market 
situation, as exists between building societies and banks 
for money deposits, movements in the general level of 
interest rates tend to be quickly parallelled by movements 
in the deposit rates offered by both sets of financial 
intermediaries. This is not to imply that deposit rates will 
be at the same numerical level as other rates, but that they 
may move in line with other rates, such that interest rate 
differentials between the financial intermediaries and that 
of other non-money assets may remain unchanged. In other 
words, as interest rates in general rise, so too do the 
rates on the assets within the broad monetary aggregates, 
such that there is little incentive to move out of money 
balances. Wnen operating from the demand side, it is 
unlikely that interest rate differentials will be 
substantially changed, and unlikely that the level of broad 
money holdings reduced (abstracting from supply-side
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considerations), when interest rates are raised.
Moreover,
"Technological innovation is also likely to accelerate 
the tendency for the retail deposit market, including 
current accounts, to provide the combination of market- 
related interest rates and payment facilities that are 
already available in the wholesale deposit market. This 
is likely to have much the same consequences on the 
demand function for retail money as occurred earlier 
with wholesale money: namely, less responsiveness to 
changes in the general level of interest rates, since 
the market-related rates offered on such deposits will 
move in step; more responsiveness to shifts in relative 
interest rates and in other terms on competitive forms 
of retail liquid assets; and increasing instability in 
demand-for-money functions for such retail balances, at 
least for a transitional period as these innovations
place . (BEQB September 1983 p375)
It is hypothesized here, however, that as high market 
related rates of interest on building society and bank easy- 
access accounts move so closely in line with general rates 
of interest,that not often do interest differentials change, 
and tne interest elasticity of the demand for money is 
likely to have fallen. If interest differentials between 
money and other assets change only rarely and for a short 
period of time, profitable portfolio switching opportunities 
are not likely to be frequent. Monitoring the rates between 
building society, bank accounts, and other assets is likely 
to be downgraded given the consistently high real rates of 
return on building society and abnk accounts in the 1980's 
and the lack of profitable portfolio switching chances. It 
is likely that there will be a stable pool of balances at 
banks and building societies that have become increasingly 
de-sensitized to interest rate differentials.
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Some authors argue however that asset-holders may be 
becoming more sensitive to changes in interest rate 
relativities between different financial assets (Goodhart 
1986, p84). The problem, in terms of monetary control, is 
that the monetary authorities can only influence the general 
level of market rates. When money bears explicit market- 
related rates of interest the authorities cannot exert any 
control over the interest rate relativities between 
different financial assets. This result tends to modify the 
monetarist contention (set out in Chapter two) that the 
greater is the interest inelasticity of the demand for 
money, the more potent will monetary policy be. The effect 
of the shift towards interest bearing balances is to raise 
the 'own' rate on the broad monetary aggregates.
In IS/LM terms, the LM curve will become progressively
steeper. In theory, it could become completely vertical, and
completely inelastic.
This effect, whereby increasing competition for
deposits tends to offset the effects on the demand for money
of changes in market rates of interest was foreseen by
Laidler (1973). He argued that a reduced interest-elasticity
of the demand for money would lead to a more effective
monetary policy,
"when a large proportion of the money stock represents 
the liabilities of commercial banks, it will, if the 
banking system is competitive, bear interest. The rate 
of interest paid on money will fluctuate with market
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rates of interest as the banks compete for funds with 
other intermediaries, and in as much as it does so, 
this will offset the tendency for money to fluctuate 
with market interest rates. Only if a cartel operates 
in the commercial banking system and results in 
rigidity in the rate paid on bank deposits would we 
expect to see the demand for money varying much with 
market interest rates. So long as the monetary 
authorities have the power to police cartel 
arrangements for the fixing of interest rates, they 
also have the power to police the slope of the LM 
curve".
(p62)
On the face of it, the more responsive are the rates
paid on building society and bank deposits to changes in
market rates of interest, and the larger the proportion of
deposits which attract such interest payments, the greater
the force with which Laidlers' argument may be applied (also
see Cagan (1979)). However, this neglects the question of
how the money supply is influenced. When the method of
control of the money supply is taken into account it can be
shown that, due to a situation of financial innovation and
competition, a relatively inelastic demand for money is not
sufficient evidence as to the relative merit of a policy of
controlling the money supply. Referring back to the IS/LM
apparatus, it can be seen that increased interest
inelasticity (i.e. a steeper LM curve) may lead to problems
of monetary control,
"If the differential [between bank deposit rates and 
other assets] becomes a constant, the demand for 
deposits will be independent of the level of interest 
rates. A rise in market interest rates will not reduce 
the demand for deposits as it does in the old regime 
and in the standard model, because the rate paid on 
deposits will rise too. The old monetarist assumption 
of interest-inelastic money demand will apply, though 




Indeed, it may be the case that an attempt to reduce
the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate from the
demand side may lead to an increase in the growth rates of
the monetary aggregates. Looking at the demand for money
balances, it has been noted that as far back as the period
1963-78 that,
"The net effect of interest changes on a broad 
definition of the "money stock" was perverse - a rise 
in interest rates appears to have led to the "money 
stock" rising faster than money income, not lagging 
behind it".
(Kaldor 1980, p289) 
This effect is also corroborated by Lewis (1980) and 
Artis and Lewis (1981) who found that when the 
authorities attempted to reduce the growth of the monetary 
aggregates by raising short rates through the discount 
market in 1973, 1976 and 1979, the rate on time deposits 
increased relative to long term rates. Tnus, an attempt to 
reduce the rate of growth of the money supply had the 
opposite effect of increasing the money supply, through the 
increased demand for time deposits. Of course, these 
perverse effects occurred before the onset of financial 
innovation in the early 1980's, which has raised the own 
rate on money . It is possible to hypothesize then, that the 
impact of financial innovation may have enhanced this 
perverse effect of movements in the monetary aggregates in 
response to changes in the general level of interest rates.
In the supply side approach, the authorities attempt to 
influence tne general level of interest rates in order to 
influence the demand for building society and bank assets, 
i.e. the demand for loans. Of course^ changes in the rate of
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interest may have effects upon both the demand for money and 
the demand for loans (credit); it is useful, however, to 
separate the effects for expository purposes.
The stated intention of the monetary authorities is to 
influence the growth of the broad monetary aggregates from 
the supply-side. The Green Paper on Monetary Control (1980) 
states that,
"The principal means of controlling the growth of the 
money supply must be fiscal policy - both public 
expenditure and tax policy - and interest rates".
(P17)
The main instrument is that of influencing interest 
rates, by the Bank of England’s intervention at the short 
end of the bill market. In broad terms the aim is to 
maintain short-term interest rates within an unpublished 
band. Ultimately, the force of a supply-side policy rests on 
the effect of interest rates upon building society and bank 
lending. Early empirical studies show, however, a poor 
relationship between the level of bank lending and interest 
rates (Hotson 1979), and experience has shown that, in 
practice, the effectiveness of this instrument is open to 
question,
"One mechanism that might have been expected to operate 
is an influence running from interest rates - the cost 
of borrowing - to the demand for credit. In practice an 
important part of our monetary policy difficulties, 
running back for most of the post-war period, has been 
tne evident weakness of this influence. The growth of 
bank (and building society) lending to the private 
sector has for many years been well in excess of that 
of national income and has seemed impervious even to 
very large upward movements in nominal interest rates 
and even at times has reacted perversely"
(BEQB August 1987 p368)
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One possible avenue of monetary control is the link 
which may exist between mortgage interest rates and 
consumers' expenditure. The elasticity of personal sector 
spending with respect to mortgage interest rates is 
ultimately an empirical matter. If, however, there is a 
strong link between personal sector expenditure and mortgage 
interest rates, this relationship may be amenable to 
control.
Given the increased importance and flexibility of 
mortgage interest rates after the abolition of the cartel, 
then this avenue of monetary control would be expected to 
have become more powerful.
Forcing up fluid interest rates on mortgage loans may
effectively choke off consumer spending as mortgage holders
faced increased repayments and cut back on expenditure
plans. If this is the case, then this could be a powerful if
perhaps politically unpalateable method of monetary control,
"The level of mortgage interest rates is very much 
under the control of the authorities. The Bank of 
England, via its money market operations, determines 
short-term interest rates, and, by implication, the 
broad structure of rates in the economy. The interest 
rate weapon is a potent macro-economic tool which 
allows the authorities to exert powerful leverage over 
movements in prices and output generally. The housing 
and mortgage credit markets are key items in the 
transmission processes". (Turnbull, 1984, p6) 
The possible importance of this transmission mechanism 
has been pointed out by Artis (1978),
"Simply by reason of its relative scale, consumption 
rather than investment may well be the component of 
expenditure through which monetary policy has its 
greatest impact on aggregate demand. General 
considerations suggest three main ways in which
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monetary factors might bear upon consumers' demand. 
Firstly, in several popular forms of the consumption 
function wealth has an important role and short-run 
fluctuations in the value of measured wealth are 
usually dominated by changes in stock and bond prices; 
secondly, changes in the rate of interest may exercise 
a general influence apart from their wealth effects 
upon the decision to save or consume; finally, credit 
rationing by financial institutions and its formal 
reinforcement by official controls also affect consumer 
spending"•
(p293)
If there is a strong link between mortgage interest
rates and the propensity to consume, then it is likely that
the effects of financial innovation and financial change may
have increased the interest elasticity of the consumption
function. The liberalization of the mortgage market and the
rapid increase in house prices in the 1 9 8 0 's would tend to
suggest that real mortgage repayments in the 1 9 8 0 's are far
higher than in the 1970's. It would then seem that an
increase in general interest rates would have a relatively
harsher impact on mortgage holders.
Liberalization of the mortgage market has led to the
personal sector using a far higher proportion of disposable
income to service debt than previously (Chapter Six). This
rise in the debt-income ratio is likely to mean a greater
number of households being affected by increases in mortgage
interest rates. An increase in interest rates may have
substantial effects on consumer spending as higher interest
repayments force mortgage holders to cut back on
expenditures. Indeed, there has recently been official
speculation that such effects may have occurred,
"Liberalization has led to a weakening of the liquidity 
constraints which previously restricted households' 
choice and, although this will have had the effect of
279
permitting consumers to move closer to their desired 
(life-cycle) levels of expenditure (since they may now 
find it easier to borrow through periods when income is 
temporarily low so maintaining a smoother consumption 
profile over time), at the same time the proportion of 
households that are likely to react to changes in 
interest rates will have risen".
(Dicks 1988 p2)
It is thus possible that mortgage liberalization, which 
importantly, gave rise to market-clearing mortgage rates 
(see Chapter Four) and higher house prices, may have 
increased the interest elasticity of consumption. Market- 
clearing mortgage rates in the 1980's are likely to mean 
that mortgage holders are hit harder during periods of 
rising interest rates as mortgage rates are far more market 
related than in the 1970's. Combined with the increase in 
the mortgage debt to income ratio in the 1980's, it is 
plausible that there may have been considerable increases in 
interest sensitivity of consumption.
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7.3 Financial Innovation and the Effectiveness of Monetary
Base Control
MBC operates through the monetary authorities 
controlling the size of the monetary base in accordance with 
a monetary target, and leaving interest rates to move freely 
in order to mop up any excess supply or demand for base 
money that the banks require. The demand for base money is 
determined by the banks' need for reserves to back their 
total liabilities. Interest rates are thus the 
equilibriating mechanism (Llewellyn et al 1982) under MBC, 
rather than the instrument of money control. [ The argument 
is that the link between the money supply and the monetary
base is more stable than the link between interest rates and
the money supply.]
If a fall in reserves is brought about by the Bank of 
England the banks may reduce lending, bid for deposits and 
exchange them for reserves, borrow from the Bank, reduce any 
excess reserves, or reduce non-reserve assets. In order to 
maintain lending banks may bid for reserves if the demand 
for credit is greater than the banks can supply with a given 
volume of base money. This will tend to bid up interest 
rates on deposits and loans until the demand for credit has 
fallen in line with what the banks can supply with the
restricted level of base money.
The effectiveness of MBC thus rests on the interest 
elasticity of the demand for credit. Given that the interest 
sensitivity of credit has tended to be relatively weak 
(Hotson 1979) and that there is no reason to suggest that
this will change with financial innovation, then it can be 
argued that the technical capacity of MBC is unlikely to be 
altered. Indeed one of the benefits of MBC, it has been 
argued by some proponents, is that it is not likely to be 
adversely affected by financial innovation and credit 
liberalization. The monetary base certainly would be subject 
to the stock effects of financial innovation noted in 
Chapters Five and Six.
It is possible that MBC has become more effective as a 
result of financial innovation. The banks' endowment effect 
has tended to be eroded by the increasing proportion of 
accounts that bear interest, and purely on a profitability 
basis, it will be less attractive to bid for retail deposits 
in the face of excess demand for credit at given volumes of 
base money.
With the large proportion of zero interest balances 
that the banks previously enjoyed it would have been more 
profitable to bid for deposits and exchange them for 
reserves to maintain lending than when more balances bear 
interest. The marginal cost of retail funds has risen, and 
may to some extent deter banks from competing for deposits. 
It may become more attractive to reduce lending or borrow 
from the central bank.
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7.4 Conclusion
It is widely acknowledged that portfolio controls 
placed on the banking sector are inequitable and cause 
distortions in the financial system. Section 7.1 briefly 
outlined some of the problems of using portfolio monetary 
controls, particularly in the form of disintermediation, as 
a counterpoint to the recognition that the manipulation of 
interest rates is the only feasible method of monetary 
control recognized by the monetary authorities.
Chapter Seven has concentrated on what are expected to 
be the continuing effects of financial innovation, credit 
liberalization and the abolition of the cartel on the 
effectiveness of monetary control.
For expository purposes, the manner in which monetary 
control is expected to work was divided into the demand side 
and supply side approaches in Section 7.1, although it is 
acknowledged there are objections to such a classification. 
With respect to the demand side approach, it is argued that 
as a result of money bearing a market related rate of 
interest, there is likely to be a reduced effect on the 
opportunity cost of holding money when the monetary 
authorities increase interest rates. Quite simply, interest 
rate differentials between money and non-money assets may 
remain relatively unchanged. It is hypothesized that an 
increase in general rates of interest is therefore unlikely 
to greatly induce money holders to switch into alternative 
(non-money) interest bearing assets. It is unlikely that 
operating from the demand side will have huge effects on the
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growth rates of the broad monetary aggregates (abstracting 
for the moment from supply side considerations) when general 
interest rates are raised, and hence there may be a 
reduction in the potency of monetary control.
Conversely, the abolition of the cartel may have 
increased the potency of monetary control. The greater 
flexibility of mortgage interest rates, and the increased 
importance of the price of mortgages after the abolition of 
the cartel may have increased the interest elasticity of 
expenditure. A plausible monetary control mechanism is the 
link which may exist between mortgage interest rates and 
consumers expenditure. If there is a strong link between 
mortgage interest rates and consumer spending, then this 
relationship may be a fulcrum of control. If the monetary 
authorities increase interest rates, and the cost of 
mortgage loans rises, there may be a dual effect of both a 
reduction in new mortgage loans demanded, and a decrease in 
consumer spending as mortgage holders facing increased 
repayments are forced to cut back on expenditures. If such a 
mechanism works, then the effect of liberalization of the 
mortgage market which has increased the level of personal 
sector mortgage debt and more market-related mortgage rates 
after the abolition of the cartel may have increased the 
ability of the monetary authorities to affect consumer 
spending through an increase in general interest rates. 
Mortgage liberalization and the increase in house prices 
means that the size of real mortgage repayments are far 
higher in the 1980's than in the 1970's, and consequently
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the debt burden of an increase in interest rates should be 
far more harsh.
It was suggested that developments in the building 
society industry would not alter the technical capacity of 
monetary base control, but may in fact improve the 
effectiveness of this mode of operation. MBC would still 
work in the same manner, but would possibly be more 
effective as a result of financial innovation.
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Notes
[1] 'Monetary base' here refers to that group of 
liabilities of the central bank over which they are 
believed to have control. It is assumed here that this 
includes notes and coins held by the banks, and bankers 
balances held at the Bank of England. See Goodhart 1986 
pp203-204, for the relative merits of inclusion of 
various central bank liabilities in the base money 
definition, (see Foot et al (1979) Congdon (1980) and 
Lewis (1980)(a) for general critiques of MBC).
[2] The MBC debate is traditionally centred on the monetary
system. In view of the noted similarity between banks
and building societies, and a presumed wish of the 
authorities to bring building societies under the aegis 
of an MBC policy, certain technical changes would need 
to be made.
[3] The confusion in the Green Paper (1980) over control of
the money base and control over interest rates is well 
documented (Friedman 1980, Miller 1981).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, THE DEMAND FOR MONEY, THE DEMAND 
FOR CREDIT, AND THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION
8 .0 Introduction
Given the above hypotheses as to the possible effects of 
building society and bank intermediation activities on the 
efficacy of monetary control, in terms of both stock and more 
continuing effects, it is desirable to analyse previously 
published empirical evidence in this area, to determine if 
research has provided answers to the above contentions. It is 
important to point out that the following critique of the 
econometric research is not intended to be an exhaustive 
examination of the vast literature on demand for money 
functions, demand for credit functions and consumption 
functions. Such a task is an enormous undertaking, which has 
been more than adequately covered elsewhere, (Laidler 
(1985), Cuthbertson (1987)). Rather, particular econometric 
studies which impinge upon the hypotheses raised above will 
be examined.
The number of econometric studies that have examined the 
effects of financial innovation on the demand for money, the 
demand for credit, or the consumption function is extremely 
limited. Those studies that directly or indirectly consider 
the effects of financial change when modelling demand for 
money and credit functions are considered in Section 8.1, 
with particular reference to the above hypotheses. There have 
been a number of other (partly inter-related) broad areas of
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research into the demand for money, mainly aimed at 
attempting to explain the problem of instability, which are 
briefly reviewed. There is recognition in section 8.2 of the 
fact that different sectors in the economy may have specific 
demand functions for assets (money and near money) such that
a disaggregated sectoral approach may be appropriate. Section 
8 . 3  examines the evidence as to the effects of financial 
innovation and financial change upon the consumption 
function.
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8•1 Financial innovation and the demand for money function.
Instability of the demand for money function is well 
documented[l]. Grice and Bennett (1981) categorise the 
empirical work on the demand for money function as "the years 
of hope" (1966-71), the "years of despair" (1972-78), and the 
period of "Hendrification" (post 1978). To this 
classification Taylor (1987) has added a fourth period, "the 
years of uncertainty" (1980 to date)[2].
Most of the above models of the demand for money 
function do not take account, or attempt to take account of 
the effects of financial innovation, despite a growing 
consensus that financial innovation may have an important 
role to play,
"It is clear that the real world is more complicated 
than the models in question, and that in fact money- 
holding agents treat a rather wide variety of assets as 
alternatives to money in their portfolios. There is 
nothing surprising about this; indeed it would be 
startling had things turned out otherwise. However, it 
does mean that as the menu of assets available to money 
holders changes over time, we might expect their 
behaviour vis a vis money holding also to change as a 
result. This is a potentially important point when 
recent stability problems with the demand for money 
function are analysed".
(Laidler, 1985 pl33) 
Moreover, official publications have tended to emphasize 
the rapid changes that have taken place in the financial 
institutional framework when explaining the recent 
difficulties of implementation of monetary controls. The view 
that has been consistently propounded suggests that the 
impact of increased competition between building societies 
and banks, and financial innovation by these institutions, 
may be a major determinant of the observed change in the
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relationship between the various monetary aggregates and 
nominal incomes as shown by the fall in the velocity of broad 
money, since 1980, (BEQB (June 1982), Sep t .1983(a)),
(Sept.1983(b)), (Dec. 1984), (March 1985).
The importance of using the correct own rate variable, 
and taking account of financial innovation is exemplified in 
Budd and Holly (1986). Their equation is affected by an 
inadequate proxy for the rate of interest on money. In 
particular, their function appears to have been inadequately 
specified as a result of exclusion of the rate of interest on 
high interest accounts. They estimate an equation for M3 over 
the period 1878-1970[3]. The function appears to be stable 
(according to the rather few test statistics reported), 
although when it is estimated up to 1984 it exhibits 
instability, largely, according to Budd and Holly, due to the 
competition and credit control reforms. They re-estimate 
their equation up to 1984, and include a dummy variable for 
1972-74, and claim the resultant formulation is stable. It is 
noticeable, of course, that stability is dependent upon the 
elimination of the GCC period by the inclusion of a dummy 
variable.
Their claim of stability is rather undermined, however, 
by the inability of their equation to predict M3 (they do not 
apply any specific forecast tests, such as the Hendry 
test). Actual growth in M3 in 1983 and 1984 is about two per 
cent slower than their model predicts, whilst actual monetary 
growth in 1985 and 1986 is about 2% - 3% per cent fas ter 
than predicted. They argue that the increase in high interest
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accounts may be responsible for the inability of their 
equations to forecast accurately monetary growth. It is 
unclear how Budd and Holly can claim that they have 
identified a stable demand for money function whilst at the 
same time noting that their equation cannot explain monetary 
growth because of
"changes in banking practice; such as the introduction
of high interest accounts". (P18)
A rise in the average rate of interest paid on building 
society and bank retail deposits is a rise in the 'own* rate 
on money.
The affect on the demand for money equation of a higher 
own rate on money depends however on whether or not the own 
rate was previously included in the function. If it is 
included in the empirical demand function, a higher own rate 
may merely be represented as a change in the own rate 
parameter of the demand for money function and as such should 
not affect parameter constancy (Johnston 1984). This is 
dependent, of course, on applied researchers' recognising 
that the own rate has in fact increased and subsequently 
including the higher rates in the function (see Chapter 
Nine). If the own rate was not previously included, the 
demand function will appear to be unstable. The equation 
should then be respecified to take account of the (higher) 
own rate of the demand for money.
It is argued here that for a stable demand for money 
function to be identified, and for the purposes of gaining 
knowledge as to past monetary developments, such
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institutional behaviour should be explicitly modelled. A 
further factor affecting their equation is the changing 
competitive positions of building societies and banks. It is 
noticeable that when their equation over-predicts the demand 
for M3 in 1983 and 1984, the building societies were 
successful in attracting retail deposits relative to the 
retail banks. Thus PSL2 would have grown at the expense of M3 
(see Chapter Five). On the other hand, over 1985-86, when the 
retail banks competed aggressively for deposits, the Budd- 
Holly model underpredicts. Budd-Holly's equation may have 
been unable to model this behaviour because of the inadequate 
variable used to measure the opportunity cost of money. The 
use of the differential between the rate on money and a long 
rate as the proxy for the opportunity cost of money may have 
understated the opportunity cost in 1983-84 whilst 
overstating it in 1985-86. It is reasonable to suggest that 
the relevant opportunity cost variable for M3 would be the 
differential between the return on (bank) money, and that on 
a near-money liquid asset, in this case the rate on building 
society shares and deposits, in view of the S w i t c h i n g '  that 
occurred during this period (see Chapter five). It is 
possible that if this opportunity cost variable was used, and 
allowance was made for high-interest accounts, a stable 
demand for M3 may be found.
Taylor (1987) estimates a demand function for M3 over 
the period 1964/2 to 1985/4, and attempts to model some of 
the affects of financial innovation. A proxy is used to model 
the specific innovation of high interest cheque accounts at
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banks. This is measured as the maximum of the seven day 
deposit rate and the rate available on high interest chequing 
accounts. Furthermore, the three-month Treasury Bill rate was 
used in an attempt to capture the effects of switching out of 
M3 assets into short-term negotiable assets. The final 
equation is stable, and the out of sample forecasts are good. 
Moreover, there is no evidence of a structural shift after 
the introduction of CCC. The own rate on money is 
significant, leading to the conclusion that the effects of 
financial innovation can be captured through the differential 
between high interest cheque accounts and the Treasury Bill 
rate.
Taylor emphasises the importance of the own rate 
variable and hence financial innovation by dropping the term 
from the equation and re-estimating the model over the same 
time period. The equation breaks down, showing, according to 
Taylor, the necessity of including financial innovation 
variables in the equation.
This test of the importance of financial innovation in 
an equation for the demand for money is not, however, 
particularly stringent. If any significant variable in an 
equation is omitted, it is likely that the equation will 
suffer in terms of insignificant parameters and test 
statistics. In the case of financial innovation, a more 
reliable test would be to replace the own rate 
which contains interest on the new, innovatory, high interest 
access accounts with a rate of interest that has been 
unaffected by such financial innovation. A useful test would
294
be to substitute the own rate for the net rate on ordinary 
shares at building societies. This would provide a far more 
stringent test of the effect of financial innovation, on the 
demand for M3. Of course, it may be argued that the rate of 
interest paid on ordinary shares has, in general, been higher 
in the 1980's due to increased competition with the retail 
banks, and that liquidity of these accounts has increased, 
both of which represent a form of financial innovation. It is 
important to know, however, the extent to which the specific 
innovation of high interest instant access accounts is 
responsible for the rapid growth in M3.
Johnson (1985) attempts an interesting quantification of 
the effects of financial innovation on the personal sectors 
demand for liquidity aggregates (both money and credit).
These liquidity aggregates do not correspond to any of the 
official monetary aggregates as sectoral holdings are not 
available, and hence it may be argued that this research is 
of limited value for direct policy purposes. It is, however, 
of use in terms of exploration of the effects of financial 
innovation on demand for money and credit functions. The 
author would argue, however, that knowledge of financial 
innovation upon official published money supply series is of 
greater relevance than the effects upon some 'hybrid' money 
supply data. However, Johnston's liquidity aggregates are 
defined as:-
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z-l = personal sector holdings of currency, bank
deposits, building society deposits, all National 
Savings instruments, 'other' money market 
instruments and C.D's.
Z2 = z-^ less National Savings instruments and other
money market instruments and C.D's.
Both financial wealth and income are included in the 
equation [4] on the grounds that the demand for liquid assets 
will be dependent upon the transactions and precautionary 
characteristics of liquid assets (see Chapter Two). Of 
course, if a narrow, non-interest bearing money aggregate 
were being estimated, only income is usually included, as a 
measure of transactions demand. The own rate on money is 
constructed as the average rate of return on the various 
assets included in the aggregate. The average rate on 
building society deposits was also tested as a measure of the 
own rate. Competing interest rates included are the three 
month inter-bank rate and the gross redemption yield on 
twenty year gilts.
The results for holdings of liquid assets are, however, 
disappointing. The equations pass the out-of-sample Hendry 
forecast test and Chow Test for stability over the period 
1980/1 to 1982/4, but there is evidence of forecast 
instability when the forecast is extended to 1983. Johnston 
suggests that instability in the equations may be the result 
of factors not included in the function. He suggests that the 
rise in the stock market may be a factor, although including 
the FT all share index made no difference. There are a number
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of points which may be relevant to instability in Johnston’s 
equations, given the arguments of Chapters Four and Five. In 
particular, Johnston does not explicitly allow for the 
effects of inflation on the demand for liquid assets. This 
may be the reason for the continuous underprediction in the 
out of sample dynamic simulation over the period 1980/1 - 
1983/4. Furthermore, the introduction of high interest 
chequing accounts and high-interest easy access accounts, may 
have increased the demand for liquid assets, yet Johnston's 
equations do not contain a proxy for such innovative 
financial assets. Johnston does however provide an 
interesting dynamic simulation in an attempt to quantify the 
effects of what he terms "financial liberalization" (which 
may be taken to mean the increased competitive pressures in 
the market for retail deposits) over the period 1980-1983.
The method of simulation is examined further in Chapters Nine 
and Ten. His results suggest that financial liberalization 
may have added about 6% to personal sector holdings of liquid 
assets over the period, about 1%% per annum . Johnston argues 
that the adjustment process due to liberalization may have 
come to an end by 1984.
Johnston also attempts to estimate a function for total 
debt of the personal sector, which includes bank lending, 
building society lending, other lending for house purchase, 
trade credit, hire-purchase and instalment debt[5]. The 
function is a reduced form model containing elements of the 
demand and supply of debt to the personal sector. It is found 
that total personal sector real debt is positively related to
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personal sector net real financial wealth, house prices, and 
the return on building society deposits, and negatively 
related to the mortgage rate, the general level of short 
interest rates, real personal disposable income and 
inflation. There is also a variable for excess mortgage 
demand, which has a significant negative impact on persons 
holdings of total debt. The equation appears to be relatively 
stable. The variable for excess mortgage demand (XSMD) is 
used to provide an estimate of financial liberalisation on 
the personal sector's holdings of total financial debt. The 
excess mortgage demand variable is from Meen (1983), which 
shows continuous excess mortgage demand up to and the 
emergence of excess mortgage supply after, the removal of the 
corset. Johnston makes the assumption that the shift in the 
supply of mortgages is the result of liberalisation in the 
personal sector financial market. Estimates are then made of 
the effect of removing the corset by running two simulations 
for 1980 Q3 - 1983 Q4 of the debt equation. One simulation 
has XSMD set at the level estimated by Meen, and one 
simulation with XSMD set at a pre-corset removal level which 
was taken to be the average level of excess mortgage demand 
estimated by Meen over the period 1978-1980.
The simulations suggest that financial liberalisation 
(or removal of the corset) may have added an extra twenty per 
cent to the stock of personal sector debt by the end of 1983. 
Given that the percentage difference between the simulations 
remains relatively stable after 1982 Q4 suggests to Johnston 
that the adjustment as a result of financial liberalisation
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may have finished by mid 1982. However, these results must be 
taken with extreme caution. Although much of Johnston's work 
in this paper is innovative and accurate, the conclusions he 
draws are in fact considerably weakened by the use of Meen's 
early estimate of excess mortgage demand. Meen has since 
(1985) amended and corrected his data series, which will 
considerably alter Johnston's results and conclusions, based 
as they are on an inadequate proxy or measure for mortgage 
rationing. The two data series, Meen (1983) and Meen (1985) 
are included in Appendix 8.A for comparison.
Although not aimed at investigating financial 
innovation, the work of Grice and Bennett (1981, 1984) is of 
interest given the hypothesis stated earlier that through 
financial innovation wealth has become an increasingly 
important variable in the demand for money function.
Grice and Bennett examine the possible importance of 
wealth in the demand for money function for M3[6j. They 
estimate an equation for the non-bank private sector over the 
period 1963-78, utilising gross financial wealth, a 
transactions variable, and an own rate on money consisting of 
the rate on money minus the return on gilts. Grice and 
Bennett find that wealth is a major determinant of money 
demand, more important than an income/transactions variable. 
Their estimated equation appears relatively stable, although 
concern over the lengths of the adjustment process leads to a 
Monte-Carlo test of the function[7]. In particular, Grice and 
Bennett conclude that the wealth data may have been collated 
with a certain degree of measurement error, possibly
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resulting in biased results[8]. Indeed, subsequent official 
data series have shown that Grice and Bennett's wealth data 
were in fact measured with a considerable degree of error 
(see Appendix 8.B where the two series are shown for 
comparison). The conclusion must be that the equation is not 
entirely satisfactory. Given this measurement error, and the 
pre-1980 period of estimate (1963-1978), further research is 
needed to establish whether or not wealth has become a more 
important variable in the demand for money function in the 
face of the breakdown in the money-income relationship, and 
the hypothesized greater use of money as an investment asset 
in the non-bank private sector's overall portfolio.
Hall et al (1989) use cointegration to estimate 
equations for the demand for M3 and M4. The M4 equation 
includes income, inflation, wealth, change in the F.T. 
ordinary share index, and a dummy for competition and credit 
control [ 9 ]. The F.T. ordinary share index was used to 
reflect changes in liquid asset holdings after the fall in 
the stock market index in the early 1970s.
Somewhat surprisingly, Hall et al find no interest rate 
effects in either the demand for M3 or M4. They suggest that 
this may be due to difficulties in accurately measuring 
interest rates when financial innovations are taking place.
It should also be noted that both equations have an 
exceptionally low (0.3 for M4 and 0.32 for M3) which must 
cast some doubt on the specification.
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8.2 The Sectoral Approach
The different rates of growth of holdings of M3 by other
financial institutions (OFl's), industrial and commercial
companies (ICG's) and the personal sector identified in
Chapter Five emphasizes the fact that it is possible that
demand for money equations may be unable to forecast
accurately if they have to take into account diverse
behaviour patterns by different agents in the economy. It is
perhaps more useful to carry out research on sectoral demand
for money equations.
The sectoral approach provides plausible long-run
equations for Weale[lO], who analyses the demand for a variety
of assets by the personal sector over the period 1967/2 to
1981/3, in terms of the allocation of short-term assets among
money and near money. Interestingly it is found that,
"the results do not suggest a sharp distinction, in 
terms of substitution properties, between money and near 
money (building society and local authority deposits) 
this suggests that the usual emphasis on monetary 
aggregates may be unhelpful, and also indicates that an
analysis of the demand for money which nets out the
building societies by aggregating the non-bank private 
sector is unlikely to yield satisfactory results".
(1986 pl58)
Currie and Kennally (1985) model liquid assets and
liabilities by disaggregating those that act as buffer stocks
and those that do not on the assumption that some assets have
a low cost of adjustment for some agents whilst a high cost
of adjustment for others (i.e. the same assets may be more or
less liquid to different holders)[11],
"we believe that the difficulty in identifying a stable 
demand function for the U.K. is due to the problems of 
going from a particular monetary aggregate to the 
functional liquidity of a given agent. In particular
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aggregates that we would wish to include in a measure of 
liquidity are likely to vary from sector to sector and 
from time to time. For this reason a sectoral approach 
seems to us to be the correct one, not necessarily 
modelling the same aggregate in all sectors".
(pl9)
The estimated buffer stock consists of building society 
deposits and time and sight bank deposits of the personal 
sector over the period 1968/1 to 1983/1. They find that,
"by including building society deposits in our liquid 
aggregate, we believe we have identified an aggregate 
which, although varying internally in its composition 
over time, gives a measure of liquidity for which stable 
aggregate behavioural parameters can be identified".
(pl9)
Of special relevance is the finding that the liquidity 
demand equation is stable across the period 1971-74 when most 
demand equations show instability. There are however, 
problems in the short-run dynamic behaviour of the equation 
(long-run elasticities exceed short-run elasticities) which 
tends to cast doubt upon the buffer stock nature of the model 
(a not entirely unexpected result, given the analysis of the 
buffer stock model with regard to financial innovation in 
Chapter Seven).
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8.3 Interest elasticity of Expenditure
The perceived wisdom of the 1970's, according to a 
survey of the consumption function by Ferber (1973) was that 
interest rate effects on consumption were likely to be 
relatively weak. In the 1980's however, Cuthbertson (1980) 
and Davis (1984) have found significant interest rate effects 
on durables expenditure. The most recent research into the 
interest elasticity of consumer's expenditure is that of 
Dicks (1988). Dicks estimates a durables consumption function 
which consists of terms representing real household 
disposable income, the clearing banks base rate, the minimum 
deposit rate on durables, the flow of mortgage lending, and 
personal sector real liquid assets [12], The model passes a 
variety of tests, and has a good forecast performance. The 
absolute interest elasticity of -0.84 1963 quarter three to 
1985 quarter four was compared with two sub-periods derived 
from splitting the sample in 1974.
The interest rate is positive in the sample ending in 
the early 1970's, but negative later. The interest rate on 
durables has risen closer to zero over time, and that on real 
net liquid assets has fallen. Dicks interprets these findings 
as suggesting that interest rates have become a more 
important factor in determining when households buy durables.
Interestingly, Dicks found that splitting lending for 
house purchase between that used for housing investment, and 
that for net cash withdrawal, and using them as variables in 
the equation, did not lead to significant coefficients.
Either equity withdrawal has not had a large effect on
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consumption (as suggested in Chapter Six) or the simple 
proxies used for equity withdrawal are not adequate for 
modelling how much lending is leaking into consumption.
Dicks also investigated the interest elasticity of non­
durables consumption [13]. The final equation consists of 
terms representing the lagged dependent variable (real 
consumer's expenditure on non-durable goods and services), 
real household disposable income, real personal sector net 
financial wealth, and the clearing banks base rate.
Again, interest elasticity effects are examined by 
splitting the sample, this time at the end of 1974, and re- 
estimating the model for the sub-periods. In the first 
period, the interest rate term was small and insignificant. 
Conversely, the interest rate term in the second sub-period 
was significant and about as twice as large as that estimated 
for the sample as a whole. Dicks concludes that,
"Clearly this result implies that further work is needed 
if we are to understand why interest rate effects appear 
to be becoming more important, particularly given that 
we found much the same story was true of durables 
expenditure. One possible reason, suggested in Dicks 
(1987), is that greater competition in the markets for 
personal sector saving and borrowing has resulted in 
reduction in liquidity constraints, which may be 
correlated with changes in interest rates".
(Dicks 1988 p26)
Despite this, proxies for mortgage rationing, and net 
cash withdrawal were not found to be significant in Dick's 
work, nor were the house price earnings ratio, or the flow of 
real mortgage lending.
Dick's work suggests that the effect of monetary control 
through the interest elasticity of the consumption function
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has increased over time, with the interest-elasticity of 
consumption rising. It is by no means clear, however, whether 
this is the direct result of financial innovation, market- 
clearing mortgage rates, and increasing house prices. A 
further avenue of research not yet explored to the author's 
knowledge would be to analyse the interest elasticity of 
consumption according to the mortgage interest rate. As noted 
above, Dicks used the clearing banks base rate for interest 
rate effects, but this is not necessarily the same as 
utilising mortgage rates. Base rates change at different 
times to mortgage rates, particularly given the widespread 
practice of changing interest rates for existing mortgage 
borrowers only once or twice yearly.
If the interest-elasticity of consumption with respect 
to mortgage interest rates has also risen, there would be a 
greater case for maintaining that the ending of the cartel, 
market-clearing mortgage rates, and higher mortgage to income 
ratios have been responsible for greater interest-sensitivity 
of consumption, and hence more effective monetary control.
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8.4 Conclusion
The problems noted by Johnston, Budd and Holly, and 
Grice and Bennett in terms of instability of the demand for 
broad money may be the result of taking inadequate account of 
the effects of financial innovation on the own rate on money, 
as Taylor's work shows. The hypothesis that wealth has become 
a more important variable in the demand for money as a result 
of money becoming an increasingly attractive form of holding 
wealth has not been fully corroborated by past research, 
although the work of Grice and Bennett may provide a useful 
base to build upon.
None of the published work on the demand for money or 
consumers'expenditure examines the interest-elasticity of 
these functions over time. Given the importance of these 
elasticities for the purposes of monetary control, and the 
hypothesized effects on these elasticities, this appears to 
be a fruitful area for research (see Chapters Nine and Ten).
Dicks has provided evidence as to the effects of 
financial innovation upon the interest-elasticity of 
consumers' expenditure, but does not examine whether the 
ending of the cartel and more fluid mortgage interest rates 
have increased the interest elasticity of expenditure.Given 
that this is likely to increase the ability of the monetary 
authorities to control the growth of the money supply, this 




[1] See Artis and Lewis (1974, 1976), Hacche (1974), Hendry 
and Mizon (1978), Coghlan (1978<), Hendry (1979), Grice 
and Bennett (1981, 1984), Judd and Scadding (1982), 
Laidler (1985), Cutherbertson (1987).
[2] See Boughton (1979, 1981(a)) for a survey of the 
econometric research into the demand for money in OECD 
countries•
[3] Budd and Holly*s final equation takes the form:
A  / M v  = -0.0162 + 0.1806
^ [ p i 1 (1.49) (2.81) ^ ( p ) t x
- 0.1166 / M V - ?  “ 0.0212 (rsl.
(5.30) V F v r  (3.90) c
- 0.0861 (rL - rL t_2 J + 0.0286 (rbd - rs)t 
(4.34) (1.59)
- 0.6181 A(p\. + 0.3123 A ( p t )-1
(11.25) (4.84)
2 - 0.768 see = 2.22% LM(3) = 1.67
+ dummies
R
M = sterling M3
• P = Price level
* y = Real income
rs = Short interest rate 
rL = Long interest rate 
rbd = rate of interest on bank deposits.
Dummy variables - four were included, two for the two 
world wars, one for a change in data source in 1967, and 
for the period 1921 to 1955, when according to Friedman 
and Schwartz there was a shift in liquidity preference
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(although this last dummy variable was dropped from the 
final equation).
. The general-to specify methodology was used (see Chapter 
N i n e ) •
LM(3) is a Lagrange Multiplier Test for autocorrelation 
of the residuals.
All of the variables are in logarithmic form (including 
the interest rates).
Figures in brackets at t statistics.
[4] Johnston's final equation for total personal sector 
holdings of liquid assets was:-
-0.22 ( r T + E C G ^ i  - 0.38 r c (1-TAX)
(2.32) C A (6.59)
R 2 = 0.91 DW = 2.17 SEE = 0.49X 
LM(1) = 0.5 LM(4) = 6.1
Hendry = 24.1 Chow = 4.8
Estimated period: 1967Q4 - 1982Q4.
where:
Z1
WAQ/P Personal sector real gross acquisitions of 
financial wealth.
as above
P consumer expenditure deflator 
Personal disposable incomey
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ECG = estimate of expected capital gains. 
rzi = average return on the aggregate z ± 
rg = general measure of market interest rates, the 
three month inter-bank rate.
Tl  a long term interest rate, the gross
redemption yield on 2 0  year gilts.
The general to specific methodology was used.
All variables (except interest rates) are in logarithmic
form.
[5] Johnston*s model of total debt of the personal sector
takes the form:
/ \ f  TD\ = 0 .78 - 0.27 7TDV -1 - 0.22 fTIX. o
(1.73) (3.92) \ ~ r  1 (1.89)V“#  J(M*-1 ' »-08M '-4
"  (2?28) Cs(1-TAX)t-4 " (3?74)r m (1_TAX>
- 0.48 Y t _ ? - 0.48A>(FL_o + 0.14 (Pfilf.i
(5.72)p (2.28) (5.62)
- 0.0013 fxSMD^ - 0.0013(XSMDL . - 0.006 (d CI)
(3.87) ' ' (3.95) ' (0.65) '
- 0.017 (DC2^ - 0.00l(DC3^ + 0.242 / N W \
(2.25) ' (0.12) ' (7.13)\— P /
+ 0 . 0 4 1 fDCCC)
(4.44) '
R 2 = 0.82 DW = 1.82 SEE = 1.03%





The corset dummy variables are:-
DC1:- 1 1974Q1-1975Q1 and zero otherwise
DC2:- 1 1976Q4-1977Q3 and zero otherwise
DC3:- 1 1978Q3-1980Q2 and zero otherwise
DCCC is a dummy for competition and credit control
taking the value 1 after 1971Q3.
TD = personal sector financial debt
P = consumer expenditure deflator
Y = Personal disposable income
Ph = Index of house -prices at completion stage.
XSMD= measure of excess mortgage demand 
NW = net financial wealth
rbsa= quarterly average building society deposit rate 
(net of basic rate tax) 
rs = quarterly average three month inter-bank rate. 
All variables except interest rates are in logarithmic 
form.
The wealth series is constructed from national balance 
sheet data (see Reid 1978 and Pettigrew 1980). 
Following Grether and Maddala (1973).





- 0.00859 o (R M ) + 0.000734 (RMRGEG)(2.87) (3.48)
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- 0.00859 A ,  (RM) + 0.000734 (RMRGEG)
(2.87) (3.48)
- 0.000406 (RMRGEG),. < + 0.000212(RMRGEG)t_c
(2.42) 1 (1.93) •
+ 0.0183(CCCDUM) + 0.0395(CRISXS)
(3.00) (5.45)
i=l
D / A  + 0.970 / M ) , .  + 0.493 ( M | r o
U ;  (17.54)(P/ 1 (4.10)1 P/ J




0.9971 SEE = 0.598%
M3 (Non bank private sector)
Non bank private sector gross financial wealth 
cumulated revaluations
Total final expenditure at current prices
Price index for TFE (1975 = 1.00)
Post tax rate of return to M3
Post tax rate of return to gilts including
expected capital gains.
ariables except interest rates are in logarithmic 
form.















[9] Their cointegrating equations take the form:
= -0.71 A 4 P + 0.72 / W v - 0.2 SND
PY PY
+ 0 . 1  DCCC
where:-
P = log of the GDP deflator
Y = log of real GDP
W = log of total financial wealth of the personal
sector




DCCC = 0 prior to 1971 Q4 and 1 thereafter 
The final equation was:
A  (M4) = 0.016 + 0.512 A  (M4]L - 0.15 RES..,
(4.8) (5.2) X 1 (2.4)
RES = Residuals from the levels regression
[10] Weale*s estimated equation is:-
Yij log Pj i (log Wt/Pt’f - log et)




Sit = share of asset i
S j t-^ - holding of asset j in previous period
W t = total short-term asset holdings at end of
period t 
Pj = price of asset j
P t" = asset price index
e t = expenditure in period t
£ l £ 2 £ 3  = seasonal dummies.
The equation is estimated by 3SLS for the period 1967 Q2 
- 1981 Q3.
The assets tested are:- Notes and coin, bank sight 
deposits, bank time deposits, savings bank deposits, 
building society deposits, and local authority deposits.
[ 1 1 ] Currie and Kennally*s final equation takes the form:-
<A(QD) = -2.62 + 0.917 ^ ( Q W ) .  - 0 .774 A ( q w ) t -
(5.7) (11.1) (3.3)
-0.893 A(RPl)«-_i + 0.121 Z ^ Q C E ) , . *
(3.6). * 1 (2.9) C 1
+0.250 A ( Q C E ) . - 9  + 0.226 A ( Q C E ) t. o
(5.6) * (4.6) t J
+0.486 ( R O W N ) o  - 0.152 (QD) . 9 
(1.1) (4.0) t 2





R " ° « 9 5
SEE = 0.59% LM(4) - 5.3
XSQ » 16.2
All variables except interest rates are in logarithms.
The general-to-specific methodology was used w h ere: -
QD = sum of building society deposits and sight and
time bank deposits of the personal sector, dividend 
by the consumers expenditure deflator.
QW = Permanent wealth of the personal sector (by 
consumers expenditure deflator).
QGE = a measure of transactions expenditure (by consumers 
expenditure deflator).
ROWN = weighted average own rate of interest on liquid
assets minus the rate of return on a competing non­
liquid financial asset (2 %% consols).
SD1 = seasonal dummy variable.
RPI = Inflation.
TIM = A time trend variable.
LM(4)= Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation.
XSQ = Eight period forecast test
[ 1 2 ] Dicks durables consumption function takes the form: 
(CD) = 1.074 (YDLH) - 0.656 (RR)
(6.8) (5.0)
0.005 (RMD ) t - 1  + 0.125
(5.3) (3.7)
 f ML 
 VPC
+ 0.206 f N L A J \ - cons




R 2 = 0.988
Numbers in brackets are t values. All variables are in 
logs. Estimation Period 1963 Q3
-1985 Q4
YDLH = Real Household Disposable Income 1980 prices.
RR = (1 + Clearing banks base rate)
Minus “ ^ t - 5 ^
PC = Consumers expenditure deflator 1980 = 1 
RMD = Effective minimum deposit rate on durables.
ML = Flow of mortgage loans (nominal)
NLAJ = Personal Sector net liquid assets (nominal)
[1 3] Dicks non-durables - consumption function takes the 
form:
(CND) = 0.534 ( C N D ) . *  + 0.340 (CND)t-2
(6.7) C 1 (4.7)
+ 0.116 A(YDLH) + 0.196 A ( Y D L H )
(3.0) (6.4)
+ 0.119 (YDLH) + 0.008 f RNFWJ *\
(- } (2.8) V YDLH /t - 1
0.0614 (RR)t-„i + constant
(2.7)
+ dummies
Estimation Period 1967 Q4 
R 2 = 0.997 -1985 Q2
where:-




NFWJ = Personal sector net financial wealth (nominal).
PC = Consumers expenditure deflator. 1980 = 1 .
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APPENDIX 8A.
1967 1 34.56 1974 1 30.05 1981 1 -5
2 27.89 2 • 33.15 2 -9
3 30.51 3 27.28 3 -0
4 24.18 4 26.66 4 -5
1968 1 20.56 1975 1 21.79 1982 1 5
2 25.33 3 15.52 2 -5
3 33.69 3 8.91 3 -1
4 39.40 4 6.46 4 0
19569 1 37.97 1976 1 5.880 1983 1 0
2 29.79 2 2.160 2 - 0
3 34.30 3 5.40 3 2
4 36.40 4 3.12 4 2
1970 1 32.950 1977 1 1 0 . 0 1 1934 1
2 26.350 2 9.16
3 28.790 3 4.60
4 27.790 4 1 2 . 8 6
1971 1 23.04 1978 1 13.28
2 16.65 2 10.48
3 21.89 3 18.12
4 23.39 4 24.49
1972 1 20.50 1979 1 10.84
2 20.57 2 17.01
3 28.31 3 14.41
4 33.03 4 18.79
1973 1 28.12 1980 1 8.16
2 19.26 2 3.76
3 32.03 3 2.72
4 26.73 4 -7.18















1963 1 4.76 1970 1 3.37 1977 1 0
2 3.75 2 2.71 2 0
3 4.05 3 2.81 3 0
4 3.45 4 2.69 4 1
1964 1 3.52 ‘ 1971 1 2.28 1978 1 1
2 3.16 2 1 .6 8 - 2 1
3 3.84 3 2.15 3 1
4 4.19 4 2.29 4 . 2
1965 1 3.82 1972 1 2 . 2 2 1979 1 1
2 4.83' 2 2.24 2 0
3 5.09 3 2.81 3 1
4 3.84 4 3.24 4 3
1966 1 3.71 1973 1 2.85 1980 1 0
2 2.23 2 2 . 1 1 2 0
3 2.49 3 3.19 3 0
4 4.14 4 2.50 4 - 0
1967 1 3.46 1974 1 2.85 * 1981 1 - 0
2 2.79 2 3.24 2 - 0
3 3.03 3 2 . 6 8 3 - 0
4 2.40 4 2.18 4 - 0
1968 1 2.05 1975 1 2 . 2 1 1982 1 0
2 2.55 2 1.93 2 - 0
3 3.35 3 0.91 3 - 0
4 3.87 4 0.58 4 - 0
1969 1 3.82 1976 1 0.46 1983 1 - 0
2 3.02 2 0 . 2 2 2 - 0
3 3.40 3 0.53 3 0







































1967 4 48163 1974 1 79315
1968 1 48455 2 81199
2 49032 3 82653
3 50138 4 83554
4 50880 1975 1 86281
1969 1 50161 2 88422
2 50111 3 91111
3 50481 4 93946
4 51744 1976 1 97468
1970 1 52059 2 101406
2 52621 3 105703
3 53473 4 109596
4 54296 1977 1 ' 114405
1971 1 55897 2 116482
2 56916 3 122133
3 . 58756 4 126083
4 61387 1978 1 128731
1972 1 62766 2 132521
2 66506 3 137045






G R I C E A N D  BENNETT'S GROSS FINANCIAL WEALTH FIGURES
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1967 4 53142 • 1974 1 87665
1968 1 53385 2 89967
2 53903 3 91449
3 54884 4 92824
4 56161 1975 1 98004
1969 1 55989 2 100301
2 56144 3 104749
3 56527 4 109480
4 57590 1976 1 114390
1970 .1 57166 2 118504
2 58006 3 121095
3 . 58578 4 126859
4 59727 1977 1 130267
1971 1 61636 2 133494
2 63098 3 142356
3 65897 4 ‘146732
4 68845 1978 1 146678
1972 1 70827 2 151322
2 74017 3 155921






UPDATED GROSS FINANCIAL WEALTH 





Few studies of the demand for money function have taken 
into account, or attempted to take into account the effects 
of financial innovation, as the scarcity of empirical work 
surveyed in Chapter Eight showed, despite the growing 
consensus that financial innovation may have an important 
role to play,
"It is clear that the real world is more complicated 
than the models in question, and that in fact money- 
holding agents treat a rather wide variety of assets as 
alternatives to money in their portfolios. There is 
nothing surprising about this; indeed it would be 
starting had things turned out otherwise. However, it 
does mean that as the menu of assets available to money 
„holders changes over time, we might expect their 
behaviour vis-a-vis money holding also to change as a 
result. This is a potentially important point when 
recent stability problems with the demand for money 
function are analysed".
(Laidler 1985 pl33) 
Moreover, to the author's knowledge, no published study 
has examined the effects of financial innovation on monetary 
control within a framework of analysis of the specification 
and estimation of a demand for money function.
Attempts are made in this Chapter to econometrically 
evaluate the hypotheses as set out earlier.
Given the analysis of Chapter Five as to the changing 
definition of money as a result of building society 
innovations, the monetary authorities own comments as to the 
increasing convergence of the deposit liabilities of banks 
and building societies, and the problems of money holders
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switching their balances between building societies and 
banks and hence distorting the growth rate of M3, the broad 
monetary aggregate M4 is used when estimating the demand for 
money function.
Sections 9.1 to 9.4 analyse the broad econometric 
modelling strategies and methodologies in the empirical 
literature and provide critiques of the main functions 
estimated under these strategies: the partial adjustment 
mechanism, the error-correction model, and cointegration.
A theoretical model of the demand for broad money is 
specified in section 9.5 with due regard to the likely 
relevant variables as outlined in Chapter Eight. This 
theoretical model is used as the basis for the econometric 
specification of the demand for broad money. The final 
equation is then used to evaluate the various hypotheses as 
set out in earlier chapters. Specifically, Section 9.5 
attempts to specify a stable demand for money function by 
taking account of interest on building society accounts, and 
investigates the interest elasticity of the demand for money 
over time. The final section concludes with an overview of 
the econometric results and their implications.
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9.1 Econometric Methodology.
The breakdown of an econometric model may occur for a 
variety of reasons, functional form mis-specification, 
inadequate econometric modelling techniques, or exogenous 
'structural breaks' to the system under study. The latter 
phenomenon has been widely blamed for instability in demand 
for money equations (Hendry, 1979, 1985).
The existence of external shocks, such as competition 
and credit control, or the abandonment of the corset, 
necessitates, it is argued, a revision of econometric 
equations to take into account the altered system. It is far 
from obvious however, when a structural break, in previously 
stable relationships, has occurred, or even if it has 
occurred. The very breakdown of an econometric model is 
often used as evidence that a structural break must have 
happened, because of the sudden breakdown of the model; it 
is by no means clear, however, whether the model was 
correctly specified at the outset. A change in exogenous 
variables which forces a model to break down may be evidence 
of mis-specification of that model, rather than evidence of 
a structural break. Indeed, a correctly specified equation 
may have been able to model a change in the behaviour of 
exogenous variables, and hence not exhibit any signs of 
instability or structural breaks. This is summed up by 
Hendry (1979),
"while a genuine structural break in a relationship may 
be sufficient to induce predictive failure in that 
equation, it is not necessary in the following sense: 
if all the true structural equations in a system remain 
unaltered but the behaviour of some exogenous variables 
changes, then all mis-specified econometric
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approximations to the equations of that system could 
manifest 'shifts' (i.e. apparent structural breaks)".p219 (Hendry's Italics).
For example, the fast rate of growth of inflation in
the 1970's, which represented a change in the behaviour of
an exogenous variable, may have appeared to produce
structural breaks or shifts in those estimated models that
did not include an inflation variable, if the underlying
tpue economic relationship did indeed depend upon the
behaviour of the inflation variable (see Hendry p220). Thus,
it is extremely difficult to ascertain as to whether model
breakdown or a reduction in model forecast accuracy is a
result of a structural break in the system oj: because of
model mis-specification.
The econometric methodology undertaken when estimating
any economic relationship can be of vital importance to the
stability and robustness of the model. Moreover, it can be
argued that if an inappropriate methodology is pursued, it
is likely that at some point in time the equation may suffer
from instability, merely as a result of an inadequate
modelling strategy, rather than due to any change in the
economic relationship under observation. If an equation
becomes unstable during a period when there are changes in
the economic system, for example during a policy regime
change (e.g. C C C ) , it may appear that the change in the
economic system has forced the equation to break down,
whereas in fact it may be that the inadequate modelling
methodology could not emulate the regime change, whilst a
more robust modelling strategy may have been able to cope
323
with such a situation without exhibiting signs of 
ins tability.
It is thus difficult to distinguish between a 'true* 
structural break that even a correctly specified equation 
using sound econometric modelling methodology would break 
down under, and a change in exogenous variables that appears 
to be a structural break when using a mis-specified model 
based on inappropriate or inadequate modelling strategy. The 
choice of econometric methodology is therefore of paramount 
importance. The adoption of a particular methodology is, as 
might be expected, a contentious issue.
Certain commentators have argued that econometric 
models have been constructed according to ad hoc procedures 
(Blaug 1980 p257). Some would argue that the standard 
textbook approach has led to a situation where research is 
concerned with confirming theories rather than evaluating 
alternative theories (Pagan 1984). With different techniques 
leading to different conclusions, there are often no methods 
for deciding which theories command the most credible 
support, resulting in contradictory hypotheses being 
maintained side by side for many years. Whilst there are 
opposing and sometimes rather extreme views, it is clear 
that there is a certain amount of dissatisfaction with 
standard methods. This has resulted in attempts to re­
evaluate econometric methodology, leading to a variety of 
alternative routes for the applied researcher.[1]
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The well-known policy critique of Lucas (1976) argues
that model breakdown occurs as a result of ignoring the role
of expectations in modelling, such that structural
instability may be unknowingly built into empirical models.
The Lucas critique is theory orientated and has led to
rational expectations playing a major role in this approach
to the modelling of time-series data (Lucas and Sargent
1981), although little work has been carried out on
rational expectations and the demand for money, (see
Cuthbertson and Taylor (1987) for a rare exception, but note
the reservations of Hendry (1988)).
For purposes of illustration it is possible to
distinguish between two broad categories of empirical
econometric modelling methods: the "specific-to-general"
and the "general-to-specific". The former has been branded
by Hendry (1979 p222) as,
"excessive presimplification with inadequate diagnostic 
checking".
It is worth repeating here in full Hendry's caricature of 
"specific-to-general" modelling, whereby researchers (Also 
see Hendry and Mizon 1978, Hendry and Ericsson 1983 and 
Hendry and Richard 1982, 1983):-
1. Commence from theories that are drastic abstractions of 
reality (usually of a long-run steady-state world 
subject to stringent ceteris paribus assumptions 
concerning all but a very small number of variables);
2. Formulate highly parsimonious relationships to 
represent their theories;
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3. Estimate their equations from the available data using 
techniques which are 'optimal 1 only on the assumptions 
that the highly restricted model is correctly 
specified;
4. Test a few of the assumptions explicitly or implicitly 
underlying the exercise;
5. Revise the specification in the light of the evidence 
acquired; and
6 . Re-estimate accordingly.
The dangers of starting with a model that is too
restrictive are examined in Hendry and Mizon (1978) and
Hendry (1979).
The general-to-specific methodology on the other hand
is characterised by,
"intended over-parameterization with data based 
simplification".
(Hendry 1979 p228) 
There are however, severe critics of the general-to- 
specific approach. In particular, it has been argued that 
the method relies too heavily on a statical basis rather 
than on economic theory per se (Lawson 1983, Laidler 1986). 
The general-to-specific approach maintains that economic 
theory cannot be used to model long run demand for money 
functions as the data generation process (DGP) is 
essentially a disequilibrium phenomenon (Hendry 1985). Lags 
on the dependent or independent variables in the long-run 
relationship are therefore used to model the adjustment 
process. Thus, the general-to-specific method is open to the 
criticism of 'ad hoc' modelling.
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Moreover, it is argued that the search for stable
functions in the general-to-specific methodology precludes
the researcher from admitting that the function is unstable:
it just has not yet been found. Some would go so far as to
say that the general-to-specific approach finds stability
when none is evident, largely due to the assumption that
stability is there to be found,
"If the economic phenomenon under consideration has 
actually experienced a structural break, but the 
investigator seeks a relationship which is wholly 
stable, then it is not beyond the wit of 
econometricians to model the phenomenon in 
autoregressive distributed lag form as if it were 
stable •Darnell (1987 p4) quoted in Lynne-Evans (1989). 
Given the emphasis placed on the rigorous testing of 
econometric models in the general-to-specific approach this 
is probably an over-harsh characterization, although the 
problem should be acknowledged by applied researchers.
The general-to-specific research programme argues that 
the temporal structure of the data should be allowed to play 
a more important role in model specification (Sargan 1964). 
This has been extended by Hendry and Anderson (1977) and 
Davidson et al (1978). This methodology combines a 
constructionist approach along with a destructive strategy. 
In other words, if the worst models are eliminated the less 
bad ones are left (Hendry 1979).
One of the main prerequisites for accepting a model is 
its ability to explain previous models, including the reason 
for their breakdown. Use of this "encompassing principle" 
(Mizon 1984) provides a progressive sequence of models which
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at worst are summaries of previous research, but at best are 
robust and stable characterisations of economic phenomena 
(Hendry and Richard 1983). Of course, a general model will 
always be able to explain models that are special cases of 
it, and would lead to the adoption of an over-general model. 
A further requirement, therefore, is that parsimony is 
upheld. This is characterised as a "general-to-specific" 
modelling strategy, where the researcher starts from a 
general dynamic specification and test downwards for a more 
parsimonious and theoretically meaningful relationship 
(Gilbert 1986).
A vital aspect of this approach is the rigorous testing 
of models both against the data and against each other. This 
accords with a Popperian methodology (Popper 1972) where a 
falsificationist approach is adopted in place of the 
positivist methodology. Thus, model tests are necessary 
conditions for models not to be invalid. Philosophically, 
there are no sufficient conditions under which models can be 
validated. Failure to reject one of the necessary conditions 
does not establish that the model is valid, only that the 
model is not demonstrably invalid (Hendry 1985). This 
destructive approach can be defended on the grounds that it 
is better to recognise uncertainties in models through 
vigorous testing than to use invalid models as a basis for 
policy decisions. This general to specific methodology 
argues that much of the traditional econometric analysis 
suffers from excessive presimplification and inadequate 
diagnostic checking (Hendry 1985). General to specific, on
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the other hand, is characterised by intended over­
parameterization with data-based simplification. Starting 
from the most general model which it seems reasonable to 
specify, sequential testing procedures are used to select a 
data coherent specification.
It is worth emphasizing that exponents of this form of 
modelling do in fact recognise that it does have its 
limitations. Again, it is worth repeating Hendry in full:
1. The chosen (ostensibly general) model could actually 
comprise a very special case of the data generation 
process, so that diagnostic testing remains important;
2 . data limitations - sample size or the information 
content of the data may be inadequate;
3. there is no uniquely 'best' sequence for simplifying 
the model - different approximations which have similar 
sample likelihoods may forecast very differently. 
Exponents of the general-to-specific approach maintain
that these problems are outweighed by the uncertainty of lag 
responses in any relationship under consideration, and hence 
the desirability of starting from a general unrestricted 
maximum lag length (constrained by degrees of freedom 
limitations). Moreover, this methodology appears to have 
produced more robust (but by no means problem free) models, 
which can be used as a useful starting point for applied 
researchers (Hendry and Mizon (1978), Hendry (1979), Grice 
and Bennett (1981, 1984), Johnston (1984, 1985), Taylor 
(1987).
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9•2 Partial Adjustment Model
Many demand for money models pre 1975 were based on 
partial adjustment principles* These models have been 
heavily criticized (Hendry and Mizon, 1978, Courakis, 1978) 
for their ad hoc nature and over-restrictive assumptions. It 
is argued by some (e.g. Hendry 1979) that it is not 
surprising that such models exhibit instability, given their 
underlying theoretical basis and the method in which they 
are developed. Although the emphasis of this thesis remains 
the effects of building society developments on monetary 
control, it is obviously of importance to examine 
alternative econometric techniques to evaluate their 
appropriateness for the econometric work to follow.
The long-run demand for money function is typically 
derived thus:-
f(X) Desired real money balance M" are (1)
a function of a set of explanatory 
variables(X)
In the long run, it is assumed that observed real money
This is rationalized on the grounds that the demand for 
money is for a target level of money balances that holders 
attempt to meet on average over time. In the long-run, it is 
therefore a useful approximation that observed balances
P




equal desired money balances. The long-run demand for money 
can then be represented by:-
However, it is unlikely that observed money holdings 
will be at their desired level in the short-run, because of
costs of adjustment in achieving long-run desired levels of 
money balances, Therefore:-
it  ^ in the short-run. (4)
It is assumed that money holders take a two stage 
decision process. Firstly, the long-run desired level of 
money balances is decided and secondly, the optimum speed of 
adjustment towards some desired level is calculated.
The speed of adjustment however, is affected by 
adjustment costs, of which there are assumed to be two 
forms:-
(a) Costs of being out of long-run desired equilibrium of
money holding. For example the opportunity cost of 
interest income on alternative assets, or an inability 
to buy goods when needed, represented by:-
f(X) (3)
a (5)
where a = cost of being out of equilibrium.
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(b). Costs of changing the observed level of assets in order 
to move towards the long-run desired equilibrium level 
of money holding. For example, the 1 shoe-leather * costs 
of inconvenience and opportunity cost of time, 
represented by:-
(6)
P / N p
where b = cost of changing towards equilibrium.
Costs of adjustment are represented by the first-order 
partial adjustment mechanism which is derived thus: 
(Cuthbertson 1985-p64).
Money-holders choose actual balances, M, to minimize costs, 
C:-
,2 . r-.. -.2
min C = a p )  - ( $ ]  *  b p ) ' (?)'-£]
U '  2* p ) • (0 ] * 2b [?) - '  0 (8>
(7)
(9)
/ M \  - / M.'%\ + C l - X D ( M \ t.i (the partial adjustment (1 0 )
V p / I p j V p / m o d e l ) .
where X  a
a+b
I *p /  \ p‘
If costs of being out of equilibrium are zero, a = 0, b = 0 
and/ M \ = / M ‘
If costs of adjustment are zero, b = 0, ck = 1 an d ^ M ^  = ^  M ^
1 / M ' >
V P / \ P /t-1
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The partial adjustment mechanism is thus used to link 
observed values of money balances with desired levels.
Combining (1) and (10) gives the short-run estimating 
equation:-
where (X) = a set of explanatory variables.
Partial adjustment assumes that short-run desired money 
holdings are a weighted average of desired long-run money 
holdings and lagged values of money holdings. The parameters 
of interest from the short-run function can be used to 
obtain those of the long-run function by dividing the short- 
run by one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable.
The lagged dependent variables represent the slow 
adjustment of observed money holdings to desired levels and 
hence the lags in price adjustment.
Partial adjustment models that performed well in the 
1960's (Paish 1958, Dow 1958, Kavanagh and Walters 1966, 
Laidler and Parkin 1970, and Laidler 1971) were found to be 
unstable in the 1970's (Hacche 1974, Artis and Lewis 1974, 
1976).
Criticism of these partial adjustment models of the 
demand for money function has tended to emphasize the 
constraints involved in the short-run dynamics of 
adjustment. Detailed critiques are put forward in Courakis 
(1978) and Hendry and Mizon (1978). Of vital importance is
(11)
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the method of modelling lags in the adjustment process in 
the partial adjustment model. The coefficient X i s  used to 
model the lag response in the short-run demand for money 
function (equation (11)). This means that the dependent 
variable (observed real money balances) will adjust to 
changes in any one of the independent variables (X) with the 
same parameter (X). So, the partial adjustment model 
constrains the lag length to be the same, despite the fact 
that the initial disturbance may derive from either income 
or interest rates. A priori, it would be expected that the 
lag length of adjustment would be different according to 
where the disturbance arose. Early partial adjustment models 
were thus extremely restrictive in their specified portfolio 
adjustment mechanisms, in the manner in which lag lengths of 
variables determining the demand for money were assumed to 
be the same.
Further criticisms of the partial adjustment model also 
relate to the restrictiveness of some of the assumptions. 
Many partial adjustment models have employed the assumption 
that:
(1) The true errors of the model were often assumed to be
correlated.
(2) The price elasticity of the demand for money was often
assumed to be unity and
(3) Equations were estimated in first difference form.
It is not obvious a priori that these assumptions hold 
true, and a crucial part of the general-to-specific 
methodology is that these restrictions should be t e s t e d . Of
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particular criticism was the practice of imposing non-linear 
restrictions on the equation due to the assumption of 
autocorrelation, usually through employing the Cochrane- 
Orcutt (1949) transformation (e.g. Hacche 1974). Sargan 
(1980) and Hendry and Mizon (1978) show that autoregressive 
errors entail a variety of restrictions on the general 
dynamic model which should be tested for. Residual 
autocorrelation is normally a symptom of model mis- 
specif ication rather than autoregressive errors (Baba et al 
1987, Mizon and Hendry 1980, McAleer et al 1985).
Having examined the underlying assumptions of the 
partial adjustment model of the demand for money function, 
it is recognized that numerous authors have argued that 
instability in these models may have arisen as a result of 
inadequately specified relationships. In particular, mis- 
specif ication may have arisen from inappropriate 
restrictions on the econometric model. If so, a structural 
change such as financial innovation may appear as a break­
down in the relationships under study, whereas it may be 
that the model cannot adequately take account of such 
changes due to mis-specification and omission of relevant 
variables. Perhaps a model which allows for more flexible 
lags in the adjustment process is more appropriate to the 
money demand function. Flexible lags can be allowed for in 
the general-to-specific modelling strategy, examined in the 
next section. Use of the encompassing principle (see 
earlier), that acceptance of a model is dependent on its 
ability to explain previous models, and the reason for their
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In the general-to-specific modelling strategy, the 
temporal structure of the data is allowed to play a much 
more important role than in previous partial adjustment 
models (Davidson et al 1973, Hendry and Richard, 1982, 1983, 
1987) although as mentioned earlier, there is still the 
criticism that the lags are still represented in a rather ad 
hoc manner. The general-to-specific methodology takes the 
stand-point that much of the t r a ditional* econometric 
analysis suffers from excessive pre-simplification and 
inadequate diagnostic checking (Hendry 1985). General-to- 
specific on the other hand, is characterised by intended 
initial over-parameterization combined with subsequent data- 
based simplification. Starting from the most general model 
which it seems reasonable to specify, sequential testing 
procedures are used to select a data coherent specification.
This approach is flexible in the manner in which lag 
responses adjust to changes in different independent 
variables. Typically, a general unrestricted, autoregressive 
distributed lag model (ADL) is initially specified. This set 
of models may be written in general terms as:
where a(L) is an arbitrary lag polynomial, Ln X t = X t-n 
and X = a set of explanatory variables.
a(L) X t + (12)
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Nested within this general ADL model is the error- 
correction mechanism (ECM), which modifies the partial 
adjustment model by allowing the adjustment process to be 
modelled by a dynamic reaction function, rather than 
restricting the lag structure at the outset. In the ECM 
money holders adjust balances in response to deviations 
between current and target money holdings. The ECM is of the
where a(L) is an arbitrary polynomial in the lag operator L 
and e t is the error between current and target money 
holdings (Salmon 1982 p3).
e represents:
The ECM-ADL equation thus allows for an unrestricted 
flexible lag pattern at the outset of the modelling process. 
The initial general unrestricted equation is simplified by 
eliminating insignificant variables, and by introducing 
restrictions into the equation such as differencing and 
common factor restrictions. The restrictions placed on the 
parameters are tested at each stage such that a parsimonious 
data-coherent model is estimated (Spanos 1986).
form
(13)
M - M V  V
(14)
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Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that error- 
correction mechanisms generate cointegrated series and vice 
versa. Moreover, a cointegrated error correction 
representation is not susceptible to problems of spurious 
regression (Granger and Newbold 1977). The basic approach is 
to use a two-step estimator by first carrying out a static 
levels regression, and using the residuals from this in a 
dynamic model. The estimator is shown to be consistent and 
convergence on the true parameter values tends to be faster 
than normal OLS.
It is necessary to find the order of integration of the 
separate time series under investigation i.e. how often the 
individual time series need to be differenced in order to 
become 1(0). A time series that has a finite non-zero 
spectrum is said to be 1(0) - integrated of order zero. If a 
time series has to be differenced once, it is integrated of 
order one. More generally, differencing a time series d 
times to induce 1 (0 ) reflects integration of order 1 (d).
If two time series X t and Y t are integrated of order 
1(1) then X fc and Y t will be cointegrated through a linear 
combination:
zt = (Yt - Xxt) = 1(0)
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An estimation of X  can be found through the regression 
of Y t on X t , and the error-correction mechanism is:
zt = (Yt - X xt)
The error-correction mechanism can then be used in a 
dynamic model as all variables are 1(0).
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9.4 Theoretical and Empirical considerations of the Demand 
for M4
The demand for money function may be written as:- 
M = £ (W, Y, P, r) (15)
where
W = Gross financial wealth
Y = Income
P = Price level
r = a vector of own and competing interest rates.
M = M4
Full definitions of variables and data sources are 
provided in Appendix A.
It is expected a priori that the demand for a broad 
aggregate such as M4 is likely to be influenced by 
transactions, precautionary and speculative considerations 
for liquid balances.
Some researchers have used income as a measure of 
transactions. Grice and Bennett (1981, 1984) note, however, 
that other studies utilize permanent income as an 
explanatory variable on the grounds that it is a proxy for 
wealth. There is thus some ambiguity as to the role of the 
income variable. A preferable method is to include an 
explicit wealth measure combined with income as a 
transactions variable. This provides plausible results for 
Grice/Bennett. Speculative motives may be allowed for by 
including expected capital gains to gilts in the equation 
(Spencer, 1981.[2])
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The general model was specified in terms of the real 
demand for money,
A  ( M )  = a + ± ,  (GFW).i + ^  ( M _ ) _
1=0 1=0
4 4
+ + ( R T - 1  - RS)-i
i=l l=o
4 4
+ (P)-l + (Y)-i
i=o i=o
4
+ ^  (RG)-;l + seasonal*,
i=o 
where:-
M = M4, unadjusted
GFW = Gross Financial Wealth of the non-bank private
sector.
Y = Real gross domestic product at factor cost.
P = Implicit GDP deflator.
RT = Rate of interest on three month Treasury Bills.
RG = Rate of interest on twenty year gilts.
RS = Rate of interest (net) on building society high
interest instant access accounts.
(16)
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Initially the model was estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with four lags on each variable in accordance 
with previous demand for money studies (Hendry, 1979,
Spanos, 1986). In view of the strictures of Wallis (1974) on 
the use of seasonally adjusted data, unadjusted data is here 
used throughout. The general model was reparameterized 
according to a sequential testing down procedure (see 
Cuthbertson 1985). This involves removing insignificant 
variables, differencing variables, and setting parameters 
equal to each other when data permissible. These 
restrictions are tested at each stage against the general 
model for data acceptability using F-tests.^-I
Proceeding in this manner, the following model was 
derived:-
A ( r )
= .048 + .123 (GFW)t - .126 (GFW ) t _ 3
\  /
(.0 2 1 ) (.035) (.036)
+ • 1 3 3 ^  ^ t -
(.06) (.048)
- .204 (RTX -• RS ) t - .622 A(i?)t
(.08) (.09)
+ seasonals• (17)
R 2 0.85 SER = 0.01
AR F[4,64] = 1.40 NORMALITY [2] = 3 . 4 3
RESET F[2, 6 6 ] = 0 . 2 2 ARCH F[4,60] = 0.47
HETEROSKEDASTICITY [15,52] = 0.98
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where:-
AR is the Lagrange Multiplier test for 4 t *1 order residual
autocorrelation.
ARCH is the LM test for autocorrelated squared residuals 
(Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity - Engle 
(1982)).
NORMALITY is the Jarque and Bera (1980) statistic for 
normality.
HETEROSKEDASTICITY is Whites (1984) test for 
heteroskedas ticity.
RESET is the Ramsey (1969) test for omitted variables (for 
adding two other basic variables).
SER is the standard error of the regression, 
represents the first-difference operator.
Single figures e.g. Normality[2] are degrees of freedom 
for an asymptotic chi-square distribution, double figures, 
e.g. AR, F[4,64] are degrees of freedom for F-statistics 
(Kiviet 1983). Figures in brackets under the coefficient 
estimates are standard errors. All variables except interest 
rates are in log form.
The equation consists of variables representing wealth, 
interest rates, inflation, and a lagged dependent variable. 
Although income is not explicitly included in the function, 
it is present in the form of the error correction term, M
PY
(see Hendry 1979, Salmon 1982 and Chapter Eight).
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The 'own 1 interest rate term (RT„^ - RSj.^is after 
Taylor (1987). The rate on competing assets (RTt) is entered 
lagged one period to reflect information costs or perception 
lags (Taylor points out that it is easier for a wealth- 
holder to monitor the return on his/her money than it is to 
monitor the returns on alternative assets).
The term(RT-^ - RS)thus represents the differential 
between holding money and a short term asset.
All of the estimated coefficients are significant and 
the R^ is reasonably high (0.85, against 0.76 for Taylor*s 
equation). The equation passes a wide variety of tests. The 
model tracks well (Diagram 9.1) and when the model is 
estimated up to 1981/4, the out-of-sample forecast is 
reasonable (Diagram 9.2). Although the equation has a 
tendency to over-predict, in only two quarters are the 
forecasts insignificant at a 5% level (1982 quarter two, and 
1983, quarter two). The actual and fitted values of 
quarterly growth in real M4 are shown in Diagram 9.3. The 
equation passes a Chow Test for parameter constancy over the 
period 1982/1 - 1986/4.
Incidentally, the equation also passes a test for 
residual autocorrelation, and so avoids Gordons (1984) 
criticism that demand for money equations suffer excessively 
from this problem.
Numerous authors have voiced scepticism as to the 
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"Frequently, after a certain amount of experimentation 
with different specifications and lag distributions, 
one can find satisfactory or stable estimates based on 
an ex post analysis of data, but those estimates may or 
may not tell us much about the ex ante behaviour. From 
a policy perspective, the usefulness of money demand 
estimates lies not so much in their in-sample stability 
as in their out-of-sample predictive powers. Judged in 
this latter sense virtually all money demand functions 
have exhibited a poor performance in recent years, and 
any case for their recent stability seems to be 
overstated".
(Akhtar 1983 p36)
Given these doubts, it is interesting to note the close
fit of the out-of-sample forecast of the demand for M4.
It is immediately noticeable that there is no explicit
income variable in the final equation, consistent with the
view that some balances are being used for investment
purposes rather than as transactions balances. As such,
wealth is becoming more relevant in the demand for money
function as a result of financial innovation, which reflects
the view that,
"money is also used as a store of wealth, and an 
increasing proportion of it, although perhaps slightly 
less liquid, carries its own real rate of interest.
This suggests that gross financial wealth may have an 
increasingly important role to play in determining the 
demand for money, since money is becoming a more 
attractive form of holding wealth".
(BEQB May 1987 p230) 
Thus, although the money-income relationship has not 
totally broken down, the lack of an explicit income variable 
may reflect the reduced importance of the income variable 
relative to wealth.
The increasing importance of wealth in the demand for 
money function as a result of financial innovation has also 
been emphasized by Thygesen (1986),
349
"Because of the rise in the share of monetary assets, 
even within a narrow definition of money, yielding a 
market-related return, the transactions and investment 
purposes for holding money have become less easily 
separable. This has a consequence not unfamiliar to 
economists from Cambridge: whatever measure of the 
money stock chosen, from Ml to private sector liquidity 
in a broad sense, the role of wealth has increased 
relative to that of income as a determinant of money 
demand". (p23)
The coefficients on the 'own* rate on money and on the 
inflation term are significant, implying that the effects of 
financial innovation and inflation are significant 
determinants of the demand for money (M4). The negative 
terms on the differential interest rate term and on the 
inflation variable suggest that, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the differential between interest bearing no n ­
money assets and money will reduce the demand for money, as 
will an increase in inflation. These results appear to 
confirm Taylor's observation that financial innovation is an 
important factor in demand for money equations. Taylor 
emphasizes the importance of the own rate variable and hence 
financial innovation by dropping the term from the equation 
and re-estimating the model over the same time period. The 
equation breaks down, showing, according to Taylor, the 
necessity of including financial innovation variables in the 
equation.
Dropping the interest rate term from the equation above 
also has significant detrimental effects. The drops to
0.7 and the error correction term becomes barely 
significant.
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This test of the importance of financial innovation in 
an equation for the demand for money is not, however, 
particularly stringent. If any significant variable in an 
equation is omitted it is likely that the equation will 
suffer in terms of insignificant parameters and test 
statistics. In the case of financial innovation, a more 
reliable test would be to replace the own rate (RT^ - R S ) t 
which contains interest on the new, innovatory, high 
interest access accounts with a rate of interest that has 
been unaffected by such financial innovation. A useful test 
would be to substitute the own rate used for the net rate on 
ordinary shares at building societies. This would provide a 
far more stringent test of the effect of financial 
innovation on the demand for M4. Of course, it may be argued 
that the rate of interest paid on ordinary shares has, in 
general, been higher in the 1980's due to increased 
competition with the retail banks, and that liquidity of 
these accounts has increased, both of which represent a form 
of financial innovation. It is important to know, however, 
the extent to which the specific innovation of high interest 
access accounts is responsible for the rapid growth in M4.
The previous model is used again, merely substituting 
(RT^ - RS) for (RTX - ORD) which is the differential between 
Treasury bills lagged one period and the net rate on 
ordinary accounts at building societies.
This model yielded the following:-
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A ( H )  = * 0 2 6  + - 1 1 8  (G F W )t 119(GFW)t_3
(.024) (.035) (.036)
(.067)
. 2 4 8 ( M 
\ P 
(.045)
.233 (RTj - ORD) 
(.083)
.643 A ( P ) t 
(.09)
+ seasonals. (18)





NORMALITY[2] = 4.88 
ARCH F[4,60] = 0.42
HETEROSKEDASTICITY[15,52] = 0.91
As can be seen, there is almost no change in the 
parameters of the equation when the differential between 
high-interest instant access accounts and Treasury bills is 
substituted for the interest differential between the net 
rate on ordinary shares and Treasury Bills. There is also no 
change in the test statistics. The tracking performance 
(Diagram 9.4) is almost identical. Moreover, the equation is 
stable when used for a twenty-period out-of-sample forecast. 
Interestingly, the equation still over-predicts the growth 
rate of M4 (see Diagrams 9.5 and 9.6). This suggests that it 
is not necessarily the specific financial innovation of high 
interest instant access accounts which has been responsible 




























A j i i . )  =_ _  FORECAST:p -v
355
income), as the net rate of interest on ordinary shares can 
also be used to explain the demand for M4. As mentioned 
earlier, ordinary shares have in fact become increasingly 
liquid and have paid on average, a higher rate of interest 
in the 1 9 8 0 fs than in the 1 9 7 0 fs, but are still much less 
attractive than high-interest access accounts, upon which 
most of the informed comment has placed the blame for the 
relatively fast growth of M4 (see Chapter Five).
An equation which included the differential between 
Treasury Bills and the maximum rate at banks was not 
significant, however,




.170 (RTX - Rb ) -  6lf.O A ( p )
(.07) (.05) (19)
9R = 0.82 Rfi - Maximum rate on high interest
accounts at banks.
AR F[4,64] = 1.46 N0RMALITY[2] = 2.46
RESET[2,66] = 0.33 ARCH F[4,60] = 0.56
HETEROSKEDASTICITY F[15,52] = 0.81
Although the test statistics change little, it can be 
seen that the lagged dependent variable ^ M j t - 2 has become
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insignificant, and the own rate term (RT-^ - RB), is only 
just significant. It would thus appear that the differential 
between Treasury bills and building society instant access 
accounts is a better measure of the own rate of the demand 
for M4 than is the differential between Treasury bills and 
the maximum rate on instant access accounts at banks. It may 
be that this is caused by the fact that building society 
interest rates have in general been above those of the 
retail banks in the 1980*s, and hence more accurately 
reflect the return on broad money and hence the demand for 
broad money as measured by M4.
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9.5 Financial innovation and the interest elasticity of the
demand for money
It has been suggested by some commentators (e.g.
Goodhart (1984)) that with the impact of financial
innovation and high real rates of return, it is the interest
differential between 'money' and competing assets which is
relevant for the demand for money function, rather than the
general level of interest rates. Indeed, this is the
reasoning behind using the differential between the own rate
on money and that on treasury bills in the models above,
"with the availability of market-related interest rates 
on deposits, and low spreads, the volume of deposits 
will increasingly prove an elastic function of relative 
interest rates, i.e. the spread between market rates 
and deposit rates and the spread between loan and 
deposit rates"
Goodhart (1986) p92, (Goodhart's italics).
If the hypothesis that the demand for money has become
insensitive to the general rate of interest is to be fully
tested, it will be necessary to take into account not only
the rate of return on gilts, but also any expected capital
gains on gilts. Grice and Bennett (1981) suggest four
methods of estimating capital gains on gilt holdings:
1. Direct information - survey information as to expected
interest rates and capital gains could be transformed
into time series data for econometric usage. In
practice, this would be likely to produce inaccurate
information and be extremely time consuming.
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2. Indirect information - the differential between the 
rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate may 
provide a forecast for future changes in interest 
rates. For example, if the rate of inflation is 
relatively high compared with nominal interest rates, 
capital losses on gilts would be expected. On the other 
hand, if the ex post real rate of interest is 
relatively high, capital gains may be made on gilts as 
the nominal interest rate falls. In practice, however, 
the equilibrium real rate of interest will tend to be 
determined by the rate of inflation, and may fluctuate 
in the short term.
3. It may be possible to include the ex post capital gains
to gilts as a proxy for ex ante expectations of capital 
gains. This is attempted below, using the change in the 
Financial Times index of gilt prices, although 
reservations as to the applicability of this proxy 
indicated in point (4) below should be taken into 
consideration.
4. Grice and Bennett (1981) point out that the approach in 
(3) above cannot be vindicated as ex post capital gains 
will only equal ex ante capital gains if investors have 
perfect foresight. As they do not have this capacity,
ex post capital gains are equivalent to the correct
variable measured with error. The traditional solution 
to such a problem is to search for instrumental 
variables that are correlated with the variables that 
exhibit measurement error, although not correlated with
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the measurement error or the time disturbances. Grice 
and Bennett follow Durbin*s (1954) proposal of using 
the rank of the badly measured variable as the 
instrument.
5. Alternatively, it may be possible to use economic
theory to choose the instrument of the badly measured 
variable (McCallum (1976)). This approach is also tried 
by Grice and Bennett, and by Spencer (1981) and 
Johnston (1985) with some degree of success. The basic 
rationale is that expected capital gains will be formed 
by investors in terras of the expected value of an 
equation explaining ex post capital gains. Data for 
expected capital gains can therefore legitimately be 
obtained as the estimated values from the equation 
explaining ex post capital gains. This approach is also 
attempted below.
Including the rate of return on 20 year gilts in the 
equation (but not the capital gains to gilts) produced the 
following equation:-
= 0.049 + 0.131 (GFW) t
(.034) (.037)






- 0.017 (K^.-l - R S ) t
(0.15)
- 0.043 (RG) ! 
(0.088) + seasonals ( 2 1 )
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R 2 = 0.84
AR F[4,63] = 1.36
RESET F[2,65] = 0.22
SER 0.12
N0RMALITY[2] = 4 . 4  
ARCH F [ 4 ,59] = 0.32
HETEROSKEDASTICXTY[15,51] = 2 . 4 1
The gilts term is clearly insignificant, as is the 
differential return from Treasury bills and building society 
accounts, and there is evidence of heteroskedasticity. Using 
the differential between gilts and building society accounts 
also proved insignificant.
Given that this simple attempt at modelling the effect 
of long-term interest rates in the form of the rate on gilts 
(n o t ) including capital gains failed to find any 
significant interest rate effects, option (5) above was 
attempted .
Using approach (5) above, the initial general 
specification of the gilts equation was of the form:-
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ED Interest rate on 3 month Eurodollars
TFE Total Final Expenditure




Implicit consumers deflator 
Yield on 2%% Consols
CG
r
Capital Gains on gilts 
short rate
The idea is to attempt to specify a model that explains 
ex post capital gains to gilts. Data from this model can 
then be used as expected capital gains on gilts in the 
demand for money equation. This is dependent of course, on 
the assumption that expected capital gains are formed by 
investors in terms of the expected value of this equation 
which explains ex post capital gains.
The variables were chosen largely as a result of the 
work of Spencer (1981) on the demand for gilts.
The final equation was of the form:-
0.43 (EDl4
(0.073)
- 0.66 ( TFE
V P(0.2)
R2 = 0.55
(R + CG + r) = - 0.9 (Ed)_^ +
(0.21)
(  - 0.62 (Plj + 0.14 (Pl2
(0.3) (0.02)




Surprisingly, utilising the total return to gilts (i.e. 
interest yield and capital gains) in the form of the data 
provided by the expected capital gains equation also proved 
to be insignificant in the demand for broad money equation:-
a ( M \  = -0.14V p  1 (0.18) + 0.055 (GFW)t - 0.042 (GFW ) t - 3
(0.052) (0.052)
+ 0.005 A ( M ) t - 2  “ 0*59
(0.12) (0.1)
+ 0.2 (RT_.-£ - R S ) t + 0.47 (CG ) t _ 1
(0.24) (0.51)
R 2 - 0.89 (24)
AR F[4,63] 1.22 N0RMALITY[2] 3.6
RESET F[2,65] - 0.35 ARCH F[4,59] = 0.31
HETEROSKEDASTICITY[15,51] = 2 . 5 5
The differential return between gilts and building 
society interest rates (CGt_^ - R S ) t was also insignificant.
This result is surprising as it contradicts that of 
Grice and Bennett (1981), Spencer and Johnston (1985), all 
of whom find the total return on gilts to be an important 
factor in the demand for money. It is feasible of course,
that financial innovation has made the demand for money
completely inelastic with respect to a long rate of 
interest, both in terms of a differential return, and the 
general level of return on gilts.
Alternatively, there may be mis-specification in the 
above equation explaining the expected capital gains to
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gilts. Concern must be expressed as to the nature of this 
equation, particularly in view of the possibility of omitted 
v ariables•
Spencer (1981) and Johnston (1985) include in their 
capital gains equations a measure of the structural balance 
of payments consisting of the current account, and non- 
market clearing capital flows. The data used was from 
Treasury estimates, which are unfortunately not available. 
The capital gains equation may suffer from omitted
ovariables, which seems possible given the low R . The
evidence as to the hypothesis that the demand for money has
become less sensitive to the general rate of long interest
rates is therefore inconclusive, although does not appear to
support the strong assertions of Akhtar,
"Over the past few years, the demand for money, 
especially at the broader level, has become less 
sensitive to the general level of interest rates. The 
share of financial instruments with market-related 
rates in monetary aggregates has risen over time, and 
the trend is continuing. The yield or return on those 
instruments tends to rise or fall with the rise or fall 
in market rates, leaving the differential unchanged. 
Consequently, there is no incentive to shift into or 
out of instruments the return on which moves in line 
with the general level of interest rates. This view is 
fairly broadly accepted, although at this stage there 
is very little evidence on the quantitative 
significance of the shift in interest elasticity of 
money demand''.
(Akhtar p37 (underlining added)1983) 
It is also of interest to test the effect of levels of 
interest rates on the demand for money function, to 
ascertain the relative importance of interest differentials 
vis-a-vis interest rate levels. Separating the differential 
term (RT_^ - R S ) t from equation (1) to see if the levels of
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interest rates are significant yielded similar results as 
earlier:-
^  / M J  = .038 + .143 (GFW)t - .145 (GFW ) t _ 3
(.075) (.048) (.051)








ARCH F[4.59] = 0.51
+ seasonals 
AR F[4,63] = 1.06
RESET F[2,65] = 0.21 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY F[18,48] = 0.87 
R 2 = 0.85 SER = 0.01
It is interesting to note however, what happens when 
this equation is used for a twenty-period out-of-sample 
forecast.
The equation yielded the following:-
( f ) .038 + .143 (GFW)t
(.075) • (.048)




•2 4 7 (fe)t-l
(.055)









AR F[4,43] = 0.60
SER = 0.009
N0RMALITY[2] = 2.48 
ARCH F[4,39] = 0.63
HETEROSKEDASTICITY F[18.28] = 0.43
It is immediately noticeable that the own 'level1 rate of 
interest is insignificant when used for a twenty- period 
out-of-sample forecast. Furthermore the competing rate of 
interest (RT-^ ) is barely significant. This may be 
interpreted as an indication of the reduced importance of 
'levels' of interest rates as compared to that of 
differentials.
Chapter Seven delineated the hypothesis that financial 
innovation has led to a decrease in the interest elasticity 
of the differential between the own rate on money and 
competing rates in the demand for broad money function. This 
hypothesis was tested by successively re-estimating equation 
(17) above over different sub-sample periods, from 1967 
quarter three to 1977 quarter four, and then adding on an 
extra year each estimation up to 1986 quarter four. The 
equations and test statistics are shown in Table [1] and the 
long run interest elasticities of the differential in Table
An examination of the coefficients on the interest 
differentials (RT_^ - RS)t shows that it has halved from 
1977 quarter 4 to 1986 quarter 4. It would thus appear that 
the interest differential between an interest bearing asset 
(Treasury bills) and interest bearing money (building 




Conscanc (GFW)t (GFW)t_3 (w)“l H1
H -RS)t A(P)t
1967/31986/4 Co + .048 (.021) + .123 (.035) - .126 (.036) + .133 (.067) + .248 .045 - .204 (.08)
- .622 (.09)
1967/31985/4 CO + .054 (.023) + .132 (.035) - .135 (.036) + .145 (.067) + .233 (.046) - .199 (.08)
- .622 (.092)
1967/31984/4 Co + .071 (.029) + .153 (.041) - .158 (.043) + .142 (.069) + .236 (.047) - .177 (.084)
- .626 (.094)
1967/3 198 /4 CO + .070 (.036) + .152 (.045) - .156 (.048) + .145 (.071) + .241 (.050) - .183 (.093)
- .622 (.098)
1967/31982/4 Co + .047 (.043) + .121 (.049) - .123 (.052) + .141 (.071) + .262 (.052) - .180 (.097) - .621 (.098)
1967/31981/4 CO + .014 (.043) + .141 (.047) - .140 (.049) + .196 (.074) + .249 (.051) - .212 (.094) - .618 (.100)
1967/31980/4 CO + .036 (.047) + .150 (.044) - .151 (.047) + .162 (.071) + .230 (.051) - .255 (.09) - .599 (.10)
1967/31978/4 CO + .049 (.055) + .154 (.053) - .157 (.055) + .175 (.076) + .202 (.062) - .327(.no) - .608 (.12)
1967/31977/4 Co + .036 (.096) + .105 (.071) - .099 (.077) + .188 (.081) + .197 (.064) - .419 (.150) - .630 (.118)
NOTES: 1. The 9R* ranged from 0.8 Co 0. 85
Demand for M4 Equations
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determinant of the demand for money over time. Within these 
figures however, it should be noted that the size of the 
coefficient reached a low in 1982/4 of -0.180, and grew 
marginally in each year from 1982/4 to 1986/4 to reach - 
0.204.
The interest elasticity Table [2] fell from -2.13 for 
the period 1967/3 to 1977/4 to a low of-0.71 for the period 
1967/3 to 1983/4. The interest elasticity then appears to 
have levelled off and, indeed, to rise marginally. Clearly 
this does support the hypothesis that the interest 
elasticity of the differential has become less elastic over 
time. A possible explanation of this finding is that as the 
interest differential has tended to fall steadily over time 
(see Chapter Four), the attractions of shifting out of money 
into interest earning assets has consequently become less 
attractive. In other words, the interest rate on money has 
closely followed other general rates of interest (as shown 
in Chapter Four), such that the interest differential is 
both small and changes only infrequently.
The opportunity cost of holding money balances when 
general interest rates rise is thus likely to be minimal, 
and the (largely unchanged) differential will have little 
effect on the demand for money. Given that money has tended 
to become increasingly market-related over time, there has 
been a reduction of the interest-sensitivity of the demand 
for money with respect to interest differentials.
In monetary control terms, this appears to show that 




1967/3 CO 1986/4 -0.82
1967/3 to 1985/4 -0.85
1967/3 Co 1984/4 -0.75
1967/3 to 1983/4 -0.71
1967/3 to 1982/4 -0 . 6 8
1967/3 to 1981/4 -0.85
1967/3 to 1980/4 -1.11
1967/3 to 1979/4 -1.63
1967/3 to 1978/4 -1.62
1967/3 to 1977/4 -2.13
Interest Elasticity of the Demand for M4.
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supply by inducing money holders to switch into alternative
interest bearing assets has become weaker. Increasing short
term interest rates will have less effect in the 1980's on
the interest differential between money and short rates than
in the 1970's, largely, it is argued, due to the influence
of high interest instant access accounts.
The warnings of Cooley and LeRoy should perhaps be
stated here,
"The data are such that a modestly energetic 
specification search will give back almost whatever 
interest elasticity one wishes to extract, particularly 
if more than one interest rate is included and if 
specification search involves extensive tinkering with 
dynamic e f f e c t s ,...The preponderance of empirical 
studies of the demand for money which show significant 
negative interest elasticities reflect the acknowledged 
prior beliefs of the researcher and not the information 
content of the data".
(1981, p836)
Given that the original model was specified with due 
regard to stability and robust testing, and that the initial 
focus was on the importance of financial innovation to the 
demand for money, estimating the (unchanged) model over 
successive time periods appears justified. No 'experiments' 
have been made with different model formulations to bring 
out any particular elasticity that may accord with prior 
beliefs.
Although significant interest rate effects have been 
found in the standard ECM model above it is recognised that 
for an error-correction mechanism to exist the variables in 
the model must cointegrate (Granger and Weiss 1983, Engle 
and Granger 1987). Conversely, if the variables in an 
equation are cointegrated then there is always an ECM 
formulation of that model. Table 3 below shows the number of
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Table 3
Testing the Individual time series for integration
LEVELS 1(0) FIRST SECOND
DIFFERENCE 1(1) DIFFERENCE 1(2) 
DF ADF DF ADF DF A'DF
RS -1.806 -1.809 -7.747 -3.843
Y -8.108 -3.079 -15.0 -7.989
P -1.352 -1.628 -2.369 -1.143 -16.271 -4.091
ORD -1.829 -1.929 -6.496 -4.155
G -2.019 -1.953 -7.168 -4.215
RT -2.131 -2.251 -7.365 -4.385
M4 0.754 -0.374 -2.816 0.1673 -19.755 -5.66
GFW 3.414 1.649 -2.674 -0.480 -13.353 -6.173
All variables except interest rates are in log form. 
The DF and ADF tests are t-tests for integration that 
require a significant and negative finding (Dickey and 
Fuller 1979).
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times the individual time series need differencing in order 
to induce stationarity, and hence the order of integration.
It appears that the interest rate terms and income are 
all 1(1), and M4, prices and gross financial wealth are all 
1(2). This accords closely with the results of Hall et al 
(1989), who also note that money and prices are 1(2) and 
combine to be 1 (1 ) so that real money will cointegrate with 
the other variables.
An OLS regression of the demand for M4 was run on the 
levels of each variable in order to find a stationary linear 
combination of the individual time series (see Hall et al 
1989):




R 2 = 0.98
DCCC = 0 prior to 1971 Q4 and 1 thereafter.
The above variables clearly do not provide a 
cointegrating vector as the ADF statistic is below the 
critical value at a five per cent level. Similar problems 
occurred when using the maximum retail rate at banks. 
Dropping the interest rate term yielded the following:
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0.02 P + 0.87 /GFWx + 0.064 DCCC
PY '
DF = - 6 . 6 6 8
ADF = -3.224
R 2 = 0.975
Dropping the interest rate terms has thus provided a 
plausible cointegrating equation. This is a somewhat surprising 
result as earlier researchers have found significant interest 
rate effects. It does, however, corroborate the work of Hall et 
al (1989) who also found that interest rates were not 
significant in a cointegrating model of M4. To see if interest 
rates were perhaps important over earlier periods the equation 
was estimated over sub-periods 1969 Q1 to 1980 Q4 and 1969 Q1 
to 1975 Q4, but interest rates were still not found to be 
significant variables.
The residuals from the above equation were included as the 
ECM in a final dynamic cointegrating regression which was 
derived using the general-to-specific modelling strategy:
y\ ,M* = constant + 0.244 A / M v  - 0.99 A ( P )
(.086) P t-2 (0.13)
+ 0.043 (Z]
(0 .0 2 1 ) t- 1
R 2 = 0.633
SER = 0.015
ARCH 1 = 0.983
LM (8 ) = 11.93
LM (4) = 10.69
LM (2) = 0.99
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LM(4) is a test for fourth order serial correlation that is 
valid with a lagged dependent variable.
ARCH(l) tests for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedas ticity.
RESET is Ramsey*s (1974) test for omitted variables.
(z) t = Residuals
The effects of interest rates at this dynamic stage were 
again tested, but still found to be insignificant. The results
of this cointegration model thus tend to conflict with the 
standard ECM model estimated earlier. There is therefore 
considerable doubt as to the validity of the interest 
elasticities of the demand for M4 equation reported earlier, 
and may reflect problems of measuring interest elasticities 
during a period of financial innovation.
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9.6 Conclusion
The aim of this Chapter has been an attempt to evaluate 
the effect of the abolition of the building societies’ 
recommended rate system and financial innovation on the
demand for money function for M4. Sections 9.1 to 9.4
analysed the main econometric modelling strategies employed 
in previous research and provided a critique of the 
underlying methodologies adopted. Having examined the main 
strategies, both an error-correction autoregressive 
distributed lag model and a cointegrating equation were 
chosen to compliment the theoretical specification of the 
demand for broad money which was established with regard to
the likely relevant variables in Chapter Eight. A sequential
testing-down procedure was used as in the general-to- 
specific modelling process to arrive at a data coherent 
stable final equation, which was then used to explore 
earlier stated hypotheses.
The final reduced form error correction equation 
contains wealth, interest rate, inflation and income 
variables. Financial innovation is captured through the use 
of employing interest rates on high interest easy access 
accounts at building societies. The equation passes a number 
of tests, including the Chow test for parameter stability, 
and forecasts well in an out-of-sample test.
The fact that income is only included in the form of 
the error correction term rather than as a distinct single 
variable may be interpreted as the reduced importance of 
income relative to wealth in the non-bank private sectors' 
demand for money. This may be rationalised as the result of
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money increasingly bearing interest, and increasingly being
used as a store of wealth.
The importance of high interest easy access accounts to 
the overall stability of the equation is important (when 
this variable is dropped the equation appears unstable), but 
similar results can be obtained by switching this variable 
with the rate on ordinary shares at building societies. This 
may also be a reflection of financial innovation, with 
ordinary shares becoming increasingly liquid and paying a 
higher real rate of interest in the 1980's. Despite the
evidence of earlier research, the total return on gilts (ie. 
including expected capital gains) was insignificant in the 
equation, both on its own and as a differential to building 
society rates. This may be explained by financial innovation 
making the demand for money completely inelastic with 
respect to long rates of interest, both in terms of the 
general level of return on gilts and a differential return, 
although mis-specification of the gilts equation cannot be 
ruled out.
The equation was also unsatisfactory when the interest 
differential between Treasury bills and building society 
high interest easy access accounts was swapped for the 
levels of these terms, in the form of insignificant 
variables when used for forecasting. This may be an
indication that 'levels' of interest rates have reduced in 
importance in the demand for money function as compared to 
interest rate differentials.
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An examination of the effects of financial innovation 
upon the interest elasticity of the differential between the 
own rate on money and competing rates found that the demand 
for money has become less sensitive over time to changes in 
the differential. This contradicts the assertions of some 
commentators, but may be explained by the fall in the 
average size of the interest differential over time, hence 
reducing the incentive of shifting out of (interest earning) 
money into other interest earning assets. Thus, the monetary 
authorities' ability to induce a switch out of money 
balances into alternative interest bearing assets appears to 
have been reduced. Increasing short-term interest rates will 
have little effect on the interest differential between 
money and other assets. Thus, the error correction model 
suggests that controlling the money supply from the demand 
side (see Chapter Seven) is unlikely to be effective. When 
operating from the demand side, it is unlikely that interest 
rate differentials will be substantially changed, and 
unlikely that the level of broad money holdings will be 
reduced (again abstracting from supply-side considerations), 
when a rise in interest rates is engineered by the monetary 
authorities. The error-correction model implies that 
financial innovation has led to a relatively stable pool of 
balances at banks and building societies that have become 
increasingly de-sensitized to interest differentials. In TS- 
LM terms, the LM curve has become progressively steeper, 
with reduced interest elasticity of money demand.
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Given the results of the cointegrating demand for money 
equation however, the above conclusions cannot be held. 
Interest rates were not found to be significant variables in 
the equation over the period 1969 quarter one to 1986 
quarter four, or in any sub-periods. A tentative rationale 
is that the effects of interest rates (if any) on the demand 
for money may be difficult to measure during a period of 
financial liberalization and innovation.
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NOTES
[1] For general critiques of the econometricians approach 
to the estimation of the demand for money see Learner 
(1978, 1983), Sims (1980), Cooley and LeRoy (1981), 
Learner and Leonard (1983), McAcleer et al (1985).
[2] That capital gains or losses may occur can be explained 
by the activities of the Bank of England in the gilts 
market (Fisher 1973). Gilts markets are not efficient, 
it is argued, because of the authorities control of 
short rates, and because of the policy of 'leaning into 
the w i n d 1 (Grice and Bennett (1984)). It is possible 
therefore, that prices may at times not fully reflect 
expected capital gains or losses to gilts as the prices 
may not be those which an unhindered market would 
normally establish.
[3] Mizon suggests a test to evaluate whether or not the 
equation can be accepted as a specialization of its 
corresponding general form:-
F Ii", T-K] = ISSEr - SStu ^
\ s s F 3 ) \
where:-
RSSE = residual sums of squares in the restricted
equation.
SS-tu = residual sums of squares in the unrestricted 
equation.
T Number of observations
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V = Number of restrictions




ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION - THE CONSUMERS EXPENDITURE FUNCTION
AND THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT
10.0 Introduction
The emphasis of Chapter Ten is on the evaluation of 
earlier stated hypotheses with regard to the consumers* 
expenditure function and the demand for credit. In Section
1 0 . 1  error correction and cointegrating models of consumers* 
expenditure are developed and estimated in order to test the 
hypothesis that the ending of the cartel and a greater 
importance of the 'price' of mortgages as opposed to 
mortgage rationing has increased the interest elasticity of 
expenditure. An increase in the interest elasticity of 
expenditure is likely to increase the ability of the 
monetary authorities to control the growth of the money 
supply, other things being equal.
In Section 10.2 a model of the demand for mortgages is 
estimated and used to create a proxy for mortgage rationing. 
This is then used as a variable in an error correction model 
of total debt of the personal sector which is developed and 
estimated in Section 10.3. This model is used to evaluate 
and quantify the hypothesis that the abolition of the 
building societies' cartel produced substantial stock 
effects on personal sector demand for credit. If this is so, 
then it is likely that the implementation of monetary 
control may have been problematic for a finite period of 
time.
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10.1 The Interest Elasticity of Consumers' Expenditure
It was recognised in Chapter Seven that the
transmission mechanism of monetary control may work through
the effects of interest rates on consumers’ expenditure.
Specifically, the effects of increased interest rates on
mortgage holders' expenditure may be a strong form of
monetary control,
"Future changes in the rate of credit growth will be 
closely related to the cost of funds, ie. the mortgage 
interest rate. If the rate increase the demand for, and 
growth of, mortgage funds will decline and consumer 
spending will be dampened. Similarly, a fall in rates 
will boost loan demand, lead to more rapid growth in 
credit and stimulate expenditure".
(Turnbull, 1984 p6) 
The hypothesis to be tested in this section is that the 
greater influence and fluidity of the price of mortgages 
after the abolition of the cartel and increased mortgage 
debt of the personal sector as a result of credit 
liberalization has increased the interest elasticity of 
consumers' expenditure. In other words, greater personal 
sector gearing is likely to have increased the sensitivity
iof consumers spending with respect to flexible mortgage 
interest rates. A rise in the interest elasticity of
iconsumers expenditure would represent an increase in the 
efficacy of monetary control, all other things equal.
Given the earlier conjectures as to the importance of 
the mortgage market to consumers' expenditure, it has been 
decided to model consumers' expenditure on durable goods 
rather than non-durables. Previous researchers into durables 
expenditure (see, inter alia, Davidson et al (1978), Hendry 
(1983), Davis (1984), Patterson et al (1987) and Dicks
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(1988)) typically estimate durables functions as:
(CD) = f (Y, ML, NLA, RMD) + dummy variables.
where
CD = Consumers* Expenditure on Durables (real)
Y = Real Personal Disposable Income OR Real Household
Disposable Income.
ML = Flow of Mortgage Lending.
NLA = Real Net Liquid Assets of the Personal Sector.
RMD = Minimum Deposit Rate on Durables.
Additionally, Dicks (1988) and Cuthbertson (1980), are, 
to the author*s knowledge, the only published models of 
durables expenditure which include an interest rate term 
(clearing banks* base rate minus the annual inflation rate 
of consumer prices).
The general model estimated here was of the form:-
4. 4
(CD) = constant + (CD) + (RPDI)i=o i=o
4 4 4
+ i < ( M L )  -i (NLA) ^  (RM ) ^
i=o i=o i=o
4
+ ^  (M R A T ) + (D731) + (D732) + (D764) 
i=o
+ (D792) + (D793)
Note that there are a number of innovations in this 
equation compared with previous researchers* models of 
consumers* durables expenditure.
Specifically, the interest rate on building society 
mortgages (RM ) is included, in the expectation that the
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cost of mortgages is likely to be a significant determinant 
of consumers' expenditure. Similarly, the (MRAT) term which 
is Meens1 (1985) measure of mortgage rationing is included 
on the grounds that the liberalization of the mortgage 
market may have affected consumers' spending on durable 
goods. The dummy variables are for the budgets of 1973 and 
1979 which affected expenditure through indirect tax changes 
(ie. some expenditure was brought forward to avoid tax 
changes - Dicks (1988)) and are standard in models of 
consumers expenditure (Full data definitions and sources are 
provided in Appendix A).
Testing down from the initial general specification 
however, it was found that neither (RM ) nor (MRAT) were 
significant in the durables equation. As an alternative 
interest rate variable, the base rate of clearing banks was 
included (RCB):-
(CD) = -2.6 + 0.45 (CD) |.o + 1.04 (RPDI)^ 1
(1.4) (0.1) (0.48)
- 0.11 (ML) + 0.68 (NLA)
(0.06) (0.18) - 0.33 (RCB)(0.05)
+ 0.09(D731) + 0.05(D732)
(0.08) (0.09) + 0.068(D764)(0.08)




AR F [4,44] = 4.45
RESET [1,47] = 0.54
SER = 0.08
NORMALITY [2] = 9.74 
ARCH F [4,40] = 0.13
HETEROSKEDASTICITY [15,32] = 0.83 
All variables are in logarithms.
All of the variables apart from some of the dummies are 
significant. The model does not track well (Diagram 10.1) 
and there are some problems of Normality and Autocorrelation 
(Dicks (1988) also found this to be the case).
The interest elasticity of consumers' expenditure on 
durables has risen from -0.45 in 1977 quarter four to -0.51 
in 1987 quarter two. It is also noticeable that the interest 
rate term is insignificant prior to 1980, suggesting that 
interest rates have recently become an important determinant 
of consumers' expenditure (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). This would 
tend to suggest that the effects of interest rates on 
expenditure have become marginally more powerful over time.
It is noticeable, however, that these elasticities are 
relatively 'low' and do not imply an especially strong 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
To test the applicability of the consumers' expenditure 
model derived above a cointegrating equation was developed 
using the Engle-Granger two step procedure. Table 10.3 below 
shows the order of integration of the individual time 
series. Consumers' expenditure, interest rates and income 
are all 1(1), and prices, net liquid assets and the flow of 
mortgage lending are also l(l) (although they are very close 
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Interest Elasticity of Consumers E x p e n d i t u r e ^ ^
(1) Measured as the coefficient on the interest rate
divided by one minus the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable.
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LEVELS 1(0) FIRST SECOND
DIFFERENCE 1(1) DIFFERENCE 1(2)
DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF
-1.34 -0.62 -15.95 -4.17
2.15 -1.04 - 5.19 -3.31 -16.35 -5.13
3.71 2.03 -6.84 -3.28 -14.6 -5.42
-2.33 -3.16 -8.13 -5.17
-1.93 -1.76 -6.38 -4.19
-8 . 1 1 -3.08 -15.0 -7.98
1.79 1.24 -7.12 -3.19 -12.7 -6.14
Testing the individual time series for integration 
All variables except interest rates are in log form.
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It proved relatively easy to find a cointegrating equation 
of the levels of the individual time series:
(CD) = 0.25 (Y) + 0.828 (ML) - 0.789 (P)
DF = -6.47
ADF = -3.62
R 2 = 0.7
The residuals from this equation were used as the error 
correction mechanism in a dynamic model which was derived using
general to specific modelling:
(CD) = - 0.521 - 0.118 (RM) + 1.08 (CD ) t _ 2 - 0-69 (Z)t_2
(0.319) (0.056) (0.04) (0.10)
R 2 = 0.9
SER = 0.09
ARCH = 0.0007
LM 8 = 11.93
LM4 = 3.5
LM2 = 3.03
In contrast to the earlier error correction model, it was 
found that the interest rate on building society mortgages was 
significant, but that the Clearing Banks* base rate was not. 
Interestingly, the dummy variables used earlier were also not 
significant, nor was the proxy for mortgage rationing.
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The equation passes a variety of tests. In particular, 
diagrams 10.4 and 10.5 showing the CUSUMSQ statistic and the 
one period ahead Chow test suggest that the equation is stable 
(although there is some evidence of instability in 1985 quarter 
2).
Table 10.4
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Dynamic Cointegrating Consumer Durables Equations
393
Table 10.5 shows that the interest elasticity of 
consumers' expenditure fell from -1.5 in the sub-period to 1978 
to -0.725 in the period to 1981, and then rose from -0.86 to 
stabilise around -1.1 to -1.3 over 1983 and 1987. These 
elasticities are approximately twice the size of those reported 
earlier, but are in the range reported by Dicks (1988). It is 
interesting to note that the elasticities reported from this 
dynamic cointegrating equation follow the same pattern as those 
of the standard error correction model, in terms of a fall in 
elasticity from 1978 to 1981, and an increase thereafter with 













The Interest Elasticity of Consumers' Expenditure 
(measured as the coefficient on the interest rate divided by 
one minus the lagged dependent variable).
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10.2 A Proxy for Credit Liberalization
This section attempts to update Meen's (1985) figures 
for mortgage rationing. Values for mortgage rationing are 
estimated for three purposes; firstly, a variable measuring 
mortgage rationing is likely a priori to be a significant 
determinant of the debt of the personal sector, which is 
estimated in section 10.2. Secondly, this variable can be 
used as a proxy for credit liberalisation to the personal 
sector, along the lines of Johnston (1985) (see Chapter 
Eight), such that it may be possible to quantify the effects 
of freeing up of credit markets in the 1980*s. Finally, it 
is feasible that the mortgage rationing variable might be of 
relevance to consumers* expenditure.
Meen (1985) provides a detailed critique of previous 
research into models of mortgage advances. The majority of 
studies include some form of variable to measure house 
prices, personal sector income, and mortgage interest rates.
Initially, the mortgage demand equation was specified 
in the following general form:-
4
/\ (M) =  constant + (RM)_^
i=o
4 4+ ^ A ( M ) . i  + ^  (PH).ii=o i=o




M = stock of building society mortgages outstanding.
RM = Building society mortgage interest rate (net of 
tax).
PH = Average house prices at mortgage completion stage.
Y = Personal disposable income.
Full data definitions and sources are included in Appendix 
A.
The variables chosen for the general specification 
accord closely with those of Andetson and Hendry (1984) and 
Meen (1985). That is, the demand for building society 
mortgages is expected to be a function of the interest rate 
on mortgages, average house prices, and income.
Testing down in the usual manner, the following 
equation was arrived at:
A  (M) = 0.004
(0.003)
+ 0 . 7 1 A ( M ) t-1 + 0.05 A ( P H )
( o l )  (0.024)
+ 0 . 0 5 A ( Y ) t_^ + seasonals(0.02)
396
R 2 = 0.75 SER = 0.05
AR F[5,64] = 2.23 NORMALITY[2] = 0.38
RESET F[1.68] = 0.96 ARCH [4,60] = 0.47
HETEROSKEDASTICITY F [13,55] = 1.88
Definitions of the test statistics are on page 360, 
Chapter Nine.
All variables except interest rates are in logs. The 
data period was 1968 quarter three to 1987 quarter four.
The equation passes the test statistics, and all of the 
variables are significant. Demand for Building Society 
mortgages is dependent upon average house prices and income, 
and mortgage interest rates. Diagram 10.1 shows that the 
model has a good fit, and forecasts relatively well in a 
twenty period out-of-sample forecast (Diagrams 10.2 and 
10.3).
Excess mortgage demand (MRAT) can be measured as:-
( M t - M s ) * 100
t
where M s us the actual change in building society mortgage 
t
supply. The updated figures for M e e n fs (1985) MRAT 
calculations are shown in diagram 10.4. The change from a 
situation of excess mortgage demand in the 1970*s to one of 
excess mortgage supply in the 1980*s can be clearly seen, 
with specific reductions in mortgage rationing over the 
periods 1973-1975 (after the removal of direct portfolio 
controls and the increase in mortgage supply as analysed in 
Chapter Three) and again in 1979-1988, when excess mortgage
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supply emerged for the first time with the abandoning of the 
corset, the break-up of the building societies cartel, and 
greater competition in the mortgage market (as examined in 
Chapter Four).
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10.3 Specification of the Personal Sector demand for credit 
The personal sector's demand for credit is expected to 
be a function of interest rates, wealth, income, inflation 
and a proxy for mortgage rationing (see Johnston 1985).
The specification of the preliminary general equation 
to be reparameterized was as follows:-
4
/\ |TDj = constant + ^  /\ ^ TDj
4 4




4 .+ ^  (5) -i1 = 0  \P/ 4 .+ /NFW]i=o \ P J
4 4
+ -i + (MRAT)i=o i=o




TD = Total debt of the Personal Sector
RCB = Clearing banks* base rate
RM = Building Society mortgage interest rate (net of
tax) •
Y = Personal Disposable Income
NFW = Net Financial Wealth of the Personal Sector
P = Consumers Expenditure Deflator
MRAT = Mortgage rationing.
DC1, DC2 and DC3 are dummy variables after Johnston (1985) 
to model the corset restrictions.
DC1 = 1 in 1974 Quarter four - 1975 Quarter One
DC2 = 1 in 1976 Quarter four - 1977 Quarter Two
DC3 = 1 in 1978 Quarter four - 1980 Quarter Two
DCCC = Dummy for competition and credit control: 1 after
1971 Q3.
Sample
Period= 1969 Quarter four to 1987 Quarter four.
The final equation represents elements of both the 
demand the supply of debt to the personal sector:-
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0.91 - 0.31Zi/TD)t-1 - 0.36 (RCB)
(0.22) ( 0 . 1 2 ) \ P /  (0.15)
0.006 (MRAT) - 0.009 (DC1) - 0.009 (DC2) 
(0 .0 0 2 ) (0.008) (0.007)
+ 0.013 (DC3) +
(0.006)
0.78
0.072 (DCCC) + seasonals 
(0.014)
SER 0.13
AR F[5,51] = 2.40
RESET F[1.55] = 1.24
NORMALITY = 18.42 
ARCH [4.51] = 1.29
HETEROSKEDASTICITY = f[13,55] = 1.88
The equation has a good fit (Diagram 10.10) and a 
reasonable forecasting performance (Diagrams 10.11 and 10.12) 
although the model does have a tendency to o v er-pre dict•
Total debt of the personal sector is explained by real 
personal disposable income, inflation, clearing banks* base 
rate, and a variable (MRAT) chat measures mortgage 
rationing. These variables all enter negatively, as would be 
expected a priori. The negative inflation term suggests that 
inflation reduces the real level of personal debt, whilst 
the negative mortgage rationing variable suggests that the 
greater is the difference between mortgage demand and 
mortgage supply, the less is the stock of personal sector 
total debt.
The equation also depends positively upon the interest 
rate on building society mortgages (net of tax) which is an 
unexpected result, and casts some doubt on the role of 
interest reates in the demand for credit.
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The. equation was used to quantify the stock effects of 
the abolition of the cartel and freer availability of 
credit.
Two simulations were carried out over the period 1980 
quarter three to 1987 quarter two, one with the variable for 
mortgage rationing set according to the estimates above 
(MRAT) and the second with MRAT set at a level that reflects 
the excess demand situation. This level is taken to be the 
average level of excess mortgage demand calculated over the 
period 1978-1980.
The difference between the first simulation (MRAT) in 
Table 10.6 which attempts to measure the change in behaviour 
towards mortgage rationing, and the second simulation 
(MRATC) which assumes no change in excess demand for 
mortgages in the 1980's provides an estimate of the effects 
of credit liberalization. The percentage difference between 
MRAT and MRATC shows a trend increase over the period 1980 
quarter four to 1987 quarter two. It appears to indicate 
that credit liberalization was responsible for an increase 
of, on average, an additional 4.2% per quarter to total 
personal sector debt over the period 1980 quarter four to 
1982 quarter four, and an average of an additional 10'% per 
quarter over 1983 quarter one to 1987 quarter two. However, 
the MRAT model over-predicts after 1983 quarter one which 
would imply that actual levels of personal sector debt are 
somewhat below what the personal sector desires (according 
to the MRAT equation) after this period. This could be 





1980 4 8 6 . 1 84.1
1981 1 89.3 88.9
2 93.7 92.5
3 97.6 98.7
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Actual and Simulated Values of Personal Sector 
Total Debt (£billion)
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lending in 1981 and 1982 there was a significant redaction 
in 1983 and 1984, particularly of mortgage lending. This may 
have occurred for three main reasons. Drayson (1985) 
suggests that with the fast increase in gross lending in 
1981 and 1982, net lending after this period would tend to 
fall as the result of repayments of principal. Also, the 
initial rapid increase in mortgage lending represented a 
once-for-all portfolio re-adjustment by the banking system 
towards an (unspecified) market share. Finally, as the banks 
became increasingly uncompetitive in the retail deposit 
market, mortgage lending was funded to a greater extent from 
wholesale money. The banks may have been unwilling to fund 
long-term mortgages with essentially short-term wholesale 
liabilities on any significant scale.
An attempt was made to justify the above results from 
the standard error-correction model by using a cointegration 




LEVELS I (0) DIFFERENCE I (1 ) DIFFERENCE I (2 )
DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF
TD 2.993 0.419 -4.81 -3.381 -11.45 -3.82
Y -1.468 -0.543 -13.122 -3.14 -21.45 -5.85
MRAT-1.643 -1.843 -3.759 -1.826 -11.013 -4.02
P 1.79 1.24 -7.12 -3.2 -12.7 -6.14
RM -2.19 -2.51 -8.60 -4.37 - -
Order of Integration of the Individual Time Series
All variables except interest rates in log form.
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The interest rate on mortgages is clearly 1(1), and 
total debt of the personal sector, income and prices are 
also 1 (1 ), although they are close to the test statistics 
for 1(2). The mortgage rationing proxy MRAT is definitely 
1 (2 ), which means that it will not cointegrate with the 
other 1 (1 ) variables.
Reported below are some results for the first stage of 
the Engle-Granger two step procedure in which an attempt was 
made to find a cointegrating equation in levels terms.
Table 10.8
Y 0.918 0.99 1.25 1 . 0 2 1.26 0.95 —
RM -0 . 0 2 2 -0 . 0 2 2 -0.015 - -0.015 - - 0 . 0 1 2
P -1.36 -0.236 - -0.16 - -0.31 - 0 . 2 1
DCCC -0.23 - - - -0.03 -0.233 -0.04
DF -3.61 -2.17 0.093 -0.474 0.095 - 2 . 0 1 - 2 . 1 1
ADF -1.78 -1.16 -1.215 -0.613 -1.3 -1.25 -1.7
Cointegration Levels Equations
As can be seen from the DF and ADF test statistics, it 
was not possible to find a cointegrating levels equation 
given the variables used in the error-correction model 
earlier. Neither the DC variables for the corset 
restrictions nor a variable for average house prices 
improved the results. As a separate check on the order of 
integration of the individual time series and whether the
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variable for mortgage rationing would provide a suitable 
cointegrating equation, MRAT was indicated, but did not 
enhance the DF and ADF statistics.
Given that it was not possible to find a cointegrating 
interpretation of the earlier error-correction mode, then 




An attempt has been made in this Chapter to evaluate 
earlier stated hypotheses with regard to the consumers' 
expenditure function on durables and the demand for credit.
A model of consumers' expenditure on durables was developed 
with income, interest rate, holdings of net liquid assets 
and mortgage lending variables. It was possible to estimate 
both a standard ECM and a dynamic cointegrating model for 
consumers' expenditure.
Building society mortgage rates were significant in the 
cointegrating equation and not the ECM, whilst bank base 
rates were significant in the ECM but not the cointegrating 
equation. Where the interest rates are significant in each 
equation they suggest that the interest elasticity has 
increased over time. The increase in interest elasticity of 
consumers' expenditure suggests that monetary control 
working through this route has become more powerful in the 
1980's. The evidence from the cointegrating equation tends 
to imply that the greater fluidity of mortgage interest 
rates and market-relatedness has led to consumers' 
expenditure becoming more sensitive to interest rates.
The standard ECM of personal sector debt contains 
income, inflation, interest rate, and mortgage rationing 
variables. A simulation using the above equation implied 
that credit liberalization provided an additional 5-10% per 
quarter to personal sector debt, although it appears that 
from 1983 quarter two onwards the actual amount of personal 
sector debt was lower than that desired. There are however,
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doubts as to the robustness of the credit equation, given 
that it was not possible to estimate a corresponding dynamic 
cointegrating model. It is not therefore possible to draw 
conclusions from the results as to the stock effects of the 




This thesis has provided an analysis of the efficiency
of monetary control in relation to the activities of
building societies and banks. The central thematic core has
been that the application of monetary control cannot be
separated from the financial system within which it operates
and the intermediation activities of the financial
institutions that make up that system. An attempt has been
made to re-emphasize the importance of an institutionalist
approach to monetary control which reneges against the
predominant assumption of the passivity of financial
institutions and a static financial system. Indeed, direct
parallels have been drawn between the warnings of the
institutionalist school over two decades ago that financial
innovation reduces the efficiency of monetary control and
the recent concern expressed by the monetary authorities
over the effects of a changing financial system.
The importance of the institutional system to the
manner in which monetary control is conducted cannot be
over-emphasized,
"The choice of monetary policy instruments and the 
evolution of the financial system are inextricably 
inter-related. The relative importance of banks in 
total financial intermediation, the size of the 
financial market, the barriers to entry into banking, 
the pace and extent of financial innovation, the nature 
of bank competition and conceptions about how banks 
react to the use of different policy weapons determine 
the types of instruments that are given prominence as 
well as the way they are designed and used".
(Bingham 1985, pl03)
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Chapter Two analysed the central tenets of monetarism 
and monetary control, and contrasted these with the opposing 
Keynesian school. The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a monetarist policy of control of the money supply were 
specified, as was the Keynesian view as to the conduct of 
monetary policy.
Specifically, it was noted that if monetary aggregates 
are to be controlled as part of a money supply targeting 
strategy it is a necessity that there is a reasonably stable 
relationship between the policy instrument and the monetary 
aggregate(s) targeted, a reasonably stable relationship 
between the monetary aggregate(s) and the ultimate goal, and 
a stable demand for money function. An attempt was made to 
re-evaluate these traditional paradigms of monetary 
economics in terms of the increasing recognition of the 
importance of the financial system to monetary control.
The analysis of the forces determining financial 
innovation and change by the building societies and banks 
emphasized the crucial role of regulations, monetary control 
and the cartel as major constraints and major catalysts. 
Asymmetric monetary controls, placed on the banking system 
in the 1970's but not on the building societies, have been 
important in shaping the activities of banks and building 
societies, and hence a major determinant of both the nature 
of competition between these financial institutions and the 
level of financial innovation.
Specific attention was paid to the interaction between 
the monetary authorities' changes in regulations and
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monetary controls, and the innovatory activities of building 
societies and banks. It has been emphasized that official 
actions that induce changes in regulatory and monetary 
control provisions rarely have a neutral effect upon the 
structure and operations of financial institutions.
The importance of the mutuality of the building society 
industry and the recommended rate system have been 
emphasized in terms of the manner in which these 
institutional factors shaped the nature of competition 
between the mix of price and nonOprice elements, and hence 
provided a constraint to financial innovation. The cartel 
had a major effect on the type of competition between banks 
and building societies and on the level of financial 
innovation. Price competition was effectively ruled out as a 
change in interest rates was only carried out by all 
building societies as a group.
It was pointed out that the operation of the building 
societies' cartel had the effect of smoothing building 
society interest rates, and created an ex cess demand for 
mortgages that tended to vary with changes in general 
interest rates. The lag in the building society deposit and 
mortgage interest rates created high excess demand for 
mortgages when general interest rates were rising, and non­
price rationing devices were used to limit mortgage supply. 
When general market rates were falling, deposit inflows to 
building societies were strong, and mortgage rationing fell. 
When the cartel was in operation there was thus a limited 
role for the price of mortgages in determining the supply of
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mortgages. It was maintained that the abolition of the 
cartel would lead to more market related mortgage rates, 
and greater importance of the price of mortgages in 
equilibriating the supply and demand for house purchase 
loans.
Portfolio monetary controls on the banking system in 
the 1970's effectively inhibited the banks from competing 
for personal sector deposits or from entering the mortgage 
market on a large scale. The building societies cartel could 
only really be operational in combination with this 
asymmetry of monetary control. Lack of competition for 
personal sector deposits was reflected in the homogeneous 
and simple nature of building society and bank accounts.
The abandonment of distorting portfolio monetary 
controls on the retail banking sector allowed them to re­
distribute their portfolios towards mortgage lending, 
increasing the level of competition in this sector and 
precipitating the breakdown of the building societies 
interest rate cartel. The cartel had maintained the building 
society's deposit and mortgage interest rates below market 
clearing levels. Increased competition and the abandonment 
of the cartel did indeed lead to a change in the interest 
rate policies of the building societies. Building society 
interest rates have also become less sticky and tend to be 
market-related.
It was argued that the abolition of the cartel would 
have finite stock effects which wouid affect the 
interpretation of monetary conditions. It was maintained
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that credit liberalisation after the ending of the 
recommended rate system would result in a finite portfolio 
reallocation by the personal sector to regain its desired 
credit position. This would be expected to cause problems of 
interpretation of the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates during the period when the stock adjustments 
occurred, but would not be expected to be a long term 
problem for monetary control. It would also be expected that 
the relationships between credit and income, and money and 
income may be altered in the interim, but may settle down to 
a steady state.
Financial innovations by building societies and banks 
in terms of interest bearing transactions balances would, it 
was argued, be expected to produce stock effects which may 
cause fast growth of one or more monetary aggregates, and 
alter the money-income relationship as balances are moved 
into the new innovatory accounts. In the long term, however, 
it would be expected that the money-income relationship 
would stabilise.
The Radcliffe Report (1959) first drew attention to the 
significance of non-bank financial intermediaries in 
relation to the operation of monetary control. The Report 
argued that spending decisions are affected by the broad 
liquidity position of wealth holders, rather than the 
possession of money balances (paragraph 389). It concluded 
that the existence of non-bank financial intermediaries and 
money substitutes makes the relationship between the money 
stock and the level of expenditures on goods, services and
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real assets more uncertain. Now, almost thirty years after 
the deliberations of the Radcliffe Committee, developments 
within the UK financial system (and in particular in 
relation to the activities of retail financial 
intermediaries) have reached the stage whereby the 
distinction between bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries is largely academic in respect of many 
aspects of the provision of financial services.
An analysis of the effects of financial innovation on 
the definition of money in Chapter Five points to the 
conclusion that it is no longer possible to distinguish 
between balances that are for purely transactions or purely 
investment purposes. This has tended to confuse 
interpretation of monetary conditions.
The analysis of Chapter Five suggested that the stock 
effects of the desire on the part of the personal sector to 
hold high interest easy access accounts within their 
portfolios has been a major determinant of the change in the 
money-income relationship as evidenced by the fall in the 
velocity of circulation of broad money since 1980.
The credit market was analysed in Chapter Six in terms 
of finite stock effects and the effects on the growth rates 
of the monetary aggregates relative to nominal incomes. The 
effect of credit liberalization of the mortgage market after 
the ending of the cartel upon the growth of the monetary 
aggregates was examined. It appears that the credit side 
shock of mortgage lending led to a large number of last time 
sellers, who willingly held their balances in the form of
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interest bearing money. This seems to be part of the 
explanation of the fall in the income velocity of 
circulation of the broad monetary aggregates. Removal of 
direct monetary constraints allowed a portfolio re­
allocation on the part of the personal sector in both money 
balances and credit. Both were increased faster than nominal 
incomes to adjust to the portfolio allocation position that 
would have been previously preferred. In turn, the credit 
shock did not lead to holdings of unwanted balances as would 
be expected under Buffer Stock models.
It has been noted that buffer-stock theorists have 
explained early instability in demand for broad money 
functions as being the result of the NBPs being 'forced-off1 
its demand for money function. This theory may have been 
relevant for the 1970's, but it has been argued that it is 
not applicable to the 1980's. Financial innovation by 
building societies and banks that has introduced financial 
instruments which offer market related rates of interest 
means that at the time of credit side shocks, money balances 
are willingly held, rather than being slowly spent over a 
period of time. This was particularly the case after the 
banks entered the mortgage market in the 1980's.
The usual duality between the views of endogeneity and 
exogeneity appear to be a function of the manner in which 
financial institutions operate, which in turn is heavily 
dependent upon the panoply of constraints which characterize 
the market environment at any point in time. The ability of 
building societies and banks to operate as price setters and
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quantity takers depends largely upon the degree and nature 
of regulatory and monetary controls adopted by the monetary 
authorities. If they are able to operate as price setters 
and quantity takers, then the money supply process, it is 
argued, is essentially an endogenous phenomena. This implies 
that the money supply is demand-driven or credit-driven when 
financial institutions are able to operate in this manner. 
Given that financial institutions have not always had the 
opportunity to act as price setters and quantity takers, it 
appears that the money supply process may at times be 
exogenous, and at times endogenous, depending upon the 
specific market environment and the institutional activities 
appertaining at the time.
Alternative monetary control techniques were surveyed 
in Chapter Seven, and particular attention paid to the 
ability of the monetary authorities to control the money 
supply through the manipulation of interest rates.
It was argued that in addition to causing stock 
effects, the abolition of the cartel would also have 
produced more continuing effects. It was hypothesized that 
the greater fluidity of mortgage interest rates and the 
increased debt to income ratio of the personal sector have 
resulted in an increase in the interest elasticity of 
consumers' expenditure (although these factors are difficult 
to separate).
This would mean an increase in effectiveness of 
monetary control working through interest rates, other 
things being equal.
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It was also hypothesized that interest bearing 
transactions balances would lead to a reduction in the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money. This would mean 
that the ability of the monetary authorities to control the 
money supply through the demand side (which is not their 
stated intention) by inducing money holders into alternative 
interest bearing assets by increasing interest rates - would 
be reduced.
It has also been argued that the building society 
developments analysed have not in fact altered the technical 
capacity of monetary base control. If the authorities can 
control the reserve base, tnen there is no reason to suggest 
that financial innovation and credit liberalisation would 
affect the manner in which MBC works. It is widely held that 
the effectiveness of MBC depends ultimately on the response 
of the demand for credit to interest rates. Financial 
innovation and change does not alter this argument.
In fact, it is possible (although difficult to show 
empirically, and an attempt is out of the scope of this 
thesis) that MBC may be more effective as a result of 
financial innovation and competition eroding the banks' 
endowment effect. It may not be now so profitable for banks 
to push up deposit and loan rates to attract funds to swap 
for reserves, as a greater proportion of deposits pay 
interest than previously. This is certainly an area for 
further research.
The standard error-correction demand for money function 
specified for M4 in Chapter Nine has provided some
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interesting insights. It would appear to show that if 
financial innovation in the form of interest-bearing easily 
accessible balances is explicitly taken into account in the 
equation, then it is possible to specify a relatively robust 
and stable function. Dropping the own rate terms led to 
instability of the equation and poor forecasting, indicating 
the importance of these factors to the overall model 
specification, and on this evidence confirming the 
hypothesis that financial innovation has been responsible 
for the breakdown of the demand for money function. The 
hypothesis that the demand for money has become insensitive 
to the general rate of interest was evaluated, with 
variables that both included and excluded the expected 
capital gains to gilts. There does not appear to be a 
relationship between the demand for money and the return to 
gilts in the period 1969 to 1986 or in any of the sub­
periods investigated. This does not, of course, rule out 
model mis-specification, although it does appear to indicate 
that the null hypothesis should be accepted. It should be 
noted that this result is in direct contra-distinction to 
that of Grice and Bennett (1981, 1984), although their own 
doubts as to the robustness of their model cannot be 
ignored.
The hypothesis that interest bearing money balances 
have reduced the interest elasticity of tne demand for money 
(and hence made the LM curve steeper) does appear to be 
sustainable according to the evidence from the error- 
correction model. There has been a substantial reduction in
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the interest elasticity of the demand for money since 1980. 
In terms of monetary control operating from the demand side 
this would tend to imply that an increase in interest rates 
will have a reduced effect in inducing money holders to 
switch into alternative interest bearing assets and would 
suggest a decline in the potency of this form of control.
The overall evidence from the demand for money models 
is somewhat mixed however. Significant interest rate effects 
were not found in the cointegrating equation for the demand 
for M4. This casts considerable doubt on the above findings, 
and it cannot be held that the interest elasticity of the 
demand for money has fallen, nor that financial innovation 
has led to a temporary change in the money-income 
relationship.
An alaysis of the continuing effects of the abolition 
of the cartel and flexible mortgage rates on the 
effectiveness of monetary control working through c o n s umers1 
expenditure was carried out. Using an error correction 
equation it was found that bank base rates were significant, 
but that mortgage rates were wrongly signed, whilst in the 
cointegrating equation mortgage rates were significant but 
bank base rates were not. Such findings are difficult to 
rationalise.
The evidence from both models suggests that the
iinterest elasticity of consumers expenditure has become more 
sensitive to at least one set of interest rates, and this is 
backed up by recently reported research. The specific 
evidence from the cointegrating equation, which is
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theoretically superior to the error-correction formulation, 
suggests that there has been a rise in the interest 
sensitivity of expenditure with respect to mortgage interest 
rates, and it is argued that this has been caused by more 
flexible and market related mortgage interest rates and 
greater debt to income ratios of the personal sector after 
the abolition of the cartel.
The personal sector's demand for credit function 
estimated in Chapter Ten was used to quantify the short-term 
stock effects of liberalization of credit conditions under 
the medium term financial strategy. The degree of mortgage 
rationing derived from a separate equation was used as a 
proxy for credit constraints on the personal sector. The 
results indicate a substantial portfolio re-adjustment on 
the part of the personal sector once constraints were 
removed, although the effects are not as great as those 
estimated by Johnston (1985). Particularly important was the 
increase in mortgage supply once the building societies' 
cartel was ended and the banks entered the mortgage market. 
The personal sector responded with a rapid growth in house 
purchase loans, a significant factor in the rapid growth of 
the broad monetary aggregates in the 1980's.
It was impossible however to find a suitable 
cointegrating formulation of the error-correction model, and 
the above results need to be treated with caution.
The New Libertarian School approach which maintains 
that control of the money supply is only feasible under a 
certain set of institutional conditions appears to be over-
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harsh in its attack upon the tenets of monetary control. Th 
e stability of the demand for M4 function would tend to 
militate against the more extreme assertions of the Legal 
Restrictions or Libertarian School, for the time being. In 
other words, this particular econometric relationship 
appears to have remained stable over a variety of regulatory 
regimes and under extensive financial innovation, which 
vitiates the claim that a stable demand function for money 
rests largely on various legal restrictions on money and 
financial institutions. This does not necessarily mean, of 
course, that further innovation and re-regulation will not 
bear out the Libertarian case. These results do seem to 
confirm Laidler's assertions as to the effects of financial 
innovation,
"Whatever its cause, that institutional change could 
affect the demand for money is an intuitively obvious 
idea, and yet early studies of the relationship seemed 
to demonstrate its stability independently of any 
consideration of this factor. In this respect, it is 
now clear that they were misleading".
(Laidler 1986, p6.)
Although a stable demand for money function has been 
estimated over the period 1969-86 after taking account of 
financial innovation, this has been done with a considerable 
degree of hindsight. At a time when institutional conditions 
are changing, and financial innovations being introduced, it 
is difficult for the monetary authorities to interpret 
events. As noted earlier, a correctly specified model may be 
able to capture the effects of financial innovation, but any 
model that maintains ex post forecasting performance and 
stability, but is incorrectly specified, may subsequently
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break down under further changing conditions,
"To say, after the event, that our policy did not work 
because new assets evolved whose existence affected the 
outcome of our policies in a way that we could have 
forecast had we only been able to foresee their 
invention, may be true, but it is not very helpful in 
enabling us to do better next time, unless the 
evolution in question was, as it sometimes can be, the 
predictable policy outcome of some policy action or 
o ther". (Laidler 1981 p4) 
The stock effects of the ending of the cartel and of 
financial innovation on the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates suggests that discretionary policy action is a 
necessity when such events occur. It may be necessary to 
rely on a variety of indicators in order to assess monetary 
conditions. These stock effects do not mean however that
interest rates will not be an effective form of monetary 
control.
Indeed, the evidence from the cointegrating equation 
implies that control by manipulating interest rates to 
influence ocnsumers expenditure has become a more powerful 
mode of monetary control.
Where does this leave the operation of monetary policy?
It appears that there have been major changes in the
rationale and operation of the MTFS as a result of the
effects of financial innovation, which would seem to suggest
a degree of discretion is necessary in policy actions, but
that interest rates are more a stronger form of control.
Currie (1987) has noted that there are some who maintain
that policy is turning full circle back into a fully
discretionary mode,
"Indeed, some have chosen to interpret recent policy 
pronouncements by the Chancellor as showing that the 
process of easing has gone so far that the MTFS 
provides little clear guidance as to future policy
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actions beyond a broad commitment to maintaining a low 
and declining inflation rate. There is, therefore, the 
possibility that further evolution will lead us back to 
total discretion in policy making albeit with inflation 
as an over-riding priority".
(PI)
That policy has to be discretionary, with regard to a 
variety of indicators, is backed up by the monetary 
authorities, who nevertheless argue that this represents 
very little deviation from the original modus operandi of 
the MTFS.
"The simple, easily understood, rule which a £M3 target 
represented was no doubt always an oversimplification. 
Indeed this was acknowledged, as the policy framework 
evolved, through the addition of further targets and 
the progressive elaboration of some of the many other 
factors necessarily ‘taken into account* in the real- 
world process of policy decision-making. In practice, 
little of substance has changed. The £M3 rule has never 
operated in a purely mechanical way: we have always 
been prepared to override its signals in the light of 
other, contrary, evidence on the state of monetary 
conditions".
(BEQB August 1987 p366) 
Further research might examine the effects of interest 
rates on sub-sections of the personal sector, in particular 
those individuals who are liquidity constrained and those 
who are not (Hubbard and Judd 1986). Another avenue of 
research is the development of new portfolio controls that 
could be placed on both banks and building societies, 
although the problem of distortion of the monetary 
aggregates through disintermediation cannot be 
underestimated. Finally, it should be emphasized that 
institutional change and innovation is an on-going process, 
and analysis of monetary developments cannot be divorced
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DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Demand for Money Equations
M4 = Money stock M4, seasonally unadjus ted,provided by
the Bank of England.
Y = Real GDP at factor cost, Economic Trends Annual
Supplement Table 9.
P = Implicit GDP deflator.
RT = Rate of Interest on 3 month Treasury Bills,
Financial Statistics Table 13.8.
RG = Rate of Interest on 20 year Gilts, Financial
Statistics, Table S7.
RS = Maximum rate of interest (net) on ordinary share
accounts and High-interest accounts at building 
societies (average rate over the ten largest 
societies). Building Societies Gazette.
ORD = Net rate of interest on Ordinary Share Accounts.
B.S.A. Bulletin and Compendium of Building Society 
Statistics, 6th Edition.
RB = Maximum rate of interest at banks, Financial
Statistics Table S7 and Midland Bank High Interest 
Account.
GFW = Gross Financial Wealth of the Non-Bank Private
Sector, Financial Statistics, Tables 14.1 and E.
RM = Rate on Mortgages (net of tax), B.S.A. Bulletin
and Compendium of Building Society Statistics, 6th 
Edition.
Capital Gains Equation:-
ED = Interest rate on three month Eurodollars,
Financial Statistics, Table 13.3
TFE = Total Final Expenditure, Economic Trends, Table
14.
NFW = Net Financial Wealth of the Non-Bank Private 
Sector, Financial Statistics, Tables E and 14.1.
P = Implicit Consumers' Deflator.
R = Yield on 2%% Consols, Financial Statistics, Table13.3
CG = Capital Gains on Gilts, Financial Times Index of
Gilt Prices.
r = Short rate of interest (3 month Treasury Bill
Rate) Financial Statistics, Table 13.8.
TD = Gross Financial Debt of the Personal Sector (Total 
Liabilities), Financial Statistics, Table S15.
ML = Total Flow of Mortgage Lending^Financial
Statistics, Table 14.4.
Y = RPDI = Real Personal Disposable Income,Economic
Trends Annual Supplement 1989, Table 5.
RMO = Rate of Interest on Building Society Mortgages
(net) measured as
(1 + (RM/100) - (In PC.^ - In PC_5))
RCB = Clearing Banks' Base Rate, measured as:-
(1 + (RCB/100) - (In PC.^ - In PC_5))
RMD = Minimum deposit rate on durables.
Mortgage Equation:-
M = Stock of Building Society Mortgages Outstanding,
Compendium of Building Society Statistics, Table 
A15.
PH = Average House Price at Mortgage Completion Stage
(all houses), Compendium of Building Society 
Statistics, Table D2.
Y = Personal Disposable Income (Current Prices)
Economic Trends, Annual Supplement 1988, Table 5.
P = Price Deflator for Consumers' Expenditure.
RCB = Clearing Banks base rate, Financial Statistics,
Table 13.15.
RM = Rate on Mortgages (net of tax) B.S.A. Bulletin and 
Compendium of Building Society Statistics, 6th 
Edi tion.
NFW = Net Financial Wealth of the Non-Bank Private 






Rate of Interest on 20 year Gilts, Financial 
Statistics, Table S7.
Expenditure Equation:-
Consumers* Expenditure on Durables (real) 1980 
prices, Economic Trends Annual Supplement 1988, 
Table 27.
Net Liquid Assets of the Personal Sector 
(Nominal), Financial Statistics, Tables 9.5 and 
10.3.
Consumers' Expenditure Deflator (durables) 1980=1 
Economic Trends Annual Supplement,1988.
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